Murphy v. City of Alameda
| Decision Date | 14 December 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. A056245,A056245 |
| Citation | 11 Cal.App.4th 906,14 Cal.Rptr.2d 329 |
| Parties | Edward J. MURPHY et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CITY OF ALAMEDA et al., Defendants and Respondents. |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
David A. Self, Stuart A. McIntosh, David A. Self & Associates, Oakland, for plaintiffs and appellants.
Douglas Y. Dang, Dang & Trachuk, Oakland, Carol Korade, City Atty., Alameda, for defendants and respondents.
Evidence Code section 669.5 requires that in any action challenging the validity of certain growth control ordinances, the city or county enacting the ordinance must bear the burden of proof that the ordinance is "necessary for the protection of the public health, safety, or welfare" of its population. 1 The question in this appeal is whether section 669.5 is applicable in an action attacking a city charter amendment adopted by initiative and an ordinance implementing the amendment, both enacted
before the effective date of the statute. We conclude that the statute applies, reverse the judgment, and remand for trial.
In March 1973 the voters of the City of Alameda (the City) amended its charter with a policy declaration that no multiple dwelling units should be built in the City, except for the replacement of certain existing low cost housing units and a proposed senior citizens low cost housing complex. (Alameda City Charter, art. XXVI, §§ 26-1, 26-2.) The City Council implemented the charter amendment, which was commonly known as Measure A, by adding to the Municipal Code chapter 4 of title 11 (the ordinance). The ordinance defines the prohibited multiple dwelling unit as a residential building to be used by three or more families or living groups, living independently of each other. (Alameda Mun.Code, tit. XI, ch. 4, § 11-421(b).)
In 1987 plaintiffs Edward J. Murphy, Madlyn K. Murphy, and Elisabeth Lillie filed an amended complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief against the City and others; their first two counts attacked Measure A and the ordinance as unconstitutional.
Plaintiffs moved for summary adjudication of issues, seeking a determination that section 669.5, which became effective in January 1981, applied to those counts. The trial court found no indication that the Legislature intended the statute to be retroactive and concluded it did not apply. Thereafter, the parties stipulated to entry of judgment in favor of defendants to permit an appeal by plaintiffs; the parties agreed that should the trial court's ruling on section 669.5 be reversed, a trial on the merits would be required. Judgment pursuant to the stipulation was entered in favor of defendants. The foregoing procedure to facilitate plaintiffs' appeal was patterned after that approved by the Supreme Court in Building Industry Assn. v. City of Camarillo (1986) 41 Cal.3d 810, 816-817, 226 Cal.Rptr. 81, 718 P.2d 68 (Camarillo ).
Under the traditional rule, a party challenging the constitutionality of an ordinance has the burden to present evidence and documentation that the legislation is not reasonably related to the public welfare of those whom it significantly affects. (See, e.g., Associated Home Builders etc., Inc. v. City of Livermore (1976) 18 Cal.3d 582, 607-610, 135 Cal.Rptr. 41, 557 P.2d 473.) With the enactment of section 669.5 in 1980, the Legislature intended as a matter of public policy to shift the burden of proof in actions challenging the validity of certain growth control ordinances to the proponents of those ordinances, to counteract unjustified limitations on the supply of local housing sufficient to meet the local entity's share of regional housing needs. (Camarillo, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 818, 226 Cal.Rptr. 81, 718 P.2d 68; see also Stats.1980, ch. 1144, § 1, p. 3703.)
Section 669.5 provides in relevant part: (Emphasis added.)
Underlying the trial court's ruling is its assumption that application of section 669.5 in this case would give the statute retroactive effect. Plaintiffs disagree, arguing that the statute concerns rules of evidence at future trials and is therefore prospective.
Courts have consistently recognized the principle that a new statute addressing the conduct of trials may actually be prospective in nature when applied to a trial occurring after its effective date, even though the trial deals with facts existing prior to that date. (Tapia v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 282, 288-291, 279 Cal.Rptr. 592, 807 P.2d 434; Hogan v. Ingold (1952) 38 Cal.2d 802, 812, 243 P.2d 1; Estate of Patterson (1909) 155 Cal. 626, 638, 102 P. 941; Republic Corp. v. Superior Court (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 1253, 1257, 207 Cal.Rptr. 241; Strauch v. Superior Court (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 45, 48-49, 165 Cal.Rptr. 552.) The operation of such a statute is prospective because it does not deprive a person of any right which he or she had at the time of the commencement of the suit, but instead only prescribes the conditions upon which the suit may be brought and maintained. (Hogan v. Ingold, supra, at p. 812, 243 P.2d 1.)
This principle does not include statutes which do not simply address the conduct of trials, but which change the legal consequences of the parties' past conduct, as by imposing new and different liabilities based on that conduct. Although courts at times use the terms "substantive" and "procedural" to determine whether a statute alters the legal consequences of past events, what is important is the law's effect, not its label or form. (Tapia v. Superior Court, supra, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 288-291, 279 Cal.Rptr. 592.) A statute which takes a seemingly procedural form and uses evidentiary language concerning burdens of proof may in effect alter or destroy a preexisting substantive right by imposing an evidentiary requirement with which it is impossible to comply. (See, e.g., In re Marriage of Buol (1985) 39 Cal.3d 751, 756-760, 218 Cal.Rptr. 31, 705 P.2d 354; see also Morris v. Pacific Electric Ry. Co. (1935) 2 Cal.2d 764, 768, 43 P.2d 276 [].)
Defendants argue that application of section 669.5 to this action would change the legal consequences of past events because the City would have to prove that regional housing needs were balanced against the City's need for Measure A and the ordinance when they were enacted in 1973. Meeting that burden would be impossible, defendants claim, because at that time cities were not obliged to consider regional housing needs in their local planning. (See generally, Gov.Code, § 65580 et seq.)
The most obvious flaw in defendants' argument is its premise that application of section 669.5 would require proof of circumstances in 1973. The statute directs that in any action challenging the validity of a growth control ordinance, the city or county shall bear the burden of proof that the ordinance "is" necessary, not that it was necessary at the time it was enacted. As applied in that manner, the statute does not invalidate previously enacted ordinances; instead, it simply subjects such ordinances to a presumption of impact on the housing supply and places on the local Because section 669.5 addresses the conduct of trials and does not change the legal consequences of the parties' past conduct, its operation is prospective; therefore, the trial court erred in concluding it was inapplicable in this action.
entity a new burden of proof. (See Camarillo, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 822, 226 Cal.Rptr. 81, 718 P.2d 68; Building Industry Assn. v. Superior Court (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 277, 292, 259 Cal.Rptr. 325, disapproved on other grounds in Lesher Communications, Inc. v. City of Walnut [11 Cal.App.4th 913] Creek (1990) 52 Cal.3d 531, 545-546, 277 Cal.Rptr. 1, 802 P.2d 317.) The presumption is not irrebuttable, and the evidentiary requirement is not...To continue reading
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