Nadasky v. Pub. Serv. R. Co.

• Decision Date: 19 June 1922
• Docket Number: No. 24.,24.
• Citation: 117 A. 478
• Parties: NADASKY v. PUBLIC SERVICE R. CO.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

117 A. 478

NADASKY

v. PUBLIC SERVICE R. CO.

No. 24.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

June 19, 1922.

(Syllabus by the. Court.)

Action by Catherine M. Nadasky against the Public Service Railroad Company. Motion to direct verdict for defendant. Defendant's rule to show cause made absolute.

Argued February term, 1922, before GUMMERE, C. J., and PARKER and KALISCH, JJ.

Wm. C. Gebhardt & Son, of Jersey City, for plaintiff.

Lefferts S. Hoffman and Henry H. Fryling, both of Newark, for defendant.

PARKER, J. Plaintiff, while riding in an automobile driven by a man who, as it seems to be admitted, was her agent for that purpose, sustained injuries by reason of the automobile running into a "work car" of the defendant at a point where the public highway crossed defendant's railroad track substantially at right angles at grade. Defendant is a corporation organized under the General Railroad Law, and therefore having the rights and being subject to the duties of other railroads organized under that act. The accident occurred at night, and it does not seem to be definitely settled on the evidence whether defendant's work car was at a standstill across the highway or was moving at a very slow speed. If at a standstill, there was no proof, and we think no claim, that the car had been standing there for any unreasonable length of time. The driver of plaintiff's automobile, a man named Jones, testified that he knew the highway well, that he was well acquainted with the crossing, and that he was looking out for approaching cars, and especially was looking for signals of approaching cars which he expected would be given by certain appliances put up at the crossing by defendant, consisting of a flash light and of a bell. The negligence alleged in the complaint was that the defendant permitted the car to stand across and upon the said highway in the nighttime when it was very dark, without having thereon any light and without giving any warning to the traveling public or to the plaintiff of the approach of the said car to or of the presence thereof on the said public highway by means of a bell, gates, flagman, light, or lights, or otherwise. There was a motion to direct a verdict for the defendant on the ground: First that there was no proof of negligence on the part of the defendant; and, secondly, because of negligence of the driver of the automobile with which, as defendant claimed, the plaintiff was chargeable. Other reasons are assigned for making the rule absolute, but the above are sufficient for the purpose of this decision.

As we have said, there was nothing to show that defendant's car, which was a long platform car with a sort of shanty at each end intended for the protection of the motor-man according to the direction in which the car was moving, had been allowed to remain upon the crossing for any specified length of time. Defendant seems to have had another track running along or parallel with the highway and a switch connecting the two tracks. Whatever defendant may have been doing with the car at that point is not made to appear, but if it was at a standstill there is no proof that it had stopped on the crossing more than momentarily, and it is with this situation in...