N.Y. Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Queens v. Microtech Contracting Corp.

• Decision Date: 26 September 2012
• Citation: 951 N.Y.S.2d 546,2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 06287,98 A.D.3d 1096
• Parties: NEW YORK HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER OF QUEENS, appellant, v. MICROTECH CONTRACTING CORP., respondent.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

98 A.D.3d 1096

951 N.Y.S.2d 546

2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 06287

NEW YORK HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER OF QUEENS, appellant,

v.MICROTECH CONTRACTING CORP., respondent.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

Sept. 26, 2012.

Farley, Holohan & Glockner, LLP, Mineola, N.Y. (Robert J. Farley and David A. Rosen of counsel), for appellant.

Wade Clark Mulcahy, New York, N.Y. (Cheryl Fuchs of counsel), for respondent.

PETER B. SKELOS, J.P., RUTH C. BALKIN, PLUMMER E. LOTT, and ROBERT J. MILLER, JJ.

In an action for contribution and indemnification, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Rebolini, J.), entered August 19, 2011, as granted that branch of the defendant's motion which was to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7).

ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

The defendant allegedly employed two undocumented aliens (hereinafter the subject employees) to perform work on the plaintiff's property. The subject employees were injured on the job, and the defendant provided them with compensation for their injuries pursuant to the Workers' Compensation Law. The employees sued the plaintiff for damages relating to their injuries predicated upon violations of the Labor Law. The plaintiff commenced this separate action seeking contribution and indemnification from the defendant. The defendant, inter alia, moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) on the ground that the plaintiff's claims for contribution and indemnification were barred by Workers' Compensation Law § 11. The Supreme Court granted that branch of the motion which was to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7). The plaintiff appeals. We affirm the order insofar as appealed from.

New York's Workers' Compensation Law was enacted in 1914 “for socioeconomic remediation purposes ‘as a means of protectingwork[ers] and their dependents from want in case of injury’ on the job” (Matter of Johannesen v. New York City Dept. of Hous. Preserv. & Dev., 84 N.Y.2d 129, 134, 615 N.Y.S.2d 336, 638 N.E.2d 981, quoting Matter of Post v. Burger & Gohlke, 216 N.Y. 544, 553, 111 N.E. 351;see Matter of Richardson v. Fiedler Roofing, 67 N.Y.2d 246, 250–251, 502 N.Y.S.2d 125, 493 N.E.2d 228). “It was the intention of the legislature to secure such injured workmen and their dependents from becoming objects of charity, and to make reasonable compensation for injuries sustained or death incurred by reason of such employment a part of the expense of the lines of business included within the definition of hazardous employments as stated in the act” (Matter of Post v. Burger & Gohlke, 216 N.Y. at 553, 111 N.E. 351). The Workers' Compensation Law thus requires employers to “ ‘pay or provide compensation [to employees] for their disability or death from injury arising out of and in the course of the employment without regard to fault as a cause of the injury’ ” ( Madeira v. Affordable Hous. Found., Inc., 469 F.3d 219, 229, quoting Workers' Compensation Law § 10[1] ).

With very limited exceptions, the Workers' Compensation Law is intended to be the employer's exclusive liability to its employees ( see Minkowitz, Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons. Laws of N.Y., Book 64, Workers' Compensation Law § 11, at 444; see also Fleming v. Graham, 10 N.Y.3d 296, 299–300, 857 N.Y.S.2d 8, 886 N.E.2d 769). “An employer may be held liable for contribution or indemnification only if the employee has sustained a grave injury as defined by the Workers' Compensation Law or when there is a ‘written contract entered into prior to the accident or occurrence by which the employer had expressly agreed to contribution or indemnification of the claimant’ ” ( Persaud v. Bovis Lend Lease, Inc., 93 A.D.3d 831, 832, 941 N.Y.S.2d 208, quoting Workers' Compensation Law § 11). The statute thus continues to reflect the original “ ‘basis of the bargain between business and labor—that workers obtain necessary medical care benefits and compensation for workplace injuries regardless of fault while employers obtain a degree of economic protection from devastating lawsuits' ” ( Castro v. United Container Mach. Group, 96 N.Y.2d 398, 401–402, 736 N.Y.S.2d 287, 761 N.E.2d 1014, quoting Governor's Mem. approving L. 1996, ch. 635, 1996 N.Y. Legis. Ann., at 460; see Fleming v. Graham, 10 N.Y.3d at 299–300, 857 N.Y.S.2d 8, 886 N.E.2d 769;Boles v. Dormer Giant, Inc., 4 N.Y.3d 235, 240, 792 N.Y.S.2d 375, 825 N.E.2d 590).

Here, the complaint seeks contribution and indemnification from the defendant. The complaint alleges that the subject employees were employed by the defendant and were injured during the course of their employment while working on premises owned by the plaintiff. The complaint does not allege that the subject employees sustained grave injuries, or that the defendant expressly agreed to contribution or indemnification in a written contract.

In opposing that branch of the defendant's motion which was to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) for failure to state a cause of action, the plaintiff did not allege that it was entitled to contribution or indemnification pursuant to a written contract, or that the subject employees suffered a grave injury. Rather, the plaintiff asserted that the defendant failed to verify the immigration status of the subject employees and that this failure constituted a violation of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (8 USC § 1324a; hereinafter the IRCA). The plaintiff contended that this violation should result in the loss of protections provided to employers under the Workers' Compensation Law and that the subject branch of the defendant's motion should therefore have been denied.

Congress adopted the IRCA as a means of eliminating job opportunities for undocumented aliens in an attempt to curtail illegal immigration ( see Madeira v. Affordable Hous. Found., Inc., 469 F.3d at 231;Balbuena v. IDR Realty LLC, 6 N.Y.3d 338, 353, 812 N.Y.S.2d 416, 845 N.E.2d 1246). “To attain this goal, the most important component of the IRCA scheme was the creation of a new ‘[e]mployment verification system’ designed to deter the employment of aliens who are not lawfully present in the United States and those who are lawfully present, but not authorized to work” ( Balbuena v. IDR Realty LLC, 6 N.Y.3d at 353, 812 N.Y.S.2d 416, 845 N.E.2d 1246, quoting 8 USC § 1324a[b]; see Madeira v. Affordable Hous. Found., Inc., 469 F.3d at 231). Before hiring an alien, the IRCA requires an employer “to verify the prospective worker's identity and work eligibility by examining the government-issued documentation. If the required documentation is not presented, the alien cannot be hired” ( Balbuena v. IDR Realty LLC, 6 N.Y.3d at 353, 812 N.Y.S.2d 416, 845 N.E.2d 1246, citing 8 USC § 1324a[a][1]; see Madeira v. Affordable Hous. Found., Inc., 469 F.3d at 231;Coque v. Wildflower Estates Devs., Inc., 58 A.D.3d 44, 49, 867 N.Y.S.2d 158). “An employer who knowingly violates the employment verification requirements, or who unknowingly hires an illegal alien but subsequently learns that an alien is not authorized to work and does not immediately terminate the employment relationship, is subject to civil or criminal prosecution and penalties” ( Balbuena v. IDR Realty LLC, 6 N.Y.3d at 353–354, 812 N.Y.S.2d 416, 845 N.E.2d 1246, citing 8 USC § 1324a[a][1], [2]; [f][1]; see Madeira v. Affordable Hous. Found., Inc., 469 F.3d at 231;Coque v. Wildflower Estates Devs., Inc., 58 A.D.3d 44, 49, 867 N.Y.S.2d 158).

“In order to preserve the national uniformity of this verification system and the sanctions imposed for violations, Congress expressly provided that IRCA would ‘preempt any State or local law imposing civil or criminal sanctions (other than through licensing and similar laws) upon those who employ, or recruit or refer for a fee for employment, unauthorized aliens' ” ( Balbuena v. IDR Realty LLC, 6 N.Y.3d at 354, 812 N.Y.S.2d 416, 845 N.E.2d 1246, quoting 8 USC § 1324a[h][2]; see Madeira v. Affordable Hous. Found., Inc., 469 F.3d at 231–232). “The statute is silent, however, as to its preemptive effect on any other state or local laws” ( Madeira v. Affordable Hous. Found., Inc., 469 F.3d at 232).

The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution provides authority for federal preemption of state law ( seeU.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2; see also Madeira v. Affordable Hous. Found., Inc., 469 F.3d at 237–238;Balbuena v. IDR Realty LLC, 6 N.Y.3d at 356, 812 N.Y.S.2d 416, 845 N.E.2d 1246). However, “courts do not readily assume preemption” ( Madeira v. Affordable Hous. Found., Inc., 469 F.3d at 238), and “[t]he presumption against preemption is especially strong with regard to laws that affect the states' historic police powers over occupational health and safety issues” ( Balbuena v. IDR Realty LLC, 6 N.Y.3d at 356, 812 N.Y.S.2d 416, 845 N.E.2d 1246;see Coque v. Wildflower Estates Devs., Inc., 58 A.D.3d at 50, 867 N.Y.S.2d 158). The presumption is only overcome if Congress demonstrates a “clear and manifest intent to preempt the exercise of state police power” ( Madeira v. Affordable Hous. Found., Inc., 469 F.3d at 238;see Balbuena v. IDR Realty LLC, 6 N.Y.3d at 356, 812 N.Y.S.2d 416, 845 N.E.2d 1246).

States enjoy an historic right to regulate employment relationships “to protect workers within the State” pursuant to the broad authority of their police powers ( De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356, 96 S.Ct. 933, 47 L.Ed.2d 43;see Balbuena v. IDR Realty LLC, 6 N.Y.3d at 358, 812 N.Y.S.2d 416, 845 N.E.2d 1246). This includes the power to enact “laws affecting occupational health and safety, and workmen's compensation laws” ( De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. at 356, 96 S.Ct. 933, 47 L.Ed.2d 43;see Balbuena v. IDR Realty LLC, 6 N.Y.3d at 358, 812 N.Y.S.2d 416, 845 N.E.2d 1246). “Pursuant to this power, New York, like many states, has enacted various laws...