Myrick v. Cooley

• Decision Date: 06 September 1988
• Docket Number: No. 8715SC1041,8715SC1041
• Citation: 371 S.E.2d 492,91 N.C.App. 209
• Court: North Carolina Court of Appeals
• Parties: Alton MYRICK v. James Oscar COOLEY, Andrew F. Goodwin, Jr., Paul Douglas Barnhart, the City of Graham Police Department and City of Graham.

Page 492

371 S.E.2d 492

91 N.C.App. 209

Alton MYRICK v. James Oscar COOLEY, Andrew F. Goodwin, Jr., Paul Douglas Barnhart, the City of Graham Police Department and City of Graham.

No. 8715SC1041.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Sept. 6, 1988.

Judith G. Behar, Greensboro, for plaintiff-appellant.

Womble, Carlyle, Sandridge, & Rice by Richard T. Rice and J. Daniel McNatt, Winston-Salem, for defendant-appellees.

BECTON, Judge.

Plaintiff, Alton Myrick, brought this civil action against Graham police officers James Oscar Cooley, Andrew F. Goodwin, Jr., and Paul Douglas Barnhart; against Police Chief William Miles; and against the Graham Police Department and the City of Graham, seeking damages under the common law of North Carolina and 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 for claims arising from an allegedly wrongful arrest. Myrick alleged in his complaint facts tending to show that Officers Cooley, Goodwin, and Barnhart arrested him without cause and by using excessive force. He further alleged that defendant Miles knew or should have known of the three officers' propensity for violence and that the police department and the City were negligent in the hiring, training, and supervision of the officers.

The matter came on for jury trial on 10 June 1987. From a directed verdict granted in favor of all defendants at the close of the plaintiff's evidence, plaintiff appeals, assigning error to the entry of the directed verdict and to various evidentiary rulings of the trial court. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

I

Myrick presented evidence at trial which showed, in part, that on 8 October 1984, at about 9:40 p.m., he and his seventeen-year-old son, Gene, had a loud argument in the yard outside the Myrick residence during which Gene angrily banged his fist against the hood of a truck parked beside the house. Afterwards, they entered the house and all was quiet.

A few minutes later, in response to a report of a disturbance, Officers Cooley, Goodwin, and Barnhart arrived at Myrick's residence, found no disturbance, and talked with Gene. When Myrick answered their knock at the door, they asked about the trouble. From his doorway, Myrick told them there was no disturbance other than the one they were creating and ordered them to leave his property unless they had a warrant. Then Myrick and Cooley argued loudly, with Myrick telling the officers several times to leave and Cooley threatening to arrest him if he did not get quiet.

About the third time Cooley said he was going to arrest him, Myrick responded, "Well, you go to hell," and turned to go back into the house. Thereupon, Cooley jumped on his back, threw him to the floor, jerked him up by the throat, knocked his glasses off, and pinned him against the wall. Officer Goodwin assisted Cooley in attempting to subdue and handcuff Myrick while Officer Barnhart stood nearby. Because of a painful shoulder problem, Myrick resisted efforts to cuff his hands behind his back. When told of the problem, the officers finally handcuffed him in front. Then they dragged him to the car and took him to the magistrate's office where Myrick was charged with disorderly conduct and resisting arrest and was jailed overnight. He received no injuries other than a minor cut and scratches on the nose and leg.

The parties stipulated that Myrick was convicted in District Court of disorderly conduct and resisting arrest, and that, on appeal to Superior Court, the charges were dismissed at the close of the State's evidence.

II

Myrick's primary contention is that the trial court erred by granting a directed verdict for the defendants. A defendant's motion for a directed verdict presents the question whether the evidence, considered in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, is sufficient to take the case to the jury and to support a verdict for the plaintiff. Manganello v. Permastone, Inc., 291 N.C. 666, 231 S.E.2d 678 (1977). The factual allegations of the complaint filed in this case are susceptible of being interpreted as stating claims under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 for both false arrest and excessive use of force in effecting the arrest, and similar claims under state tort law for false imprisonment and for assault and battery. In ruling upon the propriety of the directed verdict, we must assess the sufficiency of the evidence of each of these claims with respect to each of the named defendants.

A. False Arrest/False Imprisonment

The Federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, imposes civil liability for a deprivation, under color of state law, of rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. An arrest made in violation of the fourth amendment protection against unreasonable seizures of the person will give rise to a cause of action under Section 1983, see, e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961); Motes v. Myers, 810 F.2d 1055 (11th Cir.1987), reh'g denied, 837 F.2d 1095 (1988), and under fourth amendment standards, the validity of the arrest turns upon the existence of probable cause. Id. Accord Simons v. Montgomery County Police Officers, 762 F.2d 30 (4th Cir.1985); cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1054, 106 S.Ct. 789, 88 L.Ed.2d 767 (1986); Street v. Surdyka, 492 F.2d 368 (4th Cir.1974).

Likewise, under state law, a cause of action in tort will lie for false imprisonment, based upon the "illegal restraint of one's person against his will." Mobley v. Broome, 248 N.C. 54, 56, 102 S.E.2d 407, 409 (1958). A false arrest, i.e., one without proper legal authority, is one means of committing a false imprisonment. Id. For purposes of a tort action under state law, the existence of legal justification for a deprivation of liberty is determined in accordance with the law of arrest, which in North Carolina is codified at N.C.Gen.Stat. Sec. 15A-401 et. seq. (1983 and Cum.Supp.1987). See Hicks v. Nivens, 210 N.C. 44, 185 S.E.2d 469 (1936). Thus, it is possible, in some instances, for an arrest to be constitutionally valid and yet illegal under state law. State v. Eubanks, 283 N.C. 556, 196 S.E.2d 706 (1973), reh'g denied, 285 N.C. 597 (1973).

However, in the present case, Myrick was subjected to a warrantless arrest for an offense allegedly committed in the presence of the arresting officers. Pursuant to N.C.Gen.Stat. Sec. 15A-401(b)(1), such an arrest is valid if the officers had probable cause to believe he had committed a criminal offense in their presence. Hence, on the facts of this case, the standard for measuring the lawfulness of the arrest is the same for purposes of both the common law and Section 1983 claims, and in order to prevail upon either claim, Myrick must establish an absence of probable cause for the arrest.

Although the evidence presented by Myrick concerning the circumstances of his arrest for disorderly conduct, when considered in the light most favorable to him, tends to show that he was arrested wrongfully, the trial court concluded, and we agree, that his claims for false arrest nevertheless are barred by his conviction in District Court of the charges for which he was arrested. In civil actions for malicious prosecution which, like the case at bar, require proof of want of probable cause, our appellate courts have followed the majority rule that "absent a showing that the conviction in District Court was procured by fraud or other unfair means, the conviction conclusively establishes the existence of probable cause, even though plaintiff was acquitted in Superior Court." Falkner v. Almon, 22 N.C.App. 643, 645, 207 S.E.2d 388, 389 (1974). See also Moore v. Winfield, 207 N.C. 767, 178 S.E. 605 (1935); Cashion v. Texas Gulf, Inc., 79 N.C.App. 632, 339 S.E.2d 797 (1986); Priddy v. Cook's United Department Store, 17 N.C.App. 322, 194 S.E.2d 58 (1973). Federal courts have also applied this common law principle to claims of false arrest under Section 1983. See Cameron v. Fogarty, 806 F.2d 380 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1016, 107 S.Ct. 1894, 95 L.Ed.2d 501 (1987); Compton v. Ide, 732 F.2d 1429 (9th Cir.1984).

We question the continuing validity of this rule, first pronounced in 1935, which allows a District Court judgment which is subsequently overturned upon a trial de novo in Superior Court to insulate the arresting officer from liability, particularly in light of our Supreme Court's 1970 pronouncement, albeit in another context, that

[w]hen an appeal of right is taken to the Superior Court, in contemplation of law it is as if the case had been brought there originally and there had been no previous trial. The judgment appealed from is completely annulled and is not thereafter available for any purpose.

State v. Sparrow, 276 N.C. 499, 507, 173 S.E.2d 897, 902 (1970), (emphasis added). Accord State v. Coats, 17 N.C.App. 407, 194 S.E.2d 366 (1973). In addition, we are doubtful whether a judgment of the District Court which is overturned on the merits should be afforded any more weight in these circumstances than a magistrate's independent determination of probable cause which, according to Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986), will not insulate from civil liability an officer whose application for a warrant is not objectively reasonable. Moreover, it seems incongruous to infer from a subsequent conviction the existence of probable cause for the initial arrest when it is clear that innocence of the offense charged does not establish an absence of probable cause for the arrest. See, e.g., Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979); Atkins v. Lanning, 556 F.2d 485 (10th Cir.1977); State v. Jefferies, 17 N.C.App. 195, 193 S.E.2d 388 (1972), cert. denied,282 N.C. 673, 194 S.E.2d 153 (1973); Prosser & Keaton, The Law of Torts, Sec. 119 at 880 (5th ed. 1984). Despite these doubts about the wisdom of the rule we now apply, we nevertheless are compelled by the established precedent to conclude that, in the absence of a showing that the District Court conviction of...