Nabors Drilling, U.S.A., Inc. v. Escoto

• Decision Date: 19 June 2009
• Docket Number: No. 06-0890.,06-0890.
• Citation: 288 S.W.3d 401
• Parties: NABORS DRILLING, U.S.A., INC., Petitioner, v. Francisca ESCOTO, et al., Respondents.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

288 S.W.3d 401

NABORS DRILLING, U.S.A., INC., Petitioner, v. Francisca ESCOTO, et al., Respondents.

No. 06-0890.

Supreme Court of Texas.

Argued February 5, 2008.

Decided June 19, 2009.

Reagan W. Simpson, King & Spalding LLP, Austin, TX, Amy Eikel, Anne Taylor Hill, King & Spalding LLP, James M. Tompkins, Galloway Johnson Tompkins Burr & Smith, Houston TX, Sharon E. Callaway, Michael J. Murray, Crofts & Callaway, P.C., San Antonio, TX, for Petitioner.

Alex M. Miller, Watts Law Firm, L.L.P., San Antonio, TX, Ray R. Marchan, Law Office of Ray Marchan, Brownsville TX, for Respondents.

Stacy R. Obenhaus, Gardere Wynne Sewell LLP, Dallas, TX, Kathleen Cassidy Goodman, Law Office of Kathleen C. Goodman, PLLC, Boerne, TX, for Amicus Curiae Pacific Legal foundation.

Justice GREEN delivered the opinion of the Court.

Employers in Texas generally do not owe a duty to third parties for the tortious activities of off-duty employees occurring off the work site. Loram Maint. of Way, Inc. v. Ianni, 210 S.W.3d 593, 594 (Tex.2006). We have recognized a limited exception to this rule when an employer exercises control over the injury-causing conduct of its employee, imposing a duty, for example, when an employer sent an obviously intoxicated employee to drive home, Otis Eng'g Corp. v. Clark, 668 S.W.2d 307, 308, 311 (Tex.1983), and when an employer required its employee to consume alcohol while on the job, D. Houston, Inc. v. Love, 92 S.W.3d 450, 457 (Tex.2002). In this case, we consider whether such a limited duty should extend to an employer whose work conditions could induce extreme fatigue in its employees. For the reasons expressed below, we hold that the employer had no duty to prevent injury due to the fatigue of its off-duty employee or to train employees about the dangers of fatigue.

I

Nabors Drilling U.S.A., Inc., the largest land-based driller in the continental United States, hired nineteen-year-old Robert Ambriz to work in its oil fields. Nabors's work schedule required that Ambriz work twelve-hour day shifts from 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. one week, take a week off, and then work twelve-hour night shifts from 6:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. the following week. After working approximately four months at several of Nabors's sites, Ambriz was sent to work at Nabors's McCook site, where he began with a week of night shifts. The supervisor inspected the crew the evening that Ambriz started his first shift, to ensure that the employees were fit to work. Ambriz's shift ended at 6:00 a.m., and he left the site about ten minutes later. Just before he left, a coworker who did not believe that Ambriz looked or acted tired told Ambriz to stay at the work site in trailers provided by Nabors, but Ambriz chose to leave. While driving along a farm-to-market road at approximately 6:30 a.m., Ambriz crossed to the wrong side of the road and collided with a vehicle driven by Martin Rodriguez and occupied by Robert Escoto, Jose Gutierrez, and Leovarda Torres. The accident resulted in the death of Ambriz, Rodriguez, and all three passengers.

On behalf of themselves, the decedents' estates, and others, Fransisca Escoto, Dora Rodriguez, and Noelia Torres (collectively, Escoto) sued Ambriz's estate and Nabors. Escoto alleged that the negligence of both Ambriz and Nabors caused the collision, and sought various forms of money damages. The jury found that Ambriz was 57% responsible for the accident and Nabors was 43% responsible, and awarded Escoto $5.95 million. However, the trial court signed a take-nothing judgment, ruling that Nabors owed Escoto no duty. The court of appeals reversed, holding that Nabors owed the plaintiffs a duty and rejecting Nabors's other arguments in support of the take-nothing judgment. 200 S.W.3d 716 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2006).

II

A

The existence of a duty is a question of law. E.g., Tri v. J.T.T., 162 S.W.3d 552, 563 (Tex.2005); Fort Bend County Drainage Dist. v. Sbrusch, 818 S.W.2d 392, 395 (Tex.1991) (reviewing judgment notwithstanding the verdict and recognizing that "[t]he existence of a legal duty is a question of law for the court although in some instances it may require the resolution of disputed facts or inferences which are inappropriate for legal resolution"). Negligence actions in Texas require "a legal duty owed by one person to another, a breach of that duty, and damages proximately caused by the breach." Love, 92 S.W.3d at 454 (citing El Chico Corp. v. Poole, 732 S.W.2d 306, 311 (Tex.1987)). "Liability is grounded in the public policy behind the law of negligence which dictates every person is responsible for injuries which are the reasonably foreseeable consequence of his act or omission." El Chico Corp., 732 S.W.2d at 315. Generally, "one person is under no duty to control the conduct of another, even if he has the practical ability to exercise such control." Otis, 668 S.W.2d at 309 (internal citation omitted). An employer ordinarily will not be liable for torts committed by off-duty employees except when the torts were committed on the employer's premises or with the employer's chattels. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 317 (1965)). As a general rule, "an employer owes no duty to protect the public from the wrongful acts of its off-duty employees that are committed off the work site." Ianni, 210 S.W.3d at 594.

We have recognized limited exceptions to that general rule, though. "[C]ertain relationships do impose, as a matter of law, certain duties upon parties." Otis, 668 S.W.2d at 309; accord Greater Houston Transp. Co. v. Phillips, 801 S.W.2d 523, 525 (Tex.1990); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965).¹ We have held, for example, that under certain circumstances the employment relationship may impose limited duties on employers to control the activities of employees. See Love, 92 S.W.3d at 457; Otis, 668 S.W.2d at 311. Those situations have arisen when an employer affirmatively exercised control over its employee because of that employee's incapacity, see Otis, 668 S.W.2d at 311, and when an employer required its employee to consume alcohol to the point of intoxication while working, see Love, 92 S.W.3d at 457. We conclude that neither of those exceptions applies to impose a duty here.

In Otis Engineering Corp. v. Clark, plaintiffs sued Otis Engineering Corp. for wrongful death after Robert Matheson, an Otis employee, caused a fatal automobile accident shortly after leaving work. 668 S.W.2d at 308. Matheson had a history of drinking on the job, and had gone to his car to consume alcohol several times on the day of the accident. Id. "Matheson's extreme state of intoxication was well known to his supervisor and fellow workers," causing several employees to report to the Otis supervisor that Matheson was exhibiting signs of some incapacity, perhaps intoxication. Id. Halfway through his shift, the supervisor suggested that Matheson drive home. Id. While escorting Matheson to the parking lot, the supervisor asked if Matheson was all right and could make it home, and Matheson answered yes. Id. Matheson caused a fatal automobile accident thirty minutes later. Id. His blood alcohol level was 0.268, a level at which the medical examiner testified all persons would exhibit signs of intoxication observable to the average person. Id.

Otis began its duty analysis with the familiar observation that the "factors which should be considered in determining whether the law should impose a duty are the risk, foreseeability, and likelihood of injury weighed against the social utility of the actor's conduct, the magnitude of the burden of guarding against the injury and consequences of placing that burden on the employer." Id. at 309. But Otis viewed the ultimate question simply: "What we must decide is if changing social standards and increasing complexities of human relationships in today's society justify imposing a duty upon an employer to act reasonably when he exercises control over his servants." Id. at 310. Otis formulated the resulting duty principle by focusing on the existence of an incapacity, a sufficient risk of harm, and the employer's control over the employee:

Therefore, the standard of duty that we now adopt for this and all other cases currently in the judicial process, is: when, because of an employee's incapacity, an employer exercises control over the employee, the employer has a duty to take such action as a reasonably prudent employer under the same or similar circumstances would take to prevent the employee from causing an unreasonable risk of harm to others. Such a duty may be analogized to cases in which a defendant can exercise some measure of reasonable control over a dangerous person when there is a recognizable great danger of harm to third persons.

Otis, 668 S.W.2d at 311 (emphasis added). The Court held that Otis owed a duty to exercise reasonable care to control its employee. Id. "[In Otis,] [w]e imposed the duty upon the employer, not because of the mere knowledge of the intoxication, but because of the employer's negligent exercise of control over the employee. The defendant acted affirmatively in sending the drunken employee home and created an unreasonable and foreseeable risk of harm to others." Phillips, 801 S.W.2d at 526 (internal citations and emphasis omitted). In the present case, however, Nabors did not have the requisite knowledge of employee impairment, nor did it exercise the requisite control.

The court of appeals imposed a duty based on evidence that Nabors was aware of the dangers of fatigue and that a coworker from the night shift before the accident testified that the shift was particularly exhausting, and "we were all tired." 200 S.W.3d at 725-26. However, the record contains no evidence that Nabors knew of any incapacity Ambriz may have exhibited. In fact, Ambriz's supervisor observed that Ambriz was "fit and ready to go to work" during his shift, and a coworker who saw Ambriz at the end of his shift testified that Ambriz did not look...