N.L.R.B. v. Auto Crane Co.

Citation536 F.2d 310,92 L.R.R.M. 2363
Decision Date03 May 1976
Docket NumberNo. 75-1164,75-1164
Parties92 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2363, 78 Lab.Cas. P 11,404 NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Petitioner, v. AUTO CRANE COMPANY, Respondent.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

Thomas A. Woodley, Atty., N.L.R.B. (John H. Ferguson, Atty., Peter G. Nash, Gen. Counsel, John S. Irving, Deputy Gen. Counsel, Patrick Hardin, Associate Gen. Counsel, Elliott Moore, Deputy Associate Gen. Counsel, N.L.R.B., Washington, D.C., with him on the brief), for petitioner.

Carl D. Hall, Jr., Hall & Sublett, Tulsa, Okl., for respondent.

Before LEWIS, Chief Judge, and SETH and DOYLE, Circuit Judges.

SETH, Circuit Judge.

This case is before the court upon application of the National Labor Relations Board for enforcement of its order directing respondent, Auto Crane Company, to bargain with the International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America. The Board's decision and order, issued November 7, 1974, are reported at 214 NLRB No. 106.

The Union was certified as the bargaining representative of the Company's production and maintenance employees, and on October 1, 1972, the Company and the Union entered into a one-year collective bargaining agreement. On July 31, 1973, the Company filed a petition requesting an election to determine whether the Union still represented the majority of the workers, to which the Union consented. The election was held on September 12, 1973, and resulted in a loss for the Union by a vote of seventeen to fifteen.

Immediately after the election, on September 17, 1973, the Union filed an objection to that election based on a letter sent by the Company to its employees six days prior to the election. That objection was overruled by the Board's Regional Director.

On November 30, 1973, the Union filed charges with the Board alleging the Company violated section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act in June 1973 by unilaterally changing the wages and benefits of its employees without bargaining with the Union. On February 14, 1974, the Union filed exceptions to the Regional Director's report on its objection to the election and requested that the Board set aside the September 12th election and direct a new one.

On April 26, 1974, the Regional Director issued the complaint in this case alleging the Company had committed an unfair labor practice in violation of section 8(a)(5) by unilaterally implementing a wage increase in June 1973. After the Board remanded to the Regional Director the proceedings on the Union's objection to the election in consolidation with the unfair labor practice case, the Administrative Law Judge found a violation of section 8(a) (5) in the Company's unilateral wage increase. For this reason as well as the Company's preelection letter to its employees, the judge ruled the election should be set aside and the Company ordered to bargain. The Board adopted the judge's decision without opinion.

It is clear the Board's direction that the September 12th election be set aside is not a final order subject to court review under section 10(e) and (f) and section 9(d) of the Act, and is therefore not now before the court. See AF of L v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401, 60 S.Ct. 300, 84 L.Ed. 347; NLRB v. Lifetime Door Co., 390 F.2d 272 at 274 (4th Cir.); Hendrix Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 321 F.2d 100 (5th Cir.). Instead, the issue on appeal is the Board's finding of an unfair labor practice in violation of section 8(a)(5) when the Company unilaterally put into effect a wage increase and a thrift plan while refusing to bargain with the employees' certified representative.

The right of employees to have their employer bargain in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment is clear. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5). A violation of that right under the statute is an unfair labor practice. There is no dispute in the present case that the Union requested the Company to negotiate when the Company announced its plan to implement a wage increase and a thrift plan, and the Company refused.

The Company, while not questioning its basic duty to bargain, argues here that the Union waived its statutory right to bargain in the collective bargaining agreement it signed with the Company. Article 22 of that contract reads:

"22.1 This Agreement is subject to amendment, alteration, or addition only by a subsequent written agreement between and executed by the Company and the Union. The waiver of any breach, term, or condition of this Agreement by either party shall not constitute a precedent in the future enforcement of all these terms and conditions. The parties acknowledged that during the negotiations that resulted in this Agreement, each had the unlimited right and opportunity to make demands and proposals with respect to any subject or matter not removed by law from the area of collective bargaining, and that the understandings and agreements arrived at by the parties after the exercise of that right and opportunity are set forth in...

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6 cases
  • East Richland Educ. Ass'n IEA-NEA v. Illinois Educational Labor Relations Bd.
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • July 28, 1988
    ..."words of art" sufficiently broad to include the regularly, previously paid Christmas bonuses), and NLRB v. Auto Crane Co. (10th Cir.1976), 536 F.2d 310, 92 L.R.R.M. 2363 (denying enforcement of NLRB order finding a section 8(a)(5) violation in the employer's unilateral imposition of a wage......
  • County of Los Alamos v. Martinez
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of New Mexico
    • February 7, 2011
    ...some circuits following a more flexible approach, while others continue to apply other analyses. Compare, e.g., NLRB v. Auto Crane Co., 536 F.2d 310, 311–12 (10th Cir.1976) (denying enforcement of an NLRB order finding a Section 8(a)(5) violation in the employer's unilateral imposition of a......
  • City of Bangor v. American Federation of State, County, and Mun. Employees, Council 74
    • United States
    • Maine Supreme Court
    • September 8, 1982
    ...issues, and further because waiver clauses in collective bargaining agreements are read constrictively, N.L.R.B. v. Auto Crane Co., 536 F.2d 310, 312 (10th Cir. 1976), see, e.g., State v. Maine Labor Relations Board, supra, 413 A.2d at 515, the Board did not err in concluding that the waive......
  • N.L.R.B. v. Americana Healthcare Center
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit
    • February 19, 1986
    ...leave benefits without notice to the union or negotiation with it. Aeronca, Inc. v. NLRB, 650 F.2d 501 (4th Cir.1981); NLRB v. Auto Crane Co., 536 F.2d 310 (10th Cir.1976). The General Counsel does not argue otherwise. Therefore, the specific question for our decision is, what difference do......
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