Nabors Wells Servs., Ltd. v. Romero
| Decision Date | 30 January 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. 08–09–00319–CV.,08–09–00319–CV. |
| Citation | 408 S.W.3d 39 |
| Parties | NABORS WELLS SERVICES, LTD., f/k/a Pool Company Texas, Ltd., and Lauro Bernal Garcia, Appellants, v. Asuncion ROMERO, Individually and as Representative of the Estate of Aide Romero, Deceased, and as next friend of Edgar Romero and Saul Romero, Esperanza Soto, Individually and as next friend of Esperanza Soto, Guadalupe Soto, Maria Elena Soto, and Martin Soto, Appellees. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
David Wayne Lauritzen, Cotton, Bledsoe, Tighe & Dawson, Midland, TX, for Appellants.
Jeffrey R. Vaughan, Villalobos & Vaughan, PLLC, Houston, TX, Mauro F. Ruiz, Ruiz Law Firm, PLLC, McAllen, TX, Scott McLamore, McLamore, Reddell, Ardoin & Story, PLLC, Houston, TX, Richard J. Plezia, Richard J. Plezia & Associates, Houston, TX, for Appellees.
Before McCLURE, C.J., RIVERA, J., and CHEW, C.J. (Senior).
Nabors Well Services, Ltd., formerly Pool Company Texas, Ltd., appeals a jury verdict that awarded actual damages of just more than $2.3 million to the Romero and Soto families. Nabors brings a single issue: that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding expert and lay testimony regarding the use or non-use of seat belts in a rollover automobile crash.
In the late afternoon of December 20, 2004, 53 year-old Martin Soto was driving a Chevrolet Suburban, a light truck utility vehicle, with seven family member occupants, ages 48 to 43 years, southbound on U.S. 285 in rural West Texas. Close ahead, Lauro Garcia, a Nabors' employee, was driving southbound in a company tractor trailer. Just as the SUV overtook the truck, but before it passed clear, Nabors' tractor trailer turned left to turn off the highway and the tractor's front left bumper struck the passing Suburban, causing it to careen off the highway roadway into scrub brush causing it rolled over some multiple before coming to rest, upright. Most of the Suburban occupants were ejected.
Emergency services arrived about an hour later. Martin Soto, his 48–year old wife Esperanza, 15–year–old twins, Esperanza and Guadalupe Soto, 9–year–old Marielena Soto, 8–year–old Edgar Romero, and 4–year–old Saul Romero suffered injuries. Marielena and Esperanza Soto were unconscious with head injuries. Aydee Romero was dead.
The record is conflicted about who was wearing seatbelts at the time of the collision. Texas State Trooper James Matthies recorded after the fact that all the Suburban occupants were unrestrained except Marielena Soto and the elder Esperanza Soto. But according to their deposition testimony, Marielena Soto and the elder Esperanza Soto stated that they were not wearing seatbelts. Martin Soto and Guadalupe Soto testified that they were belted in. The younger Esperanza Soto testified that she was not wearing a seat belt.
Likewise, testimony about who was ejected was inconsistent. According to Guadalupe Soto, all the occupants were ejected except the driver Martin Soto and Edgar Romeo. But Edgar Romeo testified that he was ejected. Finally, EMS reports reflect that an unspecified “family member” reported that seven of the eight occupants were ejected.
The Romero and Soto families filed suit against Nabors for negligence and vicarious liability for Lauro Garcia's negligence. Primary to its defense, Nabors retained expert witness James Funk, Ph.D., to testify regarding the effects of seat belt or non-use in a rollover crash. The Romero and Soto families filed a written objection to the expert evidence on the basis that the methodology Dr. Funk used to form his opinion was not sufficiently reliable to be admissible as evidence. In addition, they objected to the admissibility of any evidence of seat-belt use, or nonuse, on the basis that such evidence was prohibited in civil trials in Texas. Following a pretrial evidentiary hearing, the trial court sustained both objections, and in separate written orders excluded all seat-belt use evidence and Dr. Funk's expert opinions. A jury returned a verdict finding both Nabors and Martin Soto negligent and found them 51% and 49% responsible respectively.
In its sole issue, Nabors contends that the trial court committed reversible error by excluding all evidence related to the passengers' seat-belt use, including testimony by Nabors' biomechanics expert, James Funk, Ph.D. Nabors argues that although prior versions of the Texas Transportation Code prohibited the so called, “seat-belt defense,” the current version of Texas Transportation Code, Section 545.413, no longer requires such evidence to be excluded from trial. SeeTex.Transp.Code § 545.413 (West 2011). In response, the Romeros and Sotos contend that the 2003 amendments in Section 545.413, were not intended to supplant existing Texas common law, which the families argue, continues to reject the admissibility of seat-belt use evidence in primary collision cases.
A trial court's decision to admit or exclude evidence is generally reviewed for an abuse of discretion. All Metals Fabricating, Inc. v. Ramer Concrete, Inc., 338 S.W.3d 557, 561 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2009, no pet.). Even if error occurs, the case will not be reversed unless the error probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment. SeeTex.R.App.P. 44.1; Owens–Corning Fiberglas Corporation v. Malone, 972 S.W.2d 35, 43 (Tex.1998).
The standard of review for a pure legal question is de novo, and a reviewing court must determine if the trial court acted without reference to any guiding rules or principles. Worford v. Stamper, 801 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex.1990). When conducting a de novo review, an appellate court exercises its own judgment and redetermines each issue of fact and law. Quick v. City of Austin, 7 S.W.3d 109 (Tex.1998). In so doing, we accord no deference to the trial court. See State v. Heal, 917 S.W.2d 6, 9 (Tex.1996).
Prior to repeal in 2003, Texas Transportation Code Sections 545.413(g) and 545.412(d) provided a statutory bar to the admissibility of evidence regarding seat belt non-usage.1 However, long before these provisions (and their predecessors) were enacted, it was well established in Texas jurisprudence that such evidence did not constitute contributory negligence, nor was it properly considered as a means to mitigate damages. See Carnation Co. v. Wong, 516 S.W.2d 116, 117 (Tex.1974); Kerby v. Abilene Christian College, 503 S.W.2d 526, 528 (Tex.1974); Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 633 (Tex.1986); see also Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Glyn–Jones, 878 S.W.2d 132, 134 (Tex.1994)( ).
The first case in Texas to address the issue of a seat belt defense held there was insufficient evidence to show that the decedents, whose deaths resulted from a motor vehicle collision, would have lived had they worn their seat belts. Tom Brown Drilling Co. v. Nieman, 418 S.W.2d 337, 341 (). The court noted that there was neither a mandatory seat belt usage statute in Texas nor authority to determine whether a plaintiff had a duty to wear a seat belt. The court discussed the split in other jurisdictions with respect to recognizing the so called “seat belt defense” but it did not directly address whether the plaintiff had a responsibility to use an available seat belt. One year later, an intermediate court again refused to decide whether the plaintiff had a duty to wear a seat belt. Sonnier v. Ramsey, 424 S.W.2d 684 (). But the opinion appeared to suggest the possibility of considering the seat belt defense in subsequent cases. The court noted that should such a scenario occur, the seat belt defense should be used when addressing damages, rather than when determining liability. The question was finally answered in Quinius v. Estrada, 448 S.W.2d 552, 554 (Tex.Civ.App.-Austin 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The answer was no. See id. ().
Several years after Quinius, the Texas Supreme Court decided Kerby. This case involved a car collision between a van driven by Kerby and a school bus driven by an employee of the college. After running a red light, the employee drove the bus into Kerby's van. The door to Kerby's van was open and, as a result, Kerby was ejected and crushed. The Supreme Court compared driving with a door open to driving without a seat belt. Both, the court noted, were not actionable negligence, but instead were “negligence contributing to the damages sustained.” The Kerby court explained the reasoning with respect to the limited value of evidence that a claimant was unbelted:
We draw a sharp distinction between negligence contributing to the accident and negligence contributing to the damages sustained. Contributory negligence must have the causal connection with the accident that but for the conduct the accident would not have happened. Negligence that merely increases or adds to the extent of the loss or injury occasioned by another's negligence is not such contributory negligence as will defeat recovery. The conduct of driving ... without use of available seat belts has been held not to be contributory negligence.
Kerby, 503 S.W.2d at 528. The decision was important because it distinguished between negligence that contributes to the accident and negligence that worsens the injuries sustained. While the court did not specifically say that evidence of non-use was irrelevant, it criticized the suitability of the evidence. Further, the court's distinction between the two types of negligence pointed out the inadequacies of a negligence theory in addressing the seat belt defense.
...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Nabors Well Servs., LTD v. Romero
...court which had excluded evidence related to the alleged non-use of seat belts by most of the Appellees. Nabors Wells Services, Ltd. v. Romero, 408 S.W.3d 39, 41 (Tex.App.–El Paso 2013), rev'd, 456 S.W.3d 553 (Tex.2015). Appellants, who we collectively refer to as Nabors, sought to introduc......