Fairley's Estate, In re
Citation | 159 N.W.2d 286 |
Decision Date | 11 June 1968 |
Docket Number | No. 52918,52918 |
Parties | In the Matter of the ESTATE of Rosa FAIRLEY, Deceased. Frank S. FAIRLEY and James W. Fairley, Executors, Frank S. Fairley and James W. Fairley, Executors of the Estate of Rosa Fairley, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Lea FAIRLEY, Frank S. Fairley and James W. Fairley, Defendants-Appellants. |
Court | United States State Supreme Court of Iowa |
James T. Holmes, and Lynch, Dallas, Smith & Harman, Cedar Rapids, for defendant, appellant, Lea Fairley.
White, Stone & Horan, Marion, for plaintiffs and for defendants, Frank S. Fairley and James W. Fairley, appellees.
This action to obtain judicial construction of the Last Will and Testament and Codicil of Rosa Fairley was brought by Frank S. Fairley and James W. Fairley individually and as executors claiming the will and codicil are ambiguous when read together and there is doubt and uncertainty as to the interests of the parties thereunder. Defendant, Lea Fairley, alleges there is no ambiguity. His application for separate adjudication of law points resulted in a final decision adverse to his construction of the instruments. He has appealed.
As the proceedings did not reach an evidentiary hearing, all we have before us are the will and codicil. After providing for the payment of debts and giving $1000 to Sarah Jane Fairley Clark, her granddaughter by a deceased child, Mrs. Fairley's will dated June 30, 1939, provided:
'ITEM THREE
'All the rest, residue, and remainder of my estate, whether real, personal or mixed of which I may die seized or possessed or to which I may then be entitled, I will, devise and bequeath as follows:
'One-third thereof to my son, Frank S. Fairley and one-third thereof to my son, James W. Fairley.'
On February 18, 1952 Mrs. Fairley executed the following Codicil to her Will:
'I hereby revoke Item Three of my Last Will and Testament and substitute therefor the following:
'ITEM THREE: All the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, whether real, personal or mixed, of which I may die seized or possessed, or to which I may be entitled, I will, devise and bequeath as follows:
'Upon the death of my said son, Lea Fairley, then the undivided one-third (1/3) interest shall be divided equally between my sons, Frank S. Fairley and James W. Fairley.'
The trial court concluded 'the intent of the testator is obvious from an objective and unbiased reading of the will and codicil when read together' and found 'no ambiguity, latent or patent, which is apparent from a reading of the instruments'. He rendered judgment as follows:
'(2) That said Will and Codicil effectively vests in each James W. Fairley and Frank S. Fairley an undivided one-half interest in and to all sums and property remaining after the establishment of the trust fund for the benefit of Lea Fairley above referred to.'
I. We concede the trial court's decision probably rendered substantial justice in this case and the result approached that which testatrix would have desired. However, we do not believe his decision can be affirmed under recognized rules of will construction. Although our purpose is to arrive at the true intent of the testatrix, experience has demonstrated the advisability of adhering to established rules for the construction of wills rather than freeing judges to operate on broad principles of equity and justice. 51 I.L.R. 103--106.
It is a universal rule that a testator's intention must be gathered from the language of the instrument where such language is clear and unambiguous. 'The question is not what the testator meant to say but what he meant by what he did say.' In re Estate of Hogan, 259 Iowa 887, 146 N.W.2d 257, 258; In re Estate of Winslow, 259 Iowa 1316, 147 N.W.2d 814, 818; Bankers Trust Co. v. Allen, 257 Iowa 938, 944, 135 N.W.2d 607, 610--611. If the language of the will and codicil is clear and unambiguous this rule applies. In making this determination we read and construe the two instruments as one executed on the date of the codicil. Watson v. Manley, 257 Iowa 92, 97, 130 N.W.2d 693, 696; In re Estate of Artz, 254 Iowa 1064, 1070, 120 N.W.2d 418, 422.
It seems anomalous to say we agree with the trial court that the language of the will and codicil read together is clear and unambiguous and then reach the opposite conclusion as to the meaning. However, the trial court's decision appears to be a logical speculation on what testatrix meant to say, but didn't, rather than determining the meaning from what she did say.
'Item Three' of the will disposed of testatrix's remainder estate in equal one-third shares to her sons. Frank and James were to receive their shares outright. Lea's share was given to them in trust and he was to receive the income for life. On Lea's death Frank and James were to divide his one-third share.
The codicil specifically revoked 'Item Three' and substituted a different provision. This provision increased the trust fund by adding $2500 to Lea's one-third share of the remaining estate. The one-third share was to be divided equally between Frank and James when the trust terminated. The codicil did not dispose of the additional $2500 upon termination of the trust. It did not dispose of the remainder of testatrix's property. We do not believe the language of the instruments lends itself to any other construction. There is no indication anywhere in the codicil that the revocation was not to apply to the second paragraph of 'Item Three'. Under this construction Mrs. Fairley died intestate as to two-thirds of her estate including the $2500 in trust subject to Lea's life estate.
We are not suggesting testatrix sought this result in her testamentary planning and agree with the trial court that she did not mean to leave anything to Lea Fairley outright. However, the situation is similar to the one with which we were faced in Bankers Trust Co. v. Allen, 257 Iowa 938, 135 N.W.2d 607, where decedent's will failed to dispose of the share of his estate included in a bequest to his sister, which lapsed. As a result, one-half of testator's large estate went to his heirs, some of whom he did not even know. We said: 'The testator's intention must be determined from what he said, not from what it may be supposed he intended to say or should have said.' 257 Iowa at 944, 135 N.W.2d at 610.
257 Iowa at 945, 135 N.W.2d at 611.
Appellee argues wills are to be construed to avoid partial intestacy. In re Estate of Austin, 236 Iowa 945, 948, 20 N.W.2d 445, 447, 162 A.L.R. 709; Myers v. Smith, 235 Iowa 385, 393, 16 N.W.2d 628, 632, 155 A.L.R. 1413; Busby v. Busby, 137 Iowa 57, 61, 114 N.W. 559. This is particularly true when, as here, the instrument expresses an intent to dispose of all of testatrix's property.
Bankers Trust Company v. Allen, 257 Iowa 938, 947, 135 N.W.2d 607, 612.
'The presumption does not require the court to make a new will, nor to include in it property not comprehended by its terms, and cannot be invoked to establish a gift against the...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Randall's Estate v. McKibben, 54676
...1205, 1214, 282 N.W. 316, 312. Few propositions are better established in our opinion.' (Emphasis supplied). See also In re Estate of Fairley, 159 N.W.2d 286, 288 (Iowa); Sawyer v. Sawyer, Supra; In re Estate of Ramthun, 249 Iowa 790, 797--798, 89 N.W.2d 337, 341; Baker v. Syfritt, 147 Iowa......
-
Kalouse's Estate, Matter of
...of his heirs at law, or to have included the children of deceased first cousins. In this regard the Iowa Supreme Court, in In re Estate of Fairley, 159 N.W.2d 286, 288, stated: "Although our purpose is to arrive at the true intent of the testatrix, experience has demonstrated the advisabili......
-
Spencer's Estate, In re
...Hollenbeck v. Gray, 185 N.W.2d 767, 769 (Iowa 1971); In Re Estate of Lamp, 172 N.W.2d 254, 259 (Iowa 1969); In Re Estate of Fairley, 159 N.W.2d 286, 289 (Iowa 1968). See also Crawford v. Crawford, 266 Md. 711, 296 A.2d 388, 393, 394 An invalid exercise of a power of appointment constitutes ......
-
In re Will of Uchtorff, 04-0288.
...would require us to rewrite the will, judicially superinscribing a new condition of survival. We will not do so. See In re Estate of Fairley, 159 N.W.2d 286, 291 (Iowa 1968) (refusing to rewrite will when its language was clear and In re Trust of Cross The Iowa Court of Appeals arrived at t......