Murphy v. Murphy (In re Murphy's Estate), 42301.
| Decision Date | 13 February 1934 |
| Docket Number | No. 42301.,42301. |
| Citation | 252 N.W. 523,217 Iowa 1291 |
| Parties | In re MURPHY'S ESTATE. MURPHY et al. v. MURPHY et al. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from District Court, Monona County; F. H. Rice, Judge.
Action to cancel and set aside an order in probate. Plaintiff's petition was dismissed, and they appeal.
Affirmed.Gill & Gill, of Sioux City, and Geo. E. Allen, of Onawa, for appellants.
Prichard & Prichard, of Onawa, for appellees.
John R. Murphy, a resident of this state, on November 16, 1931, died testate. On December 31, 1932, the court, in pursuance of a stipulation signed by all of the beneficiaries named in the will, denied its admission to probate.
This action, which was tried in equity, is to set aside and cancel the order thus made. The grounds upon which this relief is sought will be stated a little later in the opinion. The will was duly presented and filed in the office of the clerk of the district court of Monona county on November 18, 1931. The stipulation of the beneficiaries, who are the heirs at law of the testator, under the will, which constituted the basis for the court's action denying probate of the will, was filed in the office of the clerk December 12, 1931.
Charles S. Murphy, designated in the will as executor, and Margaret Murphy, as executrix, together with their brother Mark, were appointed administrators of the estate, and have since acted as such. The administrators' bond filed December 12, 1931, is signed by all of the beneficiaries named in the will.
On the next day after the stipulation was signed by all of the beneficiaries agreeing that the will should not be admitted to probate, another agreement, signed by the same parties, was entered into. By the second agreement, an attempt was made to organize a partnership to share the estate upon a different basis than that provided in the will, but otherwise, in substance, carrying out its terms. As stated, the administrators took possession of the estate, consisting largely of real property, and managed it, so far as the record shows, up to the time of the trial, and perhaps since.
The second stipulation entered into by the parties provided for a report and an accounting by the administrators at the end of one year. Failing to comply with this provision of the contract, William and Mark Murphy, parties to the contract, filed an application in the probate court for an order to compel the administrators to make such accounting and report. This, apparently, operated as the provocation for the present action.
Two major propositions are urged by appellants: (a) That they were induced to execute the respective stipulations and agreements “without any consideration therefor, through intimidations, fear, threats, deceit, fraud, misrepresentation and threats of personal violence”; and (b) that the stipulation signed by all of them, agreeing to waive probate of the will, is wholly null and void because in violation of the statutes of this state and contrary to public policy.
As the first of the propositions stated above is without support in the evidence, we need give it no particular consideration. The respective instruments were clearly voluntarily signed by each and all of the parties thereto. Whether it was read over in the presence of all of them, as claimed by appellees, we need not determine, as each had full opportunity to read the same, and, in any event, they obviously fully understood its purport and purpose.
We need not detail the steps necessary to be taken in this state for the probation of wills. The procedure is statutory, obvious, and well understood by the profession.
[1] In support of the proposition most vigorously urged by appellant, that is, that the stipulation forming the basis for the court's order refusing to admit the will to probate is void because contrary to public policy, counsel relies almost wholly upon decisions of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin. In re Dardis' Will, 135 Wis. 457, 115 N. W. 332, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 783, 128 Am. St. Rep. 1033, 15 Ann. Cas. 740;Cowie v. Strohmeyer, 150 Wis. 401, 136 N. W. 956, 957, 137 N. W. 778;Graef v. Kanouse, 205 Wis. 597, 238 N. W. 377;Taylor v. Hoyt, 207 Wis. 520, 242 N. W. 141. The foregoing citations are in point and tend strongly to support appellants' contention. The Wisconsin rule is, however, contrary to the weight of authority. Parker v. Broadus, 128 Miss. 699, 91 So. 394;In re Stewart's Estate, 253 Pa. 277, 98 A. 569, Ann. Cas. 1918E, 1216;Cole v. Cole, 292 Ill. 154, 126 N. E. 752, 38 A. L. R. 719;Blount v. Wheeler (Dillaway) 199 Mass. 330, 85 N. E. 477, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1036; Gugolz v. Gehrkens, 164 Cal. 596, 130 P. 8, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 575.
It is the rule, well established in this state, that beneficiaries may renounce the provisions of a will intended for their benefit, even though it may defeat the claims of personal creditors. Lehr v. Switzer, 213 Iowa, 658, 239 N. W. 564;Schoonover v. Osborne, 193 Iowa, 474, 187 N. W. 20, 27 A. L. R. 465;Stutsman v. Crain, 185 Iowa, 514, 170 N. W. 806;Farwell v. Carpenter, 161 Iowa, 257, 142 N. W. 227;Davenport v. Sandeman, 204 Iowa, 927, 216 N. W. 55.
[2] It is also the rule in this and other jurisdictions that such beneficiary may, by renouncing the provisions of a will made for his benefit, defeat...
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