Narens v. Campbell Sixty-Six Exp., Inc., SIXTY-SIX
| Decision Date | 12 June 1961 |
| Docket Number | No. 48400,No. 2,SIXTY-SIX,48400,2 |
| Parties | Robert L. NARENS, Appellant, v. CAMPBELLEXPRESS, INC., Respondent |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Morris B. Kessler, St. Louis, for plaintiff-appellant.
William C. Dannevik, Jr., Springfield, for defendant-respondent.
BARRETT, Commissioner.
The plaintiff, Robert L. Narens, formerly employed by the defendant, Campbell Sixty-Six Express, as a truck driver, instituted this action to recover $17,500 actual and punitive damages for his alleged wrongful discharge. Upon defendant's motion alleging (1) that the court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit and (2) that the petition failed to state a cause of action upon which relief could be granted, the trial court dismissed the action with prejudice and the plaintiff appeals.
Other than in the particular respect subsequently noted, the plaintiff's petition is substantially identical with the one set forth in Williams v. Kansas City Public Service Co., Mo., 294 S.W.2d 36, 39, and therefore need not be set forth and analyzed in detail in this opinion. The parties, particularly the plaintiff's employment as a truck driver, were subject to the terms and conditions of a collective bargaining agreement between Teamsters Union, Local 600 and the defendant, Campbell Sixty-Six Express. In his petition the plaintiff alleges, in substance, that in August 1958 there was a hearing before a 'Joint Local Area Committee,' allegedly in compliance with the union contract, in which the defendant's action in discharging the plaintiff 'was made permanent' despite the fact that he was not afforded due process of law. It is said that he was not accorded due process in that, one, he was not represented by counsel, two, the hearing and decision 'was based on false, extrinsic, incompetent, and immaterial matters and charges,' and, three, that 'no proof was made of any of the basis of discharge as contained in said contract.' The petition says that the charges against the plaintiff were false, that the committee was improperly constituted, that he had exhausted his administrative remedies, that his discharge was intentional and wrongful and in violation of the contract and entitled him to actual and punitive damages.
As indicated, in Williams v. Kansas City Public Service Co., supra, it was held that substantially similar allegations in a petition did not 'state a claim upon which relief can be granted.' Sup.Ct.Rule 55.33, V.A.M.R. It is not necessary to consider the rationale of that opinion, it is sufficient to note that the court said in part:
'Plaintiff has alleged the existence of a contract between the defendant and a labor union to which it is generally stated plaintiff's employment was subject, but he does not allege the terms thereof pertaining to his employment or the circumstances under which his relationship to defendant as employee may or may not be terminated, and he does not allege facts from which it can be reasonably inferred that the discharge of plaintiff was in violation of that contract.'
As to the hearing before the committee the court said:
'The discharge may have been authorized by the contract, and if so, the discharge does not subsequently become a violation of the contract because the administrative procedure for review provided for in the contract was not performed in a proper manner.'
In connection with the petition's stating a claim upon which relief can be granted, there is also an allegation that the defendant's actual purpose in discharging plaintiff was that he had sought benefits due him under the Workmen's Compensation Act and that a discharge for this reason was a misdemeanor under the compensation law, Section 287.780 RSMo 1959, V.A.M.S., and a violation of the contract. Again it is not necessary to consider the rationale of the case, but in Christy v. Petrus, Mo., 295 S.W.2d 122, it was held that an employer's alleged violation of this particular section of the compensation law did not state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
But in addition to these noted allegations, this petition also contains in paragraph 3(d) this allegation: 'That the discharge or suspension of plaintiff by defendant was in violation of all the provision of the Central States Area Local Cartage Agreement and in particular in violation of Article X thereof, in that the discharge was without just cause; was without warning notice in writing within nine (9) months prior to discharge; was not for dishonesty or drunkenness or recklessness redulting in serious accident while on duty or the carrying of unauthorized passengers while on the job; and that the discharge was based upon false, extrinsic, incompetent, immaterial and irrelevant grounds and that defendant knew that the grounds given by it for plaintiff's discharge were false and in violation of the contract.' In Marranzano v. Riggs Nat. Bank of Washington, D. C., 87 U.S.App.D.C. 195, 184 F.2d 349, 351, it was held that allegations somewhat similar to these did not state a cause of action. In that case it was said that to state a cause of action it was necessary for the plaintiff
The opinion in that case is quite persuasive, and yet there are some distinguishing factors. The plaintiff in that case evidently pleaded the union contract at length or attached it as an exhibit (as the plaintiff could have pleaded the contract in this case) because the court, as to her allegation of notice and discharge, quoted the contract against her. In this case the plaintiff has not attached the contract as an exhibit, neither has he pleaded it 'at length,' instead he has pleaded the instrument 'according to legal errect.' Sup.Ct.Rule 55.24. There was no motion for a more definite statement (Sup.Ct.Rule 55.34) or any other effort to make the contract a part of the pleading. While our code provision requiring a 'claim for relief' to contain 'a short and plain...
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