Murray v. Robinson

• Docket Number: 13-22-00033-CV
• Decision Date: 18 January 2024
• Parties: CHRISTOPHER MURRAY, Appellant, v. VERONICA ROBINSON, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

1

CHRISTOPHER MURRAY, Appellant,
v.
VERONICA ROBINSON, Appellee.

No. 13-22-00033-CV

Court of Appeals of Texas, Thirteenth District, Corpus Christi-Edinburg

January 18, 2024

On appeal from the 98th District Court of Travis County, Texas.

Before Justices Longoria, Silva, and Peña

MEMORANDUM OPINION

L. ARON PEÑA JR. JUSTICE

Appellant Christopher Murray appeals a judgment following a bench trial in favor of appellee Veronica Robinson on Murray's claims for declaratory judgment and equitable reimbursement regarding a jointly owned property. The trial court declared that Robinson was not responsible for the property taxes, mortgage payments, or maintenance, repair,

2

and improvement expenses incurred by Murray. However, it declared that Robinson was responsible for one half of the insurance premiums paid for the structures on the property. In three issues, which we reframe and construe as two issues, Murray argues that the trial court erred in: (1) not granting judgment in Murray's favor; and (2) issuing declarations that were not supported by the pleadings. We affirm.^[1]

I. Background

Murray and his wife, Florentina Murray, owned approximately seventy-eight acres of property in Travis County which constituted their homestead (the property). Florentina died intestate in 1997. At the time of Florentina's passing, the property was unencumbered by any liens. In 1998, Robinson, Florentina's only child from a prior marriage, filed an affidavit of heirship asserting an interest in the property pursuant to Texas's laws on intestate succession.^[2] See Tex. Est. Code Ann. §§ 102.003, 201.003(c).

After Florentina's death, Murray continued to reside on the property and claim it as his homestead, while Robinson resided elsewhere. In 2019, Murray sued Robinson, asserting causes of action for contribution and reimbursement, foreclosure of equitable lien, and declaratory judgment. Murray claimed that Robinson was responsible as a joint owner for fifty percent of the sums Murray paid for taxes, insurance, and repairs for the property. Murray also claimed Robinson was responsible for fifty percent of the principal and interest paid for a mortgage taken out on the property after Florentina's death. Finally, Murray claimed Robinson was responsible for fifty percent of the cost of improvements to

3

the property and reimbursement for the resulting increase in value to the property.

Robinson filed an answer asserting a general denial, and the case proceeded to a bench trial. At trial, Murray testified that there was no probate administration for Florentina's estate. He claimed that Florentina owed approximately $300,000 in debts at the time of her death, although the property itself was not encumbered by those debts. Following Florentina's death, Murray took out two loans secured by a lien on the property-$238,477.50 in 1998 and $410,000 in 2001.^[3] Murray testified that the proceeds of the 1998 loan went toward paying the debts of Florentina's estate. He testified that $300,000 of the proceeds of the 2001 loan were used for the same purpose. Murray stated that he used the remaining $110,000 for private investment. Murray did not produce any documentary evidence showing how the money for either loan was spent. Murray agreed that Robinson did not receive any proceeds from these loans. Robinson did not sign the promissory note on either loan, and she was not personally liable on the loans.

According to Murray, he sought reimbursement from Robinson for the principal and interest paid toward $300,000 of the 2001 loan, which constituted approximately $611,000 at the time of trial. Murray also spent $82,121.27 on homeowner's insurance through trial, although he claimed Robinson was only responsible for paying her share of sixty-seven percent, or $55,021.25, because that portion went toward insuring the structures on the property. Murray testified that he paid a total of $335,997 in property

4

taxes. Murray also testified that he spent $135,459.95 to improve the property, which he claimed increased the value of the property by $23,028.14.

The trial court signed a judgment, with the following declarations:

1. The [property] was the marital homestead of [Murray] and Florentina[], and [Murray] continues to occupy the [p]roperty under his homestead rights as a surviving spouse

2. [Robinson] is not responsible for any of the ad valorem property taxes on the [p]roperty;

3. [Robinson] is not responsible for any payments, whether a principal payment or an interest payment on the property;

4. [Robinson] is not responsible for any of the maintenance, repairs, or improvements made on or to the [p]roperty by [Murray]; and

5. [Robinson] is responsible for one-half of the insurance premiums on the structures and shall reimburse [Murray] for the paid insurance premiums in the amount of $27,510.62.

The trial court signed the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:

I. FINDINGS OF FACT

1. The [property] was the marital homestead of [Murray] and Florentina[^[4];

2. Florentina[] passed away in 1997, and her ½ community property interest in the [p]roperty passed by intestate succession to []Robinson;

3. [Murray] has exclusively occupied and continues to exclusively occupy the [p]roperty under his homestead rights as the surviving spouse of Florentina[];

4. There were no liens on the [p]roperty at the death of Florentina[] in 1997;

5. [Robinson] did not execute the Promissory Note, dated April 3, 1998,

5

from [Murray] to Banc One Financial Services ("1998 Note");

6. [Robinson] did not execute the Texas Home Equity Fixed/Adjustable Rate Note, dated July 23, 2001, from [Murray] to Long Beach Mortgage Company ("2001 Note");

7. No proceeds from either the 1998 Note or the 2001 Note were used to purchase the [p]roperty or refinance any debt used to purchase the [p]roperty;

8. [Robinson] did not receive any proceeds from either the 1998 Note or the 2001 Note; and

9. The total insurance premiums paid on the structures on the [p]roperty since Florentina['s] death are $55,021.24.

II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. Since [Murray] is occupying the [p]roperty under his rights as the surviving spouse, [Murray] is responsible for all of the ad valorem taxes on the [p]roperty;

2. Since [Murray] is occupying the [p]roperty under his rights as the surviving spouse, [Murray] is responsible for all of the maintenance, repairs, and/or improvements made to the [p]roperty;

3. Since no proceeds of the 1998 Note or the 2001 Note were used to purchase the [p]roperty or refinance any debt used to purchase the [p]roperty, and since [Robinson] did not receive any proceeds from the 1998 Note or the 2001 Note, [Robinson] is not responsible for any principal or interest payments on either note.

4. [Robinson] is responsible for one half of the hazard insurance premiums paid for the hazard insurance on the structures of the policy which equals $27,510.62.

Murray filed a motion to correct, modify, and reform the judgment, which was overruled by operation of law. This appeal followed.

II. Surviving Spouse Homestead Rights

In his first issue, Murray argues that the trial court erred in declaring that Robinson was not obligated to reimburse him for any portion of the property taxes, loan payments,

6

maintenance, repairs, or improvements pertaining to the property.

A. Standard of Review & Applicable Law

We construe Murray's issue as challenging the trial court's conclusions of law. "We apply a de novo standard to review a trial court's conclusions of law in a bench trial and will uphold them if the judgment can be sustained on any legal theory supported by the evidence." Wood v. Wiggins, 650 S.W.3d 533, 544 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2021, pet. denied) (first citing City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 822 (Tex. 2005); and then citing In re Moers, 104 S.W.3d 609, 611 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.)). "If the reviewing court determines a conclusion of law is erroneous, but the trial court nevertheless rendered the proper judgment, the error does not require reversal." Bowman v. Stephens, 569 S.W.3d 210, 224 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.) (citing BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 794 (Tex. 2002)).

"The homestead of a decedent who dies leaving a surviving spouse descends and vests on the decedent's death in the same manner as other real property of the...