Murphy v. State
| Decision Date | 30 November 2022 |
| Docket Number | 2D22-2126 |
| Parties | JEFF ANTHONY MURPHY, Petitioner, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, Respondent. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Petition for Writ of Prohibition to the Circuit Court for Highlands County; Peter F. Estrada, Judge.
Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Rhonda J. Whittaker Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Petitioner.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Lydon W. Schultz, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Respondent.
Jeff Anthony Murphy seeks a writ of prohibition preventing the circuit court from proceeding with his criminal prosecution. In a previous order of this court, we granted the petition for writ of prohibition, and this opinion now follows.
The issue before us concerns the right to speedy trial, so we must begin with the sequence of pertinent dates. On May 9, 2019, the State filed an information charging Mr. Murphy with grand theft ($10,000 or more), see § 812.014, Fla. Stat. (2015), and scheme to defraud thirteen individuals in Highlands County, see § 817.034, Fla. Stat. (2015). The offenses were alleged to have been committed between September 1, 2015, and March 31, 2016. On May 15, 2019, the trial court issued a capias for Mr. Murphy's arrest, which the Highlands County Sheriff's Office received on May 22, 2019.
As it turned out, at the time the information was filed and the capias was issued, Mr. Murphy was in custody in the Seminole County jail.[1] On August 15, 2019, the Highlands County sheriff placed a hold on Mr. Murphy. But, for reasons not clear from the record, Mr. Murphy was transferred to the custody of the Department of Corrections (DOC) on January 6, 2021, without the capias warrant on the grand theft case having been executed. When the sheriff's office learned of Mr. Murphy's transfer the next day, it placed a detainer on him. Mr. Murphy remained in DOC custody until December 20, 2021, when he was transferred to Highlands County and the capias was finally executed.
To briefly recap, then, an information was filed on May 9, 2019; a court issued a capias warrant in that case on May 15, 2019; but the warrant was not executed until December 20, 2021, more than thirty months later, on a defendant who had been in state custody the entire time.
On February 17, 2022, Mr. Murphy filed a motion to dismiss the information claiming that his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial had been violated. He asserted that he was unaware of the capias warrant and the grand theft case until the warrant's execution on December 20, 2021, and that the State's delay in executing the warrant was unreasonable. He further argued that his ability to prepare for the grand theft case, interview witnesses, and obtain potentially exculpatory evidence had been prejudiced because two of the alleged victims had died, one of whom was the owner of the business from which Mr. Murphy allegedly stole.
The circuit court held a hearing on his motion on March 14, 2022. In response to Mr. Murphy's arguments, the State argued that the delay in service, though lengthy, was justified because Mr. Murphy was being prosecuted in Seminole County. The State also pointed out that a law enforcement office had placed a hold or a detainer on Mr. Murphy,[2] which, the State implied, afforded some measure of notice of the grand theft charge.
The circuit court denied the motion to dismiss. Although the court noted that two years and seven months seemed to be an uncommonly long delay to execute a capias warrant, the court found that a minimum of one-and-one-half years of the delay was attributable to the COVID-19 pandemic,[3] which the court determined would not be attributable to the State, and that the fact that Mr. Murphy was incarcerated at the time the information was filed and the capias warrant was issued was attributable to him.[4]As to Mr. Murphy's claimed prejudice, the court acknowledged that there was a presumption of prejudice that "intensifies over time" but reasoned that the death of two victim witnesses "may actually favor Defendant rather than prejudice him." The court concluded that the delay, though lengthy, did not violate Mr. Murphy's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial.
Mr. Murphy has filed a timely petition for writ of prohibition challenging the trial court's ruling. The deprivation of a defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial can be considered and remedied through prohibition. See Sherrod v. Franza, 427 So.2d 161, 163 (Fla. 1983); Francois v. State, 317 So.3d 1268, 1270 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021).
The Third District summarized how appellate courts ought to consider dismissal rulings under prohibition in criminal cases:
In reviewing a petition for writ of prohibition, this Court must consider the merits of the defendant's motion to dismiss in the same manner as if it were on direct appeal. See Sutton v. State, 975 So.2d 1073, 1077-78 (Fla. 2008); Hair v. State, 17 So.3d 804, 805 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009), review denied, 60 So.3d 1055 (Fla. 2011). Thus, we review the court's legal findings de novo and we review the court's factual findings for competent, substantial evidence. Hair, 17 So.3d at 805.
Our court set forth the framework for considering claims of speedy trial violations in Seymour v. State, 738 So.2d 984, 985 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999):
The constitutional right to a speedy trial attaches upon arrest, filing of an indictment or an information, or other official accusation. See United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 6, 102 S.Ct. 1497, 71 L.Ed.2d 696 (1982). Determining whether a violation of the constitutional right to speedy trial has occurred includes consideration of federal case law, especially Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), which identifies four guiding factors. See State v. Roundtree, 438 So.2d 68 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); Howell v. State, 418 So.2d 1164 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). These four factors are (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) whether the defendant has timely asserted his rights; and (4) the existence of actual prejudice as a result of the delay. No single factor is either necessary or determinative, but a balancing of the four factors must be done to reach a just conclusion. See Howell, 418 So.2d at 1171, 1174; Roundtree, 438 So.2d at 70.
This framework has been further expounded upon by the federal courts:
"[T]o trigger a speedy trial analysis, an accused must allege that the interval between accusation and trial has crossed the threshold dividing ordinary from 'presumptively prejudicial' delay . . . ." Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651-52, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 2690-91, 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992) (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 530- 31, 92 S.Ct. at 2192). "Only if this threshold point is satisfied may the court proceed with the final three factors in the Barker analysis." Clark, 83 F.3d at 1352. Delays exceeding one year are generally found to be "presumptively prejudicial." Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652 n.1, 112 S.Ct. at 2691 n.1; see also Clark, 83 F.3d at 1352. If, after the threshold inquiry is satisfied and the second and third factor are considered, all three of these factors weigh heavily against the Government, the defendant need not show actual prejudice (the fourth factor) to succeed in showing a violation of his right to a speedy trial. Doggett, 505 U.S. 647, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 120 L.Ed.2d 520.
United States v. Ingram, 446 F.3d 1332, 1336 (11th Cir. 2006) (alteration in original).
Reviewing the Barker factors here, we can quickly dispense with the first, or threshold, factor concerning the length of the delay. The circuit court weighed this factor against the State and found that the nearly two-and-a-half-year delay between the filing of the grand theft information and executing the capias warrant[5] on Mr. Murphy was presumptively prejudicial and triggered a full consideration of the remaining three factors under Barker. We readily agree with that conclusion. See State v. Roundtree, 438 So.2d 68, 71 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983) (); see also State v. Union, 469 So.2d 840, 841 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (fifteen months); Hallman v. State, 462 So.2d 120, 121 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (thirty-one months); State v. Joyner, 460 So.2d 584, 585 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984) (twenty months); Niles v. State, 120 So.3d 658, 664 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) .
Turning, then, to the second factor, the reason for the delay, Doggett requires us to ask who was more "at fault" for the delay, the defendant or the State. Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652-53. "Because the prosecutor and the court have an affirmative constitutional obligation to try the defendant in a timely manner . . . the burden is on the prosecution to explain the cause of the pretrial delay." Niles, 120 So.3d at 664 (quoting Ingram, 446 F.3d at 1337)); see also Howell v. State, 418 So.2d 1164, 1173 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982) (). Courts have further clarified this inquiry by characterizing three categories of fault for the delay: (1) deliberate, (2) negligent, or (3) justified. See Howell, 418 So.2d at 1171.
We have no hesitation concluding that the fault here lies entirely with the State. As the Third District observed in a similarly situated case, the State is "[c]learly" aware of a defendant's whereabouts when that defendant is "incarcerated in a state institution." See Bonel v. State, 651...
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