Myrick v. Jack A. Halprin, Inc., CV105033401S

• Decision Date: 02 November 2018
• Docket Number: CV105033401S
• Court: Connecticut Superior Court
• Parties: Rochelle Myrick, Administratrix of the Estate of Ensley E. Myrick and Tara Reed, Administratrix of the Estate of Joseph E. Reed and Anthony Perelli v. Jack A. Halprin, Inc. et al.

Rochelle Myrick, Administratrix of the Estate of Ensley E. Myrick and Tara Reed, Administratrix of the Estate of Joseph E. Reed and Anthony Perelli v. No. CV105033401S

Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of New Haven, New Haven

November 2, 2018

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

Judge (with first initial, no space for Sullivan, Dorsey, and Walsh):Wilson, Robin L., J.

CORRECTED MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO SET ASIDE VERDICT AND FOR ADDITUR (#319)

Wilson, J.

STATEMENT OF CASE AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The plaintiffs, Rochelle Myrick, Administratrix of the Estate of Ensley E. Myrick, Tara Reed, Administratrix of the Estate of Joseph E. Reed, and surviving plaintiff, Anthony Perrelli commenced this wrongful death and negligent action against the defendants, Jack A. Halprin, Inc. (Halprin) and Catwalk, LLC (Catwalk), based upon premises liability and negligent security. Evidence in this case was presented over a period of two weeks commencing on February 26, 2018, and concluding on March 9, 2018. On March 9, 2018, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs, against the defendant, Jack A. Halprin, Inc., and found the defendant, Halprin 100% solely liable for the plaintiff’s injuries and deaths. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant Catwalk, LLC. The jury awarded economic damages in the amount of $18,830.59 to the estate of Ensley Myrick; $5,715 to the estate of Joseph Reed; and $1002 to Anthony Perelli. The economic damages awarded to Myrick and Reed represent exactly all of their claimed associated medical and funeral/burial expenses as a result of the accident, and the amount of economic damages awarded to Perelli represent all of his claimed medical expenses incurred as a result of the accident. Although there was evidence submitted that both Myrick and Reed at the time of their deaths were 27 and 25 years old respectively, with life expectancies of 52.4 and 54.3 years, and that both were gainfully employed at the time of death, the jury did not award damages for their lost wages or for the loss of future income/loss of earning capacity. Anthony Perelli did not make a claim for lost wages or loss of earning capacity. With respect to non-economic damages, the jury awarded Myrick and Reed each, $25,000 and awarded Anthony Perelli, $50,000.

Pursuant to Practice Book § 16-35^[1] and General Statutes 52-228b,^[2] the plaintiffs, Rochelle Myrick and Tara Reed, Administrators of the decedents’ estates, have moved the court to set aside the jury’s verdict as to damages only, and that an additur be granted on the grounds that the jury’s verdict is inadequate. The motion was scheduled for oral argument on April 16, 2018.^[3] During oral argument, the plaintiffs withdrew their claim for an additur as to economic damages because they conceded that it was the province of the jury to accept or reject any or all of plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Ward S. Curran’s testimony as to the decedents’ lost income and earning capacity. The plaintiffs, however, seek an additur as to non-economic damages awarded by the jury. The plaintiffs seek compensation for the destruction of the decedents’ capacity to carry out and enjoy life’s activities in a way that would have been done had the decedents lived, and compensation for the destruction of life itself. The plaintiffs argue that the jury’s award of $25,000 of noneconomic damages to each of the decedents is so utterly shocking that it is inconsistent with all sense of fairness and justice.

The defendant, Halprin has objected to the plaintiffs’ motion to set aside on grounds that the plaintiffs presented little evidence to the jury to adequately paint a picture of the two decedents and their loss of life’s enjoyment. The defendant contends that the evidence presented by both plaintiffs focused on evidence of personal loss to the family and significant others of the decedents, but little evidence about the decedents themselves.

DISCUSSION

" ‘The right of trial by jury is of ancient origin, characterized by Blackstone as the glory of the English law and the most transcendent privilege which any subject can enjoy ...’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 485, 55 S.Ct. 296, 79 L.Ed. 603 (1935). [Our Supreme Court] repeatedly ha[s] stated that the award of damages, in particular, ‘is a matter peculiarly within the province of the trier of facts.’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mahon v. B.V. Unitron Mfg., Inc., 284 Conn. 645, 661, 935 A.2d 1004 (2007)." Saleh v. Ribeiro Trucking, LLC, 303 Conn. 276, 280, 32 A.3d 318 (2011); and our Appellate Court in Cusano v. Lajoie, 178 Conn.App. 605, 609, 176 A.3d 1228 citing Smith v. Lefebre, has recently emphasized this stating: " ‘It is axiomatic that [t]he amount of damages awarded is a matter peculiarly within the province of the jury ... Moreover, there is no obligation for the jury to find that every injury causes pain, or the amount of pain alleged ... Put another way, [i]t is the jury’s right to accept some, none or all of the evidence presented ... It is the [jury’s] exclusive province to weigh the conflicting evidence and to determine the credibility of witnesses ... The [jury] can ... decide what- all, none, or some- of a witness’ testimony to accept or reject.’ (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Smith v. Lefebre, 92 Conn.App. 417, 421-22, 885 A.2d 1232 (2005)." Id.

Preliminarily, it is important for this court to point out that the parties did not submit interrogatories to the jury, "and, as a result, the jury returned a general verdict. [Our Appellate Court] previously ha[s] stated that [w]here there is a general verdict and no breakdown of the components of the verdict, it would be error to set it aside.’ Marchetti v. Ramirez, 40 Conn.App. 740, 746, 673 A.2d 567 (1996), aff’d, 240 Conn. 49, 688 A.2d 1325 (1997). In such a situation, ‘neither the trial court nor this court ha[s] any reasonable basis on which to break down the verdict’; id. ; and it is ‘impossible ... to determine what factors the jury considered in making its award.’ Id. Accordingly, not ‘know[ing] how or why the jury arrived at its determination of damages ... [w]e cannot speculate as to how the jury reached its figure.’ Caruso v. Quickie Cab Co., 48 Conn.App. 459, 462, 709 A.2d 1154 (1998)." Deesso v. Litzie, 172 Conn.App. 787, 797, 163 A.3d 55 (2017).

General Statutes § 52-216a provides in relevant part: "If the court concludes that the verdict is inadequate as a matter of law, it shall order an additur, and upon failure of the party so ordered to add the amount ordered by the court, it shall set aside the verdict and order a new trial."

"It is the court’s duty to set aside the verdict when it finds that the verdict does manifest injustice, and is ... palpably against the evidence ... The only practical test to apply to a verdict is whether the award of damages falls somewhere within the necessarily uncertain limits of fair and reasonable compensation in the particular case, or whether the verdict so shocks the sense of justice as to compel the conclusion that the jury was influenced by partiality, mistake or corruption." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Smith v. Lefebre, 92 Conn.App. 417, 422, 885 A.2d 1232 (2005).

"When analyzing a post-trial motion that challenges a verdict, a trial court must view the evidence offered at trial in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. See Gaudio v. Griffin Health Services Corp., 249 Conn. 523, 534, 733 A.2d 197 (1999). Consequently, in this case, the court must consider the evidence and damages award in the light most favorable to the defendant. Id. A damages award "should not be set aside ... where it is apparent that there was some evidence on which the jury might reasonably have reached its conclusion." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Weiss v. Bergen, 63 Conn.App. 810, 814, 779 A.2d 195, cert. denied, 258 Conn. 908, 782 A.2d 1254 (2001). A damages award and judgment "should be disturbed only by considerations of the most persuasive character, as where the [damages award] shocks the sense of justice or the mind is convinced that it is in fact entirely disproportionate to the injury." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hunte v. Amica Mutual Ins. Co., 68 Conn.App. 534, 541, 792 A.2d 132 (2002). "The evidence offered at trial must be given the most favorable construction to which it is reasonably entitled to support the [damages award and judgment] ..." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Indeed, a trier of fact is "not compelled to accept the plaintiff’s claims as to the severity of her injuries, no matter how persuasive that evidence might have seemed ..." Parasco v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 48 Conn.App. 671, 676, 712 A.2d 433 (1998). Importantly, a trier of fact is not required to award noneconomic damages simply because economic damages are awarded. Wichers v. Hatch, 252 Conn. 174, 176, 745 A.2d 789 (2000).

The court’s "task is to determine whether the total damages awarded falls somewhere within the necessarily uncertain limits of fair and reasonable compensation in the particular case ..." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hunte v. Amica Mutual Ins. Co., supra, 68 Conn.App. at 541, 792 A.2d 132. Only if the court finds the original award to be "so clearly against the weight of the evidence in the case as to indicate that the jury did not correctly apply the law to the facts and evidence in the case, or was governed by ignorance, prejudice, corruption or partiality, may a trial court set aside the original judgment and grant a new trial." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Schroeder v. Triangulum Associates, 259 Conn. 325, 330, 798 A.2d 459 (2002).

A fact finder’s decision to award zero noneconomic...