Nagle v. Boston & N. St. R. Co.
| Decision Date | 07 April 1905 |
| Citation | 73 N.E. 1019,188 Mass. 38 |
| Parties | NAGLE HART v. BOSTON & N. ST. RY. CO. HART v. SAME. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Knox & Coulson, for plaintiff Mary Nagle.
Bradley & Rogers, for plaintiff Henry P. Hart.
J. P Sweeney, H. R. Dow, and L. S. Cox, for defendant.
These actions arose from the same collision, and were tried together. They are here upon the defendant's exceptions to the admission in evidence, under the provisions of Rev Laws, c. 175, § 66, of certain declarations made by Nagle the intestate, of whose estate the plaintiff in the first action is the administratrix, and upon an exception to the refusal of the court to order verdicts for the defendant. The collision occurred because the car of which Nagle was motorman, instead of stopping at the point where, under the general running orders in force, it should stop, unless in any instance special directions otherwise had been given, until the car of which Hart was motorman had arrived and passed upon a double track, failed to stop, and ran on upon a single track leading to the Willows. Hart's car was running in accordance with the general order. As Nagle's car went onto the single track instead of stopping, his conductor said to him, 'Jim, did you have orders to go to the Willows?' Nagle said 'Yes,' and nodded. After the collision, as the conductor was riding in the ambulance with Nagle, the conductor said to him, 'Jim, did you get orders to go to the Willows?' and he said, 'Yes, I did.' This was the evidence admitted under exception. It is urged in support of the exception that the declarations of Nagle were inadmissible, because made in answer to leading questions, and because they merely embody the declarant's inference as to what had been done or said by others. But the statute applies to every declaration of a deceased person found to be made in good faith before the commencement of the action, and upon the personal knowledge of the declarant. If the statute was not intended to apply to declarations made in answer to leading questions, the Legislature would have so said. Its words are not to 'be narrowed from their natural meaning.' O'Driscoll v. Lynn & Boston R. R., 180 Mass. 187, 189, 62 N.E. 3. We think the questions put by the conductor were such, under the circumstances, as clearly to call upon Nagle for a fact within his own knowledge, rather than any inference of his own; and that it was for the jury to say whether he proceeded, without stopping to wait for the other car in consequence of an express order to that effect given to him. See Huebener v. Childs, 180 Mass. 483, 485, 62 N.E. 729. The statute has been construed liberally; the declarations, when admitted, being regarded as those of a witness, and given probative effect. See Brooks v. Holden, 175 Mass. 137, 55 N.E. 802; Mulhall v. Fallon, 176 Mass. 266, 57 N.E. 386, 54 L. R. A. 934, 79 Am. St. Rep. 309; Stocker v. Foster 178 Mass. 591, 603, 60 N.E. 407; Dixon v. New England Railroad, 179 Mass. 242, 246, 60 N.E. 581; O'Driscoll v. Lynn & Boston Railroad, 180 Mass. 187, 189, 62 N.E. 3; Huebener v. Childs, 180 Mass. 483, 62 N.E. 729; Green v. Crapo, 181 Mass. 55, 63, 62 N.E. 956; Stone v. Commonwealth, 181 Mass. 438, 440, 63 N.E. 1074; Boyle v. Columbian Fire Proofing Co., 182 Mass. 93, 99, 64...
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Kulchinsky v. Segal
...65, 96 A.L.R. 679), and makes admissible every declaration within its terms made upon personal knowledge. Nagle v. Boston & Northern Street Railway Co., 188 Mass. 38, 40, 73 N.E. 1019. More opinion based upon facts not known to the declarant through his own senses is inadmissible. Little v.......
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...in on track 8 and come out on track 10. In support of this contention the plaintiff has relied upon the case of Nagle v. Boston & Northern R. R., 188 Mass. 38, 73 N. E. 1019. But that decision does not support this contention. In Nagle v. Boston & Northern R. R., what the deceased said was ......
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