Murphy v. Varner

• Decision Date: 26 June 2008
• Docket Number: No. A08A0662.,A08A0662.
• Parties: MURPHY et al. v. VARNER et al.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

666 S.E.2d 53

292 Ga.App. 747

MURPHY et al. v. VARNER et al.

No. A08A0662.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

June 26, 2008.

Reconsideration Denied July 16, 2008.

Johnson & Ward, Stanley E. Kreimer, Jr., for appellants.

Randolph A. Mayer, Atlanta, for appellees.

MILLER, Judge.

K. Morgan Varner, III and the law firm of Stites & Harbison, PLLC ("S & H") filed suit against Michael Vincent Murphy and his management company, Community Management Services, Inc. (collectively "Murphy"). S & H sought unpaid legal fees in the amount of $505,000, and Varner sought repayment of an alleged $100,000 personal loan to Murphy. S & H settled its claims against Murphy in 2004, and the trial court dismissed it from the case by a consent order. Following a jury trial on Varner's individual claim, the trial court entered judgment on the jury's verdict for Varner and against Murphy in the amount of $100,000, together with post-judgment interest at the statutory legal rate. Murphy appeals, contending that the trial court erred (i) in denying his motion for a directed verdict based on the expiration of the applicable statute of limitation, (ii) in denying his motion for discovery and in granting Varner's motion in limine concerning the settled litigation, and (iii) in failing to issue written rulings upon the same. Discerning no error, we affirm.

"[A] directed verdict is appropriate only if there is no conflict in the evidence as to any material issue and the evidence introduced, construed most favorably to the party opposing the motion, demands a particular verdict. [Cits.]" St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Meeks, 270 Ga. 136, 137(1), 508 S.E.2d 646 (1998). We owe no deference to a trial court's rulings as to questions of law and apply a plain legal error standard of review thereon. Suarez v. Halbert, 246 Ga.App. 822, 824(1), 543 S.E.2d 733 (2000).

Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict (St. Paul, supra, 270 Ga. at 137(1), 508 S.E.2d 646), the record shows that Murphy entered into an attorney-client relationship with Varner in the summer of 1998. Varner was then a partner in the law firm Varner, Stephens, Humphries, and White ("Varner Stephens"). Varner Stephens, merged with S & H in May 1999. Following the merger, Varner rendered professional services for and on behalf of Murphy as his attorney, and by late December 1999, Murphy owed S & H legal fees slightly in excess of $100,000. When Varner approached Murphy as to the same, Murphy indicated that he was experiencing cash flow difficulties. Varner then made an oral offer to lend Murphy the money necessary to pay S & H's legal fees, and, on December 17, 1999, Murphy accepted that offer. Pursuant to Murphy's request, Varner purchased a $100,000 bank check payable to Murphy, who thereafter used it to pay most of the legal fees he owed to S & H as of December 1999. Notwithstanding Varner's demand for repayment of the loan by letter to Murphy, dated September 19, 2000, Murphy never repaid Varner any portion thereof. Varner filed the underlying complaint for money lent on August 13, 2004.

1. Murphy asserts that the denial of his motion for a directed verdict was error, arguing the expiration of the applicable statute of limitation, OCGA § 9-3-25, which provides: "All actions upon open account, or for the breach of any contract not under the hand¹ of the party sought to be charged ... shall be brought within four years after the right of action accrues." (Emphasis supplied.) Citing Teasley v. Bradley, 110 Ga. 497, 35 S.E. 782 (1900), Murphy argues that when money is loaned, absent an agreed time of repayment, the amount loaned is due immediately causing the statute of limitation run at that point.

The facts of this case, however, show that Murphy accepted Varner's loan only as a means of compensating for Murphy's short term "cash flow" difficulty. The facts thus show that the parties contemplated that demand for repayment would not be made until some future time when Murphy's liquidity improved.

When, as here, the facts show that the parties intended, either expressly or impliedly, that demand for repayment would not be made until some future time, then the statute of limitation does not commence to run until the date of demand for repayment. [McRae v. Smith, 159 Ga. App. 19, 20, 282 S.E.2d 676 (1981)].

(Punctuation omitted.) Mills v. Barton, 205 Ga.App. 413, 414(1), 422 S.E.2d 269 (1992).

Varner first demanded repayment of the loan by his September 2000 letter to Murphy. Thus, the underlying complaint, filed in August 2004, was filed within the statute of limitation, and the trial court did not err in denying Murphy's motion for a directed verdict based upon the expiration of the same.

2. Further, Murphy contends that the trial court's denial of his motion for additional discovery and its grant of Varner's motion in limine concerning the merger and S & H billing practices foreclosed his ability to show that the $100,000 Varner gave him represented a "write down" of his legal fees, rather than a loan. Murphy argues that he should have been allowed to cross-examine Varner as to the credibility of his claim that the loan...