Myers v. Smith

Decision Date12 December 1944
Docket Number46582.
Citation16 N.W.2d 628,235 Iowa 385
PartiesMYERS et al. v. SMITH.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

Reed & Beers and Pressey H. Frank, all of Waterloo, for appellant.

Larson & Carr and R. W. Zastrow, all of Charles City, for appellees.

SMITH Justice.

Fred E. Gates died March 29, 1925. His will was admitted to probate April 13, 1925, and his wife Viola G. Gates was appointed and qualified as executrix thereof. His will, by item 2, gave to Ilo Grace Crabtree, 'who has made her home with me for several years last past, if she shall survive me,' the sum of $15,000, 'to be paid her within one year after my decease.'

The will was dated December 14, 1918. Item 3 of the will was as follows 'I give, devise and bequeath unto my beloved wife, Viola G. Gates, all the rest, residue and remainder of my estate and property, including all real estate and personal property of which I shall died seized and possessed or to which I shall be entitled at the time of my decease, she to have and take the same absolutely and without condition.'

These were the only bequests. On or about the same day the will was admitted to probate the legatee named in item 2 executed and delivered to the executrix the following instrument:

'In the Matter of the estate
of
F. E. Gates, deceased.
Relinquishment of Rights Under the Will of Decedent.
'Comes now Ilo Crabtree Smith and states to the Court that she is the identical Ilo Grace Crabtree named as one of the beneficiaries under the will of the said F. E Gates, deceased, wherein she was to receive the sum of Fifteen Thousand ($15,000) Dollars, from said estate, and I further state that I know it was the intention of the said F E. Gates, immediately prior to his death, to change the said bequest from myself and give to his wife Viola G. Gates, his entire estate, and it is therefore my desire and in order to comply with the said desire of the said decedent, I do hereby renounce and relinquish all and every right, title or claim that I may have in and to said legacy, in order that the same may become a portion of the estate of the said F. E. Gates, and pass to the residuary legatee under the said will.
'Ilo Crabtree Smith
'Formerly Ilo Grace Crabtree.'

This document was duly verified by the legatee and attached to it was a signed statement of her husband consenting to and acquiescing in the execution of 'the within relinquishment.'

Plaintiffs herein are the only heirs of Fred E. Gates, being his sister Katie A. Sours and the administratrix of the estate of Ella Myers, his other sister. Viola Gates, his widow, elected to accept the provisions of his will. As executrix she filed her final report on or about April 30, 1926, in which she stated:

'That under the terms and conditions of the Will of the said decedent one Ilo Crabtree Smith, formerly Ilo Grace Crabtree, was given and bequeathed the sum of $15,000.00, and thereafter on or about January 21st, 1923, (sic) the said Ilo Crabtree Smith, formerly Ilo Grace Crabtree, filed in this Court her written 'Relinquishment of Rights under the will of decedent's whereby she renounced and relinquished all and every right, title and claim that she might have in said estate in order that the same may become a portion of the estate and pass to the residuary legatee of said will. Her husband W. R. Smith having joined in said relinquishment, and whereby this executrix Viola G. Gates in her personal capacity became the sole and only beneficiary under the will of the said decedent Fred E. Gates, deceased, he having died testate.

'That this executrix has turned over to herself Viola G. Gates in her personal capacity all of the property of every kind and character, real, personal or mixed property wherever the same may be found by assignment and otherwise, after having paid all of the claims filed in said estate and all costs of administration and both the State Inheritance Tax and the Frederal Estate Tax, receipts for all of which are duly filed with this report. * * *

'That I, Viola G. Gates, in my individual capacity do hereby receipt for and acknowledge in full the receipt of all properties, real, personal, or mixed from the said executrix belonging to the estate of the said Fred E. Gates and also widow's allowance granted by this Court, and do hereby ask that the Final Report be accepted and approved and the said executrix therein discharged. That there is no other person interested in said estate and no other or further notice is necessary in order to close the same. I, Viola G. Gates, aged 65 years, residing at Marble Rock, Iowa, am the surviving spouse of said decedent; that there are no other heirs and no other legatees and devisees;'

The court thereupon made his order (dated April 30, 1926) discharging the executrix and closing the estate. This order made a finding that Ilo Grace Crabtree, now Ilo Crabtree Smith, and her husband, on or about January 21, 1926, 'filed in this court their written relinquishment of all rights in and to said bequest * * * in order that the said bequest might become a portion of the estate of the said Fred E. Gates and pass to the legatee Viola G. Gates under said will of said decedent * * *.' No notice of the hearing was served on these plaintiffs.

Viola G. Gates (also known as Viola Russell Gates) is now deceased and defendant-appellant herein is said Ilo Crabtree Smith as executrix of her estate. She is not a party in her individual capacity.

The foregoing statement of facts is substantially as alleged in plaintiff's petition (filed August 20, 1941), which also alleges (based on the facts stated) that said Viola G. Gates, because of the allegations in her final report, was guilty of fraud and misrepresentation and mistake of fact; that upon said renunciation of the $15,000 bequest the renounced legacy became intestate property and upon the widow's election to take under the will it passed to the plaintiffs as the only heirs of decedent; and 'that by and through the aforesaid mistakes of fact or some of them' the ex parte order closing the estate was erroneously entered, 'which mistakes of fact the court would thereafter have discovered and corrected but for the continued silence of Viola G. Gates * * * in violation of her relation of trust and confidence to the court and these plaintiffs.'

Plaintiffs prayed that the order of April 30, 1926, closing the estate of Fred E. Gates be set aside, that the estate of Viola Russell Gates and the executrix thereof be required to fully account to these plaintiffs for the $15,000 legacy and for general equitable relief.

To this petition defendant responded with a motion to dismiss, urging the statute of limitations, laches, estoppel and res adjudicata. By amendment to the motion it was further urged that the instrument denominated 'relinquishment of rights under the will of decedent' was in fact an assignment and not a renunciation; and that there was no fraud in concealing from plaintiffs the said 'relinquishment' 'in that there was no duty on said Viola G. Gates to inform the plaintiffs concerning the same' and that 'there was no fraud in paying to herself the residuary estate' in that same was done pursuant to order of court after advising the court of all material facts. The motion of course admits the facts pleaded in the petition.

The trial court overruled the motion to dismiss, defendant elected to stand on her motion and judgment was entered against her from which she now appeals.

I. It seems logical first to determine the true character of the instrument which calls itself 'Relinquishment of Rights under the Will of Decedent.' Appellant argues that it should be construed to be an assignment. Appellees claim it is a renunciation. We have to consider the language of the document itself, the circumstances of the transaction, the situation of the parties, the object they sought to accomplish, and the construction they themselves placed on it. Huntington v. Jacob Haish Co., 190 Iowa 1197, 1200, 181 N.W. 480; Pratt v. Prouty, 104 Iowa 419, 422, 73 N.W. 1035, 65 Am.St.Rep. 472.

It is to be conceded that the name given an instrument is not conclusive but it must be pointed out that here not only the name but the language itself indicates that it was intended as a renouncement: 'I do hereby renounce and relinquish all and every right, title or claim * * * in and to said legacy, in order that the same may become a portion of the estate * * * and pass to the residuary legatee under said will.'

It recites: 'I know it was the intention of the said F. E. Gates, immediately prior to his death, to change the said bequest from myself and give to his wife * * * his entire estate * * * and in order to comply with the said desire of the said decedent, I do renounce * * *.'

The legatee was not related to decedent or his wife but his will as written gave $15,000 to her and the residue to his wife. He had no apparent intention of allowing any part of his estate to go to his sisters. The 'Relinquishment' likewise makes it clear that the legatee's sole purpose was to have the property go to the widow of decedent. Certainly, there was no purpose on the part of any of the actors to benefit the heirs at law of decedent.

It must further be conceded that there are no words of assignment or transfer--only a clear purpose, an unmistakable intention as to who should benefit by the transaction. Testator's alleged purpose was to change his will so as to make his wife sole beneficiary. Renunciation evidently seemed best adapted to accomplish that exact result. The only rational conclusion is that the parties intended a renunciation, believing that thereby the property would pass to Mrs. Gates under the residuary clause. It is significant that she so reported it to the court and the...

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