Musicians Union, Local No. 6 v. Superior Court of Alameda County

• Decision Date: 26 November 1968
• Docket Number: S.F. 22609
• Citation: 447 P.2d 313,73 Cal.Rptr. 201,69 Cal.2d 695
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 447 P.2d 313 MUSICIANS UNION, LOCAL NO. 6 et al., Petitioners, v. The SUPERIOR COURT OF ALAMEDA COUNTY, Respondent; CHARLES O. FINLEY & COMPANY, Inc., et al., Real Parties in Interest.

Page 201

73 Cal.Rptr. 201

69 Cal.2d 695, 447 P.2d 313

MUSICIANS UNION, LOCAL NO. 6 et al., Petitioners, v. The SUPERIOR COURT OF ALAMEDA COUNTY, Respondent CHARLES O. FINLEY & COMPANY, Inc., et al., Real Parties in Interest.

S.F. 22609.

Supreme Court of California In Bank.

Nov. 26, 1968.

Neyhart, Grodin & Beeson, Joseph R. Grodin, Duane Beeson, Levy, De Roy, Geffner & Van Bourg and Victor J. Van Bourg, San Francisco, for petitioners.

No appearance for respondent.

Stark, Simon & Sparrowe, Merrill J. Schwartz, Hagar, Crosby & Rosson, Raoul D. Kennedy and Paul L. May, Oakland, for real parties in interest.

SULLIVAN, Justice.

Petitioners, a labor union, several of its officers, and a central labor council, seek a writ of prohibition restraining the respondent superior court from taking any further proceedings in an action for injunctive relief brought against them by real parties in interest Charles O. Finley & Company, Inc. (Finley) and the Oakland-Alameda County Coliseum, Inc. (Coliseum) and from enforcing any orders or injunctions issued in said action. Finley is the owner of the Oakland Athletics, a professional baseball team affiliated with the American League. Coliseum, a nonprofit California corporation is the lessee and operator of the Oakland-Alameda County Coliseum Complex (hereafter Coliseum Complex) which is the site of the Athletics' home games.

We first set forth the pertinent background facts. In the main action seeking an injunction Finley and Coliseum alleged in their complaint that the defendants American Federation of Musicians, Musicians' Union, Local No. 6 (Musicians Union), its named officers, and Alameda County Central Labor Council (Labor Council) all of whom are petitioners herein, threatened to interfere with the exhibition of the baseball game between the Athletics and the Baltimore Orioles on April 17, 1968, the opening day of the home season. Finley sought to hire an organist who was a member of the Musicians' Union to play at all home games, and a band of 25 union members to play at the opening game. The union denied its members permission to perform, demanding that Finley employ a union band at all weekend home games. Finley refused and the union stationed pickets at all entrances to the Coliseum site to carry signs stating, 'This Employer is Unfair to Musicians Union Local No. 6.'

The complaint further alleged that the defendants had begun, and would continue, to place pickets and distribute handbills at the entrances to the Coliseum Complex and would trespass upon the property leased by Coliseum. Allegedly, the purpose of the picketing was to coerce Finley to employ musicians at all weekend home games and to further coerce both Finley and Coliseum 'by causing the Unions representing building trades and other persons to refrain from operating and performing their trades in the Coliseum Complex.' The result, according to the complaint, would be to substantially interfere with the exhibition of the opening baseball game. It was additionally charged that the further effect of any picketing would be to cause the plaintiffs and the public great and irreparable injury. ¹

After a hearing at which Finley, Coliseum, and the union appeared, respondent court issued a temporary restraining order on April 16, 1968, enjoining petitioners from 'congregating, gathering, massing, demonstrating, marching, picketing, or maintaining or stationing any signs, pickets, or other persons or automobiles at the entrances of the property, or any portion thereof, described in detail in Exhibit A attached hereto and commonly known as the Coliseum Complex for any purpose relating to the hiring of musicians by Charles O. Finley & Co., Inc., or others.' The order was effective until May 6, 1968, when respondent court issued a preliminary injunction to the same effect. Upon petitioner's application we issued an alternative writ of prohibition restraining all further proceedings, including the enforcement of the injunction.

We have concluded that respondent court was without jurisdiction to issue the injunction. As we explain, infra, under federal law the controversy is subject to the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board (Board). Real parties in interest have failed to demonstrate that the Board in its discretion would decline to assert jurisdiction. Respondent has enjoined activities that are 'arguably' protected or prohibited by federal law; therefore only Congress may regulate them. Moreover, the injunction cannot be justified as an exercise of the power reserved to the states to ensure public health and safety. The peremptory writ must therefore issue. ²

The Labor Management Relations Act (Act) aims 'to promote the full flow of commerce * * * and to protect the rights of the public in connection with labor disputes affecting commerce.' (29 U.S.C.A. § 141.) The Board 'is empowered * * * to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice * * * affecting commerce.' (29 U.S.C.A. § 160(a).) 'The term 'commerce' means trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, or communication among the several States * * *.' (29 U.S.C.A. § 152(6).) 'The term 'affecting commerce' means in commerce, or burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce, or having led or tending to lead to a labor dispute burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce.' (29 U.S.C.A. § 152(7); 'The term 'industry affecting commerce' means any industry or activity in commerce or in which a labor dispute would burden or obstruct commerce * * * or the free flow of commerce.' (29 U.S.C.A. § 142(1).)

The Act 'evidences the intention of Congress to exercise whatever power is constitutionally given to it to regulate commerce * * *.' (N.L.R. B. v. Fainblatt (1939) 306 U.S. 601, 607, 59 S.Ct. 668, 83 L.Ed. 1014.) Moreover, by 'encompassing * * * all industries 'affecting commerce,' (the legislation) applies to * * * (an industry) whose business and activities are carried on wholly within a single state.' (Amalgamated Association of Street, Electric Railway & Motor Coach Employees of America, Division 998 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board (1951) 340 U.S. 383, 391, 71 S.Ct. 359, 364, 95 L.Ed. 364.)

Major league baseball teams play in eight states in the National League and in eight states and the District of Columbia in the American League. Widely distributed capital investments facilitate competition between teams constantly traveling between states. Clubs receive and expend large sums of money transmitted between states. They purchase materials in interstate commerce. Large audiences often travel across state lines to attend games. Radio and television coverage brings games, accompanied by interstate advertising of products and services, to still larger audiences beyond state lines. Major league teams are affiliated with minor league clubs comprising an organized 'farm system' in several states. (See dissenting opinion of Burton, J., in Toolson v. New York Yankees (1953) 346 U.S. 356, 357--358, 74 S.Ct. 78, 98 L.Ed. 64.) A labor dispute involving a major league baseball team can therefore affect interstate commerce and disrupt its 'full flow.' (29 U.S.C.A. § 141.)

Real parties in interest contend, however, that the activities of a major league baseball club do not constitute interstate commerce, and that the Board is therefore without jurisdiction to regulate its labor relations. They rely on Federal Base Ball Club of Baltimore v. National League (1922) 259 U.S. 200, 42 S.Ct. 465, 66 L.Ed. 898, in which the United States Supreme Court held that a treble-damages action for conspiracy to monopolize the business of baseball could not be brought under the Sherman Act, on the ground that Congress could not apply federal antitrust legislation to '(t)he business (of) giving exhibitions of baseball, which are purely state affairs.' (259 U.S. at p. 208, 42 S.Ct. at p. 466.)

In Toolson v. New York Yankees, supra, 346 U.S. 356, 74 S.Ct. 78, the Supreme Court reaffirmed baseball's exemption from federal antitrust regulation. The court did so, however, 'without re-examination of the underlying issues' determined by Federal Base Ball and only insofar as 'that decision determines that Congress had no intention of including the business of baseball within the scope of the federal antitrust laws.' (Italics added; Toolson v. New York Yankees, supra, 346 U.S. 356, 357, 74 S.Ct. 78, 79.) After extensive hearings Congress had declined to extend the coverage of antitrust laws to baseball. Thus the business developed for many years in reliance on its exemption from antitrust regulation, and although the court characterized Federal Base Ball as a 'ruling which at best was of dubious validity,' it concluded that it was for Congress to determine whether the exemption should remain. (Radovich v. National Football League (1957) 352 U.S. 445, 450, 77 S.Ct. 390, 393, 1 L.Ed.2d 456.) ³

No such exemption created by judicial decision and nurtured by legislative acquiescence existed in professional football and boxing, however. The Supreme Court therefore applied federal antitrust laws to those sports upon the finding that they constitute interstate commerce (Radovich v. National Football League, supra, 352 U.S. 445, 77 S.Ct. 390; United States v. International Boxing Club (1955) 348 U.S. 236, 75 S.Ct. 259, 99 L.Ed. 290.) These cases 'make it clear that organized baseball is interstate commerce and Congress may therefore regulate it.' (State v. Milwaukee Braves, Inc. (1966) 31 Wis.2d 699, 720, 144 N.W.2d 1, 11, cert. den. 385 U.S. 990, 87 S.Ct. 598, 17 L.Ed.2d 451.) We conclude that the labor dispute involving the Oakland Athletics affects interstate commerce and we detect no intent on the part of Congress to exclude baseball from its coverage under the Act. (See also N.L.R.B. v. Associated Musicians (2d Cir.1955) 226 F.2d 900, 907, cert. den. 351 U.S. 962, 76 S.Ct. 1025, 100 L.Ed. 1483; but see ...