Stutsman v. Crain

• Decision Date: 18 February 1919
• Docket Number: 32184
• Citation: 170 N.W. 806,185 Iowa 514
• Parties: JEAN ELIZABETH STUTSMAN et al., Appellants, v. CHARLES CRAIN et al., Appellees
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

170 N.W. 806

185 Iowa 514

JEAN ELIZABETH STUTSMAN et al., Appellants, v. CHARLES CRAIN et al., Appellees

No. 32184

Supreme Court of Iowa, Des Moines

February 18, 1919

Appeal from Johnson District Court.--R. P. HOWELL, Judge.

ACTION to enforce the specific performance of an oral contract. The opinion states the facts. Decree dismissing plaintiffs' petition in the court below. Plaintiffs appeal.

Reversed.

W. H Stutsman, Seerley & Clark, and Wilson & Evans, for appellants.

Milton Remley and Dutcher, Davis & Hambrecht, for appellees.

GAYNOR J. LADD, C. J., PRESTON and STEVENS, JJ., concur.

OPINION

GAYNOR, J.

The plaintiffs in this suit are minors and devisees under a will executed by one Samuel Sharpless n the 11th day of May, 1901, but never probated. The defendants are the devisees named in a certain will executed by the wife of Samuel Sharpless, on the 28th day of February, 1912. The facts out of which the controversy arises are substantially these: Samuel Sharpless, during his lifetime and at the time of his death, was the owner of a considerable estate, consisting both of real and personal property. The plaintiffs are the minor children of one Ada Sharpless Stutsman, adopted daughter of Samuel. Whether she was legally adopted or not is not material here. She was the daughter of Samuel's sister, and lived in the Sharpless family from early childhood until married to William Stutsman. She not only lived in the family, but was cared for and nurtured with all the tenderness of a natural child. On the 11th day of May, 1901, Samuel made what purports to be his last will and testament. In this will, after providing for the payment of his just debts, he devised to his wife, Priscilla F. Sharpless, all his property, for the period of her natural life; the remainder at her death to the children of Ada Sharpless Stutsman who might be living at the time of his wife's death. These children are the plaintiffs. Samuel Sharpless died soon after the making of this will, to wit, on or about June 5, 1901. This will was filed for probate on August 5, 1901. The widow, Priscilla Sharpless, appeared and contested, alleging that her husband, Samuel, was, at the time it was made, lacking in testamentary capacity. These objections were filed on September 7, 1901. At this time, there was also filed for probate a paper purporting to be the will of Samuel Sharpless, dated May 19, 1868. This paper was in due form of will, and executed in conformity with the statute, and gave to the widow, Priscilla Sharpless, all the property of Samuel, both real and personal, to have and to hold in her own right. The contest over the will of 1901 was brought to trial, and a verdict returned on December 6, 1901, finding that the testator, at the time of the making of the will of 1901, did not have sufficient mental capacity to make a will. No judgment, however, was entered upon the verdict until December 31, 1902, when a nunc pro tunc order was made, and judgment entered as of December 9, 1901. An appeal was taken to the Supreme Court, and the cause reversed on October 24, 1904, and remanded to the district court for further proceedings. On the 11th day of December, 1901, a few days after the return of the verdict, there was an attempt to secure the probate of the 1868 will, and a record was made duly admitting it to probate; and in December following, Peter A. Dey was appointed executor, and filed an inventory of the personal property of the estate, on or about April, 1902, and, on July 3, 1903, procured an order of allowance to the widow, Priscilla Sharpless, for her support for one year, pending the settlement of the estate. After the reversal of the judgment denying probate to the 1901 will, the matter was never again called to trial. No procedendo was issued from the Supreme Court, and the matter stood as though no hearing had been had on the contest. It also appears, however, that nothing further was done under the pretended probate of the will of 1868. Peter A. Dey, as executor, performed no further duties as executor, and the allowance made to the widow was never paid. Priscilla Sharpless, the widow, lived until October 20, 1915. During all those years intervening between the death of her husband and her death, she used the income from the estate for her support and maintenance, but never touched any of the body of the estate, and it remained intact at the time of her death. On February 28, 1912, she made a will in which, after devising to the Ladies' Improvement League of Iowa City $ 100, the income from which was to be used each year to care for her resting place in the cemetery, she devised all the rest and residue of her estate, both real and personal, of which she died seised or possessed, to certain legatees named in her will. It is under this will that the defendants claim. The thought of the defendants is that Priscilla Sharpless, the widow, took the entire estate left by Samuel at the time of his death, under the will of 1868, and under her will, made in February, 1912, they took all the property, as the devisees of Priscilla. The contention of the plaintiffs is that, as to them, the will of 1868 was never legally probated; that they were interested in the estate under the will of 1901; that it was a later will, and that proceedings in probate are now pending in the district court; undisposed of; that the attempted probate of the 1868 will was made without notice to them, and' without any appearance on their part, and is not binding upon them.

However that may be, the plaintiffs must recover on the strength of their own title, and, therefore, it becomes of primary importance to know just what they claim, and what the evidence is upon which they support their claim.

It will be noted, from what has been said, that these plaintiffs are the devisees named in the 1901 will. It is admitted that this will was duly executed by Samuel Sharpless in his lifetime, and in the execution of it, compliance was had with all the forms of law to make it a valid will. It is further conceded, for the purposes of this case, but for the purposes of this case only, that Samuel Sharpless had testamentary capacity at the time of its execution. Plaintiff's claim that, after the judgment denying probate of the 1901 will had been reversed by the Supreme Court, an agreement was entered into between Priscilla Sharpless, the widow, and these plaintiffs, through their father, by which it was agreed and understood that nothing further should be done in the probate of the 1901 will during the lifetime of Priscilla; that Priscilla should accept a life interest in the estate, and that these children should take what was provided for them in the will--the remainder after the expiration of the life estate. At the time the agreement was entered into, some question appears to have arisen as to whether or not the income of the estate would be sufficient to maintain Priscilla in the same style and comfort in which she had lived during the life of her husband, Samuel. The father of these plaintiffs, acting for them, agreed that, if she would accept the income of the estate, and let the corpus of the estate remain untouched, he would supply her with all that was needed, over and above the income, to maintain her in the same splendor and comfort in which she had lived during the life of her husband. She agreed to this, and from that time until her death, both parties acted on the assumption that the plaintiffs should receive the remainder, while Priscilla enjoyed the income from the estate during her natural life.

There are some things suggested by this record that the mind is able to grasp clearly and understandingly, to wit: That prior to the filing of the 1901 will, Priscilla entertained towards the mother of these children the kindliest feeling; that she considered and treated her as a daughter, and loved her as such; that she was very fond of her husband, Samuel,--admired and approved of him. She not only loved him, but had unbounded confidence in his love for her. She not only admired him and approved of him, but considered him a man with a high sense of justice. When this will was filed, she felt humiliated and distressed to find that her husband, with whom she had lived so many years, and for whom she entertained such tender sentiments, had left her a life estate only in his property. She could not account for it on any theory except that he was not in his right mind at the time of the making of the will. We think we are safe in saying that this record discloses that her purpose was not mercenary, but rather a desire to demonstrate that her husband did not purposely, wilfully, and intelligently repudiate her as having first claim upon his love. She felt that the long years of mutual love and trust and confidence entitled her to this. This is the only theory upon which her action in seeking to avoid the will of her husband, on the plea of want of testamentary capacity, can, we think, be rationally explained. She was getting along in years, at that time, and was feeble in health. The income from the property was abundant for her support, and she loved the mother of these children as a normal mother loves her own offspring. When this 1901 will was filed for probate, and she saw its contents, and saw that the father and mother of these children were urging its probate, she felt that an effort was being made to force on the record proof that she did not stand first in the love of her dead husband. She felt that these children were seeking to take precedence over her in the one great passion of her life, and she felt resentful. The contest over the will was waged with bitterness, and the feeling which it engendered extended to the mother and father of these children. During the...