Murphy v. Pankauski
| Decision Date | 22 February 2023 |
| Docket Number | 4D17-1935 |
| Parties | TIMOTHY D. MURPHY, Appellant, v. JOHN J. PANKAUSKI, ALLISON R. SABOCIK, and PANKAUSKI LAW FIRM, PLLC, Appellees. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Florida (US) |
Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit Palm Beach County; L.T. Case No. 502014CA005344, Richard L Oftedal, Judge.
Timothy D. Murphy, Riverside, California, pro se.
William M. Martin of Peterson Bernard, Fort Lauderdale, for appellees.
Appellant Timothy Murphy timely appeals the trial court's order dismissing his third amended complaint with prejudice against John J. Pankauski, Allison R. Sabocik, and Pankauski Law Firm, PLLC (collectively "appellees"), for failing to state a cause of action. Although we affirm the court's dismissal of counts one, two, three, four, and six as stated in the complaint, we reverse the dismissal of count five and remand for further proceedings.
Appellant hired appellees to represent him in a dispute relating to trusts created by each of his parents. Appellees later withdrew from the case and ceased representing appellant on all matters. Appellant filed suit alleging five counts of legal malpractice and one count of unjust enrichment. After appellant twice attempted to amend his complaint, appellees moved to dismiss the third amended complaint with prejudice by arguing that a legal malpractice action does not exist where an attorney withdraws from representation prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations on the claims asserted, and that appellant did not allege any applicable statute of limitations had expired. Further, appellees argued appellant's alleged damages were simply litigation expenses that would have been incurred regardless of any alleged negligence, and that the third amended complaint did not contain any allegations that appellees continued to charge appellant after they withdrew from representation.
The trial court found the third amended complaint to be "largely identical to prior complaints found to be defective and deficient," only adding new allegations related to additional litigation costs incurred by appellant. The court agreed with appellees that litigation expenses are not considered damages, found it relevant that "at least two of the [appellant's] underlying cases" were still pending at the time of the order, and noted appellant's claims for negligence were not supported by any legal authority. The trial court dismissed the complaint in its entirety and ordered "that any further amendments would be futile and would only succeed in subjecting [appellees] to further unnecessary costs and expenses, as well taxing [the] court's limited judicial resources."
The standard of review of a motion to dismiss is de novo. Bell v. Indian River Mem'l Hosp., 778 So.2d 1030, 1032 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001); see also PNC Bank, Nat'l Ass'n v. Inlet Vill. Condo. Ass'n, Inc., 204 So.3d 97, 99 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (). "When considering a motion to dismiss, trial courts are not permitted to 'go beyond the four corners of the complaint in considering the legal sufficiency of the allegations.'" PNC Bank, 204 So.3d at 99 (quoting Barbado v. Green & Murphy, P.A., 758 So.2d 1173, 1174 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)). "In assessing the adequacy of the pleading of a claim, the court must accept the facts alleged therein as true and all inferences that reasonably can be drawn from those facts must be drawn in favor of the pleader." MEBA Med. & Benefits Plan v. Lago, 867 So.2d 1184, 1186 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004).
We first find no error in the trial court dismissing counts one through four of the third amended complaint. Appellant did not allege damages in those counts that were sufficient to establish a cause of action for legal malpractice. Throneburg v. Boose, Casey, Ciklin, Lubitz, Martens, McBane & O'Connell, P.A., 659 So.2d 1134, 1136 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). In counts one through four, appellant's claimed damages were based on additional costs incurred due to appellees' alleged negligence, specifically legal fees that appellant would have nonetheless incurred. The complaint does not allege any damages incurred but for appellees' breach. Rather, the complaint alleges the withdrawal of representation only caused appellant to litigate the matters himself without alleging any additional unnecessary expenditures incurred due to appellees' actions. If a client fails to sufficiently allege in a malpractice claim that he or she would not have suffered harm "but for" the attorney's negligence, no cause of action will lie. See Oteiza v. Braxton, 547 So.2d 948, 949 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (); see also KJB Vill. Prop., LLC v. Craig M. Dorne, P.A., 77 So.3d 727, 730 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (quoting Oteiza, 547 So.2d at 949).
Additionally, these four counts allege only that appellees were negligent in several different areas and did not state with any specificity how their actions caused compensable harm to appellant. In other words, the complaint "does not state what appellees may have done wrong . . . and does not illuminate any specifics of the alleged malpractice." Rios v. McDermott, Will & Emery, 613 So.2d 544, 545 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993) () (quoting Arky, Freed, Stearns, Watson, Greer, Weaver & Harris v. Bowmar Instrument Corp., 527 So.2d 211, 212 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987), disapproved of on other grounds, 537 So.2d 561 (Fla. 1988)); see also K.R. Exch. Servs., Inc. v. Fuerst, Humphrey, Ittleman, PL, 48 So.3d 889, 892-93 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010).
Although the trial court did not err in dismissing the complaint as it relates to counts one through four, we do find it erred in dismissing count five. Count five alleges appellees filed a defective motion to enjoin a sale of trust property that caused appellant damages in the amount of at least $500,000.00. Unlike counts one through four, count five does sufficiently allege a cause of action for legal malpractice in two ways. First, count five pleads definitive...
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