Murray v. Nantasket Beach Steamboat Co.

• Decision Date: 29 April 1924
• Parties: MURRAY v. NANTASKET BEACH STEAMBOAT CO.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

248 Mass. 587

143 N.E. 623

MURRAY

v.NANTASKET BEACH STEAMBOAT CO.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

April 29, 1924.

Report from Superior Court, Suffolk County; Richard W. Irwin, Judge.

Action of tort by Frederick Murray against the Nantasket Beach Steamboat Company for personal injuries received while working on board the steamboat Mary Chilton, owned by the defendnant. On report. Verdict ordered entered for defendant.

F. R. Mullin, P. F. Spain, and Wm. P. Thompson, all of Boston, for plaintiff.

Blodgett, Jones, Burnham & Bingham, of Boston, for defendant.

PIERCE, J.

This is an action of tort for personal injuries received by the plaintiff, and alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant. The case was tried before a jury. At the close of the plaintiff's evidence the defendant rested, and duly made a motion for a directed verdict in its favor. The motion was denied and the defendant duly excepted. The evidenc was then submitted to the jury and a verdict was returned in favor of the plaintiff. Before the verdict was recorded, the court, with the assent of the jury, reserved leave to enter a verdict for the defendant under the provision of G. L. c. 231, § 120. The defendant now urges in support of its motion two grounds: (1) ‘That the plaintiff was not in the exercise of due care;’ and (2) ‘that the plaintiff assumed the risk of his injuries.’ A further question is argued of the admissibility of the evidence of a witness for the plaintiff, ‘that it is a usual thing to have pipe rail guards around an open hatchway aboard ship.’ We assume the defendant waives any other possible legal grounds for sustaining his motion.

In the discussion we assume the rights and obligations of the plaintiff and defendant, the one to the other, are those which appertain to the relation of master and servant at common law and apart from the Workmen's Compensation Act (G. L. c. 152). Sullivan v. New Bedford Gas & Edison Light Co., 190 Mass. 288, 292, 76 N. E. 1048. The contractual risks a servant assumes on entering an employment are such as are apparent to an ordinary intelligent person if he sees them, or should have seen them if he had exercised his right to look over the place and its appliances with a view to decide whether he would enter upon the employment upon the conditions disclosed. Rooney v. Sewall & Day Cordage Co., 161 Mass. 153, 159, 36 N. E. 789;McLeod v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad, 191 Mass. 389, 77 N. E. 715,114 Am. St. Rep. 628;Crimins v. Booth, 202 Mass. 17, 23, 88 N. E. 449,32 Am. St. Rep. 468.

The evidence which describes the premises where the accident occurred and the actual and constructive knowledge of the plaintiff in relation thereto, succinctly stated, is, that the plaintiff, a riveter, was employed by the Richard T. Green Company (hereafter called the Green Company) to work at his trade on the steamboat on which he was hurt, while that boat was in the shipyard and on the railway of the Green Company, for repairs by the Green Company, in accordance with a contract between that company and the defendant. When the plaintiff entered the employment of the Green Company the boat was lighted with electric lights, furnished by a current running from the land to the boat. There was a house construction, called the engine room casing, on the main deck, covering the engine and machinery. The space is all housed in. Inside of this house there is a room, which is called the upper engine room, on the main deck in an inclosed space, which protects that part of the machinery which projects up into that space and partly fills the closed-in house. Between the inner inclosed space and the outer inclosed space there is a passageway which leads down into...