Nagata v. Kahului Development Co.

• Decision Date: 03 November 1966
• Docket Number: No. 4478,4478
• Citation: 420 P.2d 103,49 Haw. 378
• Parties: , 49 Haw. 513 Fuyuko NAGATA, Tokiwo Nagata and Jack Nagata, by Tokiwo Nagata, His Next Friend v. KAHULUI DEVELOPMENT CO., Ltd., a Hawaii Corporation.
• Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Page 103

420 P.2d 103

49 Haw. 378, 49 Haw. 513

Fuyuko NAGATA, Tokiwo Nagata and Jack Nagata, by Tokiwo Nagata, His Next Friend v. KAHULUI DEVELOPMENT CO., Ltd., a Hawaii Corporation.

No. 4478.

Supreme Court of Hawai'i.

Nov. 3, 1966.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 22, 1966.

Syllabus by the Court

1. The test to be employed in deciding whether a directed verdict is proper is that the evidence and the inferences fairly drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the one against whom the motion is made. If reasonable minds might differ on the conclusions there-from, the issue is one for the jury. If there is no conflict in the material evidence and but one inference can be drawn from the facts, it is the duty of the court to pass on the questions of contributory negligence and proximate cause as questions of law.

2. It is generally required that a motorist whose vision has been impaired must either stop (if his vision is cut off completely) or proceed at such a rate of speed and with such control of his vehicle as to be able to stop in time to avoid any discernible object in the road ahead.

3. While not necessarily required to bring his vehicle to an immediate and complete stop, a motorist whose vision is impaired may proceed only if he ascertains that it is safe to do so.

Meyer M. Ueoka, Wailuku (Ogata & Ueoka, Wailuku, of counsel), for appellant.

Roy A. Vitousek, Jr., Honolulu (Pratt, Moore, Bortz & Vitousek, Honolulu, of counsel), for respondent.

James H. Lack, Wailuku (Meyer M. Ueoka, Wailuku, of counsel), for the petition for rehearing.

Before RICHARDSON, C. J., and CASSIDY, WIRTZ, LEWIS and MIZUHA, JJ.

WIRTZ, Justice.

This is an appeal from the judgment for the defendant-appellee entered pursuant to the order granting the motion for a directed verdict made at the close of the evidence.

The plaintiffs-appellants are husband and wife. In the early hours of the morning of January 16, 1961, Mrs. Nagata was driving the family automobile, with her husband sitting in the front seat on her right and their son on the back seat. She was on the way to drop their son off at school and her husband at work. She was familiar with the road having traveled the same route every morning during the previous four months ever since her son had been enrolled in school the previous September. After leaving their home on Kea Street in Kahului, Maui, she turned right at the intersection into Wakea Avenue, a twolane road, the paved portion being twenty-four feet in width. She was traveling in a more or less easterly direction into the rising sun which at that time was very low in the sky and was quite bright. Upon rounding a bend in Wakea Avenue the sun was squarely ahead. After the bend, the road ran almost directly east and the sun was off to the right, its position being at that time twenty-five degrees south of east. At this point, while Mrs. Nagata 'was able to see the road,' the rays of the sun 'blocked out quite a bit of the right side of the road,' despite the sun glasses she was wearing. Also she was 'not completely' able to see the entire width of the road as 'there were places where there were deep shadows' cast by keawe trees bordering the southerly or right side of Wakea Avenue. She could see the oncoming traffic at the intersection of Wakea Avenue and Kamehameha Avenue some distance away. Despite her impairment of vision she proceeded along Wakea Avenue at the same rate of speed, which she estimated to be approximately twenty to twenty-five miles per hour, until her husbaund suddenly called out for her to 'look out' at which time she removed her foot from the gas pedal. Almost instantaneously she crashed into the left rear end of a trailer which was partially off the road and parked at an angle so that seven feet of it extended onto the pavement. The trailer was not an inconsiderable object, being characterized as one of the largest trailers on Maui, as it weighed ten tons and was forty-one feet in length and twenty and a half feet in width. It was of the 'flat-bed' type, the bed being five or sixth inches thick, and stood four feet high in the front, tapering off to three feet in height at the rear with six or eight tires larger than those of the average automobile. It was parked at a distance in excess of two hundred feet from the intersection of Onehee Street with Wakea Avenue, which was the last intersection before the scene of the accident. ¹ The exact nature of the bend in Wakea Avenue and the location of Onehee Street are not reflected in the record. ² However, it does appear clearly from the testimony of plaintiffs' own witnesses that the scene of the accident was visible from the intersection of Onehee Street with Wakea Avenue, ³ at a distance ranging from two hundred to four hundred feet.

In explanation of why she did not see the parked tractor-trailer Mrs. Nagata testified to the effect that after she rounded the bend and when 'the sun started obscuring the right side of the road' she was approximately forty-two feet, six inches (the depth of the courtroom) from the scene of the accident. Her counsel admitted during the argument in this court that, as is reflected by the record, the distance actually 'was considerably more.' Mrs. Nagata also testified that, under normal conditions, the farthest away from the scene of the accident she could have first seen the parked vehicles was this same distance of forty- two feet, six inches, ⁴ although she acquiesced in the characterization of the bend as being 'gradual' and conceded that there was nothing to obstruct her view across the bend and along Wakea Avenue beyond the scene of the accident to Kamehameha Avenue. ⁵ Later in her testimony she admitted that she 'was not very good at judging distances or the height of anything.' She felt that driving at a speed of twenty to twenty-five miles an hour she would have been able to stop her car within this same distance of the length of the courtroom (forty-two feet, six inches). It would thus appear that Mrs. Nagata would have been able to stop in time had not her visionbeen impaired by the sun for the whole distance in which the tractor-trailer combination was visible under the conditions of the terrain, ⁶ which she estimated at forty-two feet, six inches, but which actually was more than two hundred feet.

The trial judge's ruling that Mrs. Nagata was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law under the evidence is the only question raised under this appeal. ⁷ This ruling by the trial judge was inherent in the granting of the motion for a directed verdict for the defendant.

The test to be employed in deciding whether a directed verdict is proper is that the evidence and the inferences fairly drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the one against whom the motion is made. If reasonable minds might differ on the conclusions there-from, the issue is one for the jury. If there is no conflict in the material evidence and but one inference can be drawn from the facts, it is the duty of the court to pass on the questions of contributory negligence and proximate cause as questions of law Young v. Price, 47 Haw. 309, 313, 338 P.2d 203, 206, rehearing, 48 Haw. 22, 24, 395 P.2d 365, 367.

In considering whether the material evidence is conflicting, and the inferences to be drawn therefrom, the standard of care for an automobile driver whose vision has been impaired must initially be determined. In view of the realities of modern driving and traffic conditions, it may not be required of a driver whose vision has been impaired to come to a complete stop, but it is generally still required that a motorist whose vision has been impaired must either stop (if his vision is cut off completely) or proceed at such a rate of speed and with such control of his vehicle as to be able to stop in time to avoid any discernible object in the road ahead. See Annot., 22 A.L.R.2d 292, 300.

The phrase 'discernible object' has been explained as the contrast between an object such as a man, cow, horse or vehicle and one such as a thin wire or small stick (see Lindquist v. Thierman, 216 Iowa 170, 248 N.W. 504, 87 A.L.R. 893), or between see-ability and a situation creating a trap by virtue of the conduct of the other party. See Schildnecht v. Follmer Trucking Co., 330 Pa. 550, 199 A. 220, 222.

Most courts have liberally applied the rule by subjecting it to a number of qualifications, depending upon traffic conditions, the nature of visibility of the object obstructing the road and the suddenness of the visual impairment. Gaiennie v. Cooperative Produce Co., 196 La. 417, 199 So. 377; Broussard v. Krause & Managan, Inc. (1939 La.App.), 186 So. 384; Thomas v. Thurston Motor Lines, Inc., 230 N.C. 122, 52 S.E.2d 377; B. Kullman & Co. v Samuels, 148 Miss. 871, 114 So. 807; Fullerton v. Kansas City (1950 Mo.App.), 236 S. W.2d 364; see Annot., 22 A.L.R.2d 292, 299, 304-310. Other jurisdictions have rejected the general rule above for the rule of reasonable care under such qualifying circumstances. Hill v. Peres, 136 Cal.App. 132, 28 P.2d 946; Shields v. Oxnard Harbor Dist., 46 Cal.App.2d 477, 116 P.2d 121; Schassen v. Columbia George Motor Coach System, 126 Or. 363,270 P. 530. See Annot., 22 A.L.R.2d 292, 298, 310-322.

The suddenness of the condition causing impairment of vision has materiality as to the opportunity given the driver to appreciate his situation and to react accordingly. A motorist who proceeds when his vision has been impaired, after having had time to adjust to the situation but failing to do so, is chargeable with contributory negligence as a matter of law. Cf., Henderson v. National Mutual Cas. Co., 164 Kan. 109, 187 P.2d 508, 513. And it has been held that proceeding without reduced speed after visual impairment upon rounding a curve was ground for a directed verdict for the other party, the court noting that the lack of a warning light on the back of the other vehicle...