Murphy v. Morris, 87-2026

• Decision Date: 27 July 1988
• Docket Number: No. 87-2026,87-2026
• Citation: 849 F.2d 1101
• Parties: Michael D. MURPHY, Appellee, v. Terry D. MORRIS, Kelly Mescher, Appellants, and Unknown M.T.C.M. Mail Room Personnel.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 1101

849 F.2d 1101

Michael D. MURPHY, Appellee, v. Terry D. MORRIS, Kelly Mescher, Appellants and Unknown M.T.C.M. Mail Room Personnel.

No. 87-2026.

United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.

Submitted March 16, 1988.

Decided June 16, 1988.

Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied July 27, 1988.

Paul LaRose, Jefferson City, Mo., for appellants.

Daniel P. Card, II, St. Louis, Mo., for appellee.

Before McMILLIAN, WOLLMAN and BEAM, Circuit Judges.

BEAM, Circuit Judge.

Kelly Mescher, an assistant attorney general for the State of Missouri, appeals from the district court's denial of her motion to dismiss this action, brought by Michael Murphy, an inmate of the Missouri Department of Corrections, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. Mescher argues that the district court erred in concluding that she is not absolutely immune from suit for acts undertaken in defense of state officials in a prior section 1983 lawsuit brought by Murphy against the state and various state officials. We reverse.

BACKGROUND

This action arises, generally, out of civil litigation filed by Murphy in September of 1984 against the Missouri Department of Corrections and several of its officials. See Murphy v. Missouri Dep't of Corrections, 814 F.2d 1252 (8th Cir.1987). Mescher was the assistant attorney general assigned to defend the various state defendants in that case. During trial, Mescher offered into evidence a letter, written by Murphy, which letter purportedly identified Murphy as a member of a group known as the Aryan Brotherhood. In the instant case, Murphy asserts that Mescher obtained this letter by improperly diverting and copying mail received at the institution, and that its introduction into evidence in the prior civil proceeding violated his constitutional rights. Murphy alleges that Mescher conspired with various prison officials to obtain the letter and then to use it in the prior civil proceeding to impeach his credibility. According to his complaint, the letter was sent by Murphy to another inmate in the same institution, Chris Marshall. However, Murphy sent the letter to Mescher moved to dismiss the complaint, asserting that she is absolutely immune from suit for acts done in furtherance of her defense of the state in a section 1983 action. The district court denied the motion, and Mescher filed this appeal.

Marshall's mother, apparently to avoid limitations placed upon intrainstitutional mail, with instructions to Mrs. Marshall to put the letter in a second envelope and mail it back to her son at the prison. Murphy alleges that the letter was copied when "received at the mailroom * * *, in the same envelope with letters from Mrs. Wanda Marshall of Tucson, Arizona, addressed to her son Chris J. Marshall, # 149616."

DISCUSSION

A. Appealability

Before reaching the merits of the appeal, we must first address Murphy's motion to dismiss the appeal, raised just prior to oral argument. Relying on a case recently decided by the First Circuit, Kaiter v. Town of Boxford, 836 F.2d 704 (1st Cir.1988), Murphy argues that because Mescher plans to raise the defense of qualified immunity if she is unsuccessful here, the requirements of the collateral order doctrine are not satisfied in this case, and it therefore must be dismissed as an improper interlocutory appeal. In Kaiter, the First Circuit concluded that the defenses of absolute and qualified immunity should be considered together, in a single interlocutory appeal. Id. at 708. The court determined that an appeal of just one of these claims, while the other remains reserved for later pretrial proceedings, fails to satisfy the threshold requirement of the collateral order doctrine as set forth in Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949), that the ruling appealed from fully dispose of the issue presented. Kaiter, 836 F.2d at 707. The court said that "the issue of immunity must be subject to one interlocutory appeal in order to establish the defendant's right to avoid trial altogether. There is no need to burden the appellate system and prolong the pretrial process with multiple interlocutory appeals * * *." Id.

Mescher, on the other hand, argues that the adoption of such a rule would thwart the purpose of the absolute immunity defense. She asserts that absolute immunity is a distinct legal doctrine, characterized by "its possessor's entitlement not to have to answer for his conduct in a civil damages action." Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2815, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985). In comparison with qualified immunity, which often requires at least a limited amount of discovery and is usually raised by a motion for summary judgment, absolute immunity, Mescher argues, can normally be addressed on the basis of the pleadings alone, through a motion to dismiss. ¹ Requiring the state to wait until a ruling has been obtained on qualified immunity before appealing an adverse decision on absolute immunity would purportedly subject the state to unnecessary and potentially extensive discovery proceedings, which the doctrine of absolute immunity, by its nature, is designed to prevent.

Mescher claims that the differences between the doctrines of qualified immunity and absolute immunity warrant a separate appeal, if necessary, to consider each defense. She urges rejection of the analysis employed in Kaiter.

We agree with Mescher that application of the rule set forth in Kaiter, while potentially easing the burden of multiple appeals, would undercut the value of the absolute immunity defense. Absolute immunity operates to protect appropriate defendants from exposure to the litigation process. Like qualified immunity, absolute immunity entitles its possessor to be free from suit, not simply from liability. Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526, 105 S.Ct. at 2815. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 742, 102 S.Ct. 2690, 2697, 73 L.Ed.2d 349 (1982). If public officials are required to wait to appeal an adverse decision regarding absolute immunity until the court has also ruled on the qualified immunity defense, one of the principal benefits of the absolute immunity defense, freedom from as many of the costs, risks and disruptions of the trial process as possible, would be lost. Whatever additional judicial time and effort is expended in addressing those cases requiring an appeal of both defenses is, in our opinion, time well spent if defendants with absolute immunity are to be protected from burdensome and harassing lawsuits. Thus, we respectfully decline to follow Kaiter, and shall proceed to address the merits of Mescher's appeal.

B. Absolute Immunity

The district court denied Mescher's motion to dismiss, apparently holding that absolute immunity is not available in any circumstance to a state assistant attorney general. Mescher argues that the district court's analysis espouses an improperly narrow view of the absolute immunity doctrine. We agree.

The Supreme Court has extended the doctrine of absolute immunity to encompass various participants in the judicial decisionmaking process, whose duties are deemed integral to the effective, independent operation of the judiciary. The Court has adopted a functional approach toward immunity questions, noting that "[t]he cluster of immunities protecting the various participants in judge-supervised trials stems from the characteristics of the judicial process rather than its location." Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 2913, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978). In Butz, the Court held that agency attorneys who introduce evidence and cross-examine witnesses in a government administrative proceeding are entitled to absolute immunity. The Court reasoned that without such protection, attorneys might hesitate to bring forward certain documents or witnesses, for fear of potential liability premised on the quality of the evidence introduced. Id. at 517, 98 S.Ct. at 2916. The Court analogized administrative proceedings to criminal prosecutions, and found the functional roles of participants in the administrative process similar to those of judicial personnel, and thus worthy of the same protections afforded to judicial personnel. See id. at 512-17, 98 S.Ct. at 2913-16.

Likewise, in Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 103 S.Ct. 1108, 75 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983), the Court extended the protection of absolute immunity to witnesses. The Court concluded that the rationale supporting absolute immunity for other participants in the judicial process applies with equal force to a testifying witness, since a witness's apprehension of subsequent damages liability might lead to a reluctance to testify, or once the witness takes the stand, untruthful testimony. Id. at 335-36, 103 S.Ct. at 1115-16. The Court examined historical common law immunities for participants in judicial proceedings and concluded that "the common law provided absolute immunity from subsequent damages liability for all persons--governmental or otherwise--who were integral parts of the judicial process." Id. at 335, 103 S.Ct. at 1115. Approaching the issue in a functional manner, as envisioned by Butz, the Court found that witnesses do represent an "integral part" of the judicial process, and that witnesses are, therefore, absolutely immune from suit. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427, 96 S.Ct. 984, 993, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976) (Absolute immunity extended to We believe that the analysis set forth in Butz and Briscoe is of equal applicability to the advocacy functions of a state assistant attorney general...