Murphy v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd.

Decision Date31 August 2012
Docket NumberSJC–11045.
Citation463 Mass. 333,974 N.E.2d 46
PartiesErnest B. MURPHY v. CONTRIBUTORY RETIREMENT APPEAL BOARD & another.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

James E. O'Connell, Jr., Boston (Philip F. Coppinger with him) for the plaintiff.

David R. Marks, Assistant Attorney General, for the defendants.

Present: IRELAND, C.J., SPINA, CORDY, BOTSFORD, DUFFLY, & LENK, JJ.

SPINA, J.

Ernest B. Murphy was employed by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts as a Superior Court judge for approximately eight years. Following the publication of libelous articles in the Boston Herald newspaper about Judge Murphy's performance of his judicial duties, and his subsequent receipt of hate mail and death threats, Judge Murphy was diagnosed with posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), major depressive disorder, and various physical ailments brought on by his emotional distress. Eventually, he was unable to continue performing the essential duties of his job. The State Board of Retirement (board) rejected his application for accidental disability retirement benefits pursuant to G.L. c. 32, § 7, and this denial was upheld by the Contributory Retirement Appeal Board (CRAB). Judge Murphy filed a timely complaint for judicial review under G.L. c. 30A, § 14, in the Superior Court. Shortly thereafter, he filed a petitionin the county court pursuant to G.L. c. 213, § 1A, and G.L. c. 211, §§ 4A and 14, requesting that the matter be transferred to this court. A single justice allowed the petition, ordered that the matter be transferred to the county court, and then reserved and reported the case without decision to the full court.

At issue is whether Judge Murphy is entitled to receive accidental disability retirement benefits on the grounds that he is permanently disabled from performing the essential duties of his job “by reason of a personal injury sustained or a hazard undergone as a result of, and while in the performance of, his duties at some definite place and at some definite time.” G.L. c. 32, § 7(1). We conclude that Judge Murphy is not entitled to receive such benefits because he failed to satisfy his burden of proving that the personal injury that resulted in his permanent disability was sustained while he was performing his judicial duties.

1. Statutory scheme. Before considering the specific facts of this case, we begin with a brief statutory overview. General Laws c. 32 governs retirement systems and pensions in the Commonwealth. Section 7(1) of G.L. c. 32 provides, in pertinent part:

“Any member in service ... who is unable to perform the essential duties of his job and ... such inability is likely to be permanent before attaining the maximum age for his group by reason of a personal injury sustained or a hazard undergone as a result of, and while in the performance of, his duties at some definite place and at some definite time on or after the date of his becoming a member ... shall be retired for accidental disability ...” (emphasis added).

A “member in service” is “any employee included in the state employees' retirement system,” G.L. c. 32, § 1, “who is regularly employed in the performance of his duties.” G.L. c. 32, § 3(1) ( a ) (i).

Once an application for accidental disability retirement benefits is filed by a member in service, a [r]egional medical panel comprised of three physicians is convened to examine the member, review the pertinent facts in the case, and determine the member's medical condition. See G.L. c. 32, §§ 1, 6(3) ( a ). The panel shall certify to the appropriate retirement board in writing whether “such physicians on said panel find that [the] member is mentally or physically incapacitated for further duty and that such incapacity is likely to be permanent.” G.L. c. 32, § 6(3) ( a ). In addition, the panel shall state “whether or not the disability is such as might be the natural and proximate result of the accident or hazard undergone on account of which retirement is claimed under [G.L. c. 32, § 7].” 2Id. A medical panel's certificate is not conclusive regarding the ultimate fact of a causal connection, but it represents some evidence on the issue. See Wakefield Contributory Retirement Bd. v.Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 352 Mass. 499, 502–503, 226 N.E.2d 245 (1967); Blanchette v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 20 Mass.App.Ct. 479, 483, 481 N.E.2d 216 (1985); Shrewsbury Retirement Bd. v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 5 Mass.App.Ct. 379, 381, 363 N.E.2d 299 (1977). Accidental disability retirement benefits are not allowed unless the appropriate retirement board finds, after its review of the relevant evidence, including the medical panel's certificate of incapacity, and after a review by the public employee retirement administration commission, that “such member is unable to perform the essential duties of his job and that such inability is likely to be permanent, and that he should be so retired.” G.L. c. 32, § 7(1). See Lisbon v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 41 Mass.App.Ct. 246, 254–255, 670 N.E.2d 392 (1996) (local retirement board, not medical panel, vested with authority to determine whether accidental disability retirement benefits are warranted); Noone v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 34 Mass.App.Ct. 756, 762, 616 N.E.2d 126 (1993). Generally speaking, a retirement board shall make a final determination on accidental disability retirement benefits within 180 days of the date on which the member's application was filed. See G.L. c. 32, § 7(6).

Any person aggrieved by the decision of a retirement board can appeal that decision to CRAB. See G.L. c. 32, § 16(4). Once an appeal reaches CRAB, the findings of the local retirement board are “of no particular significance.” Namay v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 19 Mass.App.Ct. 456, 461, 475 N.E.2d 419 (1985). CRAB assigns the appeal to the division of administrative law appeals (DALA) for a hearing. See G.L. c. 32, § 16 (4). After a hearing before an administrative magistrate, DALA is to submit to the parties a written decision that is final and binding on the retirement board involved and on all other parties, unless a party objects to such decision in writing to CRAB, or CRAB orders the retirement board to review the decision and take such further action as is appropriate. See id. CRAB then is to “pass upon” the appeal within six months after the conclusion of the hearing, and its decision “shall be final and binding upon the board involved and upon all other parties.” Id.

CRAB is not bound by the DALA administrative magistrate's recommendation. See Blanchette v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., supra at 483 n. 2, 481 N.E.2d 216;Vinal v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 13 Mass.App.Ct. 85, 101–102, 430 N.E.2d 440 (1982). Nonetheless, all subsidiary findings made by the magistrate are entitled to “some deference” by CRAB, and those findings that are based on credibility determinations by the magistrate are entitled to “substantial deference.” Id. at 101, 430 N.E.2d 440. See Morris v. Board of Registration in Med., 405 Mass. 103, 110–111, 539 N.E.2d 50, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 977, 110 S.Ct. 503, 107 L.Ed.2d 506 (1989). To the extent that CRAB rejects the magistrate's resolution of credibility questions, CRAB's decision should contain “a considered articulation of the reasons underlyingthat rejection.” Vinal v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., supra at 102, 430 N.E.2d 440. See Lisbon v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., supra at 252–253, 670 N.E.2d 392 (“The only occasion requiring agency explanation for its disagreement with a hearing officer's findings arises when those findings are based upon live witness testimony and credibility determinations made thereon”). See also Morris v. Board of Registration in Med., supra at 111, 539 N.E.2d 50. Ultimately, the final determination regarding whether an applicant for accidental disability retirement benefits has proved a causal relationship between his permanent disability and a personal injury sustained “as a result of, and while in the performance of,” his employment duties, G.L. c. 32, § 7(1), is the province of CRAB, “based on the facts found and all the underlying evidence, including both the medical and nonmedical facts.” Blanchette v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., supra at 483, 481 N.E.2d 216. See Lisbon v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., supra at 254, 670 N.E.2d 392. The findings of CRAB, if supported by substantial evidence, will be determinative. See Namay v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., supra. Once CRAB issues its decision, a party may seek judicial review of that decision in the Superior Court pursuant to G.L. c. 30A, § 14. See id. at 462, 475 N.E.2d 419.

2. Factual and procedural background. We summarize the facts found by the administrative magistrate with some supplementation from the record. See Blanchette v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., supra at 480, 481 N.E.2d 216. CRAB drew its abbreviated statement of the facts from the magistrate's detailed findings, which CRAB incorporated by reference, as well as from the exhibits and facts stipulated to by the parties before DALA.

In September, 2000, Judge Murphy was appointed to serve as an Associate Justice of the Superior Court, and consequently, he became a member of the State employees' retirement system. At the time of his appointment, Judge Murphy was in “good psychological health” and “good overall physical health.”

Beginning on February 13, 2002, the Boston Herald newspaper published several articles written by its reporter, David Wedge, that were sharply critical of Judge Murphy's performance of his judicial duties. The articles set forth “sweeping allegations of his incompetence to sit on criminal cases, his bias toward defendants, and his open hostility to victims and prosecutors.” On March 7, with the approval and encouragement of his editors, Wedge appeared as a guest on the televised talk show “The O'Reilly...

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