Murphy v. Harpstead

• Decision Date: 27 September 2019
• Docket Number: Civil No. 16-2623 (DWF/BRT)
• Citation: 421 F.Supp.3d 695
• Parties: Tenner MURPHY, BY his guardian Kay MURPHY; Marrie Bottelson; Dionne Swanson; and on behalf of others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Jodi HARPSTEAD, in her capacity as Commissioner of The Minnesota Department of Human Services, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota

421 F.Supp.3d 695

Tenner MURPHY, BY his guardian Kay MURPHY; Marrie Bottelson; Dionne Swanson; and on behalf of others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,

v.Jodi HARPSTEAD, in her capacity as Commissioner of The Minnesota Department of Human Services, Defendant.

Civil No. 16-2623 (DWF/BRT)

United States District Court, D. Minnesota.

Signed September 27, 2019

Joseph W. Anthony, Esq., Peter McElligott, Esq., and Steven M. Pincus, Esq., Anthony Ostlund Baer & Louwagie PA; Laura Farley, Esq., and Steven Andrew Smith, Esq., Nicholas Kaster PLLP; Barnett I. Rosenfeld, Esq., and Justin H. Perl, Esq., Mid-Minnesota Legal Aid; Eren Ernest Sutherland, Esq., Justin M. Page, Esq., and Steven C. Schmidt, Esq., Mid-Minnesota Legal Aid, Minnesota Disability Law Center, counsel for Plaintiffs.

Aaron Winter, Brandon L. Boese, Janine Wetzel Kimble, and Scott H. Ikeda, Assistant Attorneys General, Minnesota Attorney General's Office, counsel for Defendant.

Pari McGarraugh, Esq., and Samuel D. Orbovich, Esq., Fredrikson & Byron, counsel for amicus ARRM.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

DONOVAN W. FRANK, United States District Judge

INTRODUCTION

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment (Doc. No. 495), and Defendant's motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 480). For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants in part and denies in part Plaintiffs' motion, and denies Defendant's motion.

BACKGROUND

I. Factual Background

The Court previously detailed the background of this case in its May 18, 2017 Memorandum Opinion and Order (Doc. No. 54 ("May 2017 Order")) and the Court only briefly summarizes the facts here.¹ In short, Plaintiffs are individuals with disabilities and Medicaid recipients who receive Home and Community Based Disability Waivers ("Disability Waivers") from the State of Minnesota under the direction of Defendant Jodi Harpstead ("Defendant"), Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Human Services ("DHS").² Plaintiffs reside, or did reside,³ in Community Residential Setting ("CRS") facilities, known as corporate adult foster care ("CFC")⁴ —and wish to access various individualized housing services available under the Disability Waivers to pursue more integrated housing options ("IHO").⁵ Plaintiffs assert that CFC facilities isolate and segregate them from their communities in violation of federal law.

Plaintiffs assert the following claims against Commissioner Jodi Harpstead in her official capacity: (1) failure to furnish Medicaid services with reasonable promptness under 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8), enforced under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count I); (2) violation of Plaintiffs' Due Process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and the Medicaid Act's advance notice and fair hearing requirements, enforced under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count II); (3) violation of Title II of the ADA (Count III); and (4) violation of § 504 of the RA (Count IV). (Doc. No. 33 ("Am. Compl.") ¶¶ 1-32.)

Plaintiffs assert their claims on behalf of themselves and a Class of similarly situated individuals. (See id. ¶¶ 92-101.) Plaintiffs assert that they and the Class "have a common remedy: modifications to Defendant's residential service system to provide individuals with choices and prevent needless segregation of individuals in segregated residential settings." (Id. ¶ 101.) Plaintiffs seek "access to Waiver services that will allow them to plan, explore options, and ultimately move out of their CFC facilities and into the most integrated setting appropriate to their needs." (Doc. No. 499 ("Pl. Memo.") at 3-4 (citing Pl. Resp. to Interrog. at 266-269).) Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief to remedy Defendants' alleged violations of the law, attorney fees and costs, and other relief deemed necessary to protect the rights of Plaintiffs and the Class. (See Am. Compl. at Prayer for Relief ¶¶ 2-6.)

Specifically, Plaintiffs seek declaratory judgment that: (1) Defendant is violating the Medicaid Act by not providing services with reasonable promptness and violating Plaintiffs' Constitutional and Medicaid due process rights; and (2) Defendant is violating the ADA and RA by segregating Plaintiffs "while failing to provide them with individualized housing services for which they are eligible." (Id. at Prayer for Relief ¶¶ 2-3.)

Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief requiring Defendant to: (1) "[p]romptly ensure every Disability Waiver recipient living in a CRS facility receives notice about eligibility for and access to individualized housing services, including person-centered planning;" (2) "[s]pecifically provide access and take prompt steps to make individualized housing services, including person-centered planning, available to Plaintiffs in a reasonable amount of time ..."; and (3) "[t]ake such other steps as necessary to enable Plaintiffs to receive residential services in the most integrated setting appropriate to their needs ..." (Id. at Prayer for Relief ¶ 4.) Under items (2) and (3), above, Plaintiffs identify in detail the proposed relief they seek to modify the state's residential service system. (Id. at Prayer for Relief ¶¶ 4(b)-4(c).)

Defendant contends that of the 45,438 Disability Waiver recipients in 2018, only 31% lived in CFC facilities, and only 1.3% of those living in CFC facilities are putative class members.⁶ (Def. Memo. at 9, 48.) Accordingly, she argues that she is not over-relying on CFC facilities, nor do her policies prevent individuals from moving to their preferred setting. She further contends that her policies and practices comply with federal law, and to the extent any alleged harm has occurred, she may not be held liable in her official capacity.

II. Procedural History

Plaintiffs filed an initial complaint against Defendant and Minnesota Department of Human Services ("DHS) (collectively, "Defendants") on August 3, 2016. (Doc. No. 1.) Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint on September 14, 2016. (Doc. No. 10.) On May 18, 2017, the Court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss insofar as it sought dismissal of DHS as a party and denied the motion in all other respects.⁷ (May 2017 Order.)

Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint on February 23, 2017. (Am. Compl.) On February 27, 2017, Plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification. (Doc. No. 35.) On September 29, 2017, the Court granted Plaintiffs' motion for class certification, certifying the following class: "All individuals age 18 and older who are eligible for and have received a Disability Waiver, live in a licensed Community Residential Setting, and have not been given the choice and opportunity to reside in the most integrated residential setting appropriate to their needs." (Doc. No. 99 at 35.)

On November 15, 2018, Plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment on Count II of their Amended Complaint, asking the Court to declare that Defendant's current notice policy for Disability Waiver recipients violates federal law. (See Pl. Memo.) On the same day, Defendant also moved for summary judgment, asking the Court to grant summary judgment in her favor on all of Plaintiffs' claims. (See Def. Memo.) Also on November 15, 2018, Defendant filed a motion to decertify the class (Doc. No. 418), and both parties moved to exclude expert testimony (Doc. Nos. 468, 488). The Court held a hearing on the motions on January 25, 2019. (Doc. No. 623.) The Court delayed ruling on the motions pending settlement discussions that ultimately proved unsuccessful. (Doc. No. 636.)

On July 26, 2019, the Court denied Defendants' motion to decertify the class. (Doc. No. 640 ("July 2019 Order").) On August 6, 2019, Defendants requested permission for leave to file a motion for reconsideration of the July 2019 Order. (Doc. No. 642 ("Request").) The Court denied Defendant's Request on August 14, 2019. (Doc. No. 646.)

On August 7, 2019, the Court granted Plaintiffs' motion to exclude the expert testimony of John Patterson, and denied Defendant's motion to exclude the expert testimony of David Michael Mank, Ph.D., and Dennis F. Price. (Doc. No. 644.)

The Court now considers Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment (Doc. No. 495) and Defendant's motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 480).

DISCUSSION

I. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate if the "movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Courts must view the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Weitz Co., LLC v. Lloyd's of London , 574 F.3d 885, 892 (8th Cir. 2009). However, "[s]ummary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed ‘to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.’ "

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 ).

The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Enter. Bank v. Magna Bank of Mo. , 92 F.3d 743, 747 (8th Cir. 1996). The nonmoving party must demonstrate the existence of specific facts in the record that create a genuine issue for trial. Krenik v. Cty. of Le Sueur , 47 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 1995). A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment "may not rest upon mere allegation or denials of his pleading, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

A. Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

Plaintiffs move for partial summary judgment on Count II of their Amended Complaint and ask the Court to declare that Defendant's current notice policy for Disability Waiver recipients violates federal law. (Pl. Memo. at 2.) Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that Defendan...