Nat'l Mut. Cas. Co. v. Briscoe

• Decision Date: 10 December 1940
• Docket Number: Case Number: 29457
• Parties: NATIONAL MUTUAL CASUALTY CO. et al. v. BRISCOE et al.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

1940 OK 487

109 P.2d 1088

188 Okla. 440

NATIONAL MUTUAL CASUALTY CO. et al. v. BRISCOE et al.

Case Number: 29457

Supreme Court of Oklahoma

Decided: December 10, 1940

Syllabus

¶0 1. STATUTES--Sufficiency of title to act to satisfy constitutional requirement though title broader than act.

That part of section 57 of article 5 of the Oklahoma Constitution relating to titles of acts of the Legislature is satisfied if the title and the body of the act both relate to the same general subject. If the title is broader than the act, and sufficiently brings the mind to that subject, it is sufficient.

2. SAME--Validity of new act broadening or extending provisions of old act.

A new act may extend the provisions of an an old act if both relate to the same general subject and if the title of the new act and its new matter are sufficiently germane. Section 57 of article 5 of the Oklahoma Constitution does not prohibit the Legislature from broadening or extending an old act, if its provisions are complied with, in which case it is not necessary that the new matter be germane to the particular provisions of the precise section amended.

Original action by National Mutual Casualty Company et al. to review an order of the State Industrial Commission reviving a claim for workmen's compensation in the name of John Briscoe and another, parents of Miller Briscoe, deceased. Order sustained.

Everett Petry, of Tulsa, and T. A. Aggas, of Oklahoma City, for petitioners.

Harold Thweatt, Bohanon & Adams, and Bert Barefoot, Jr., all of Oklahoma City, for respondents.

NEFF, J.

¶1 Miller Briscoe sustained an accidental personal injury entitling him to benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act. The State Industrial Commission made its award granting him compensation for temporary total disability and for medical care and attention. While he was receiving said payments he filed an application for an award for permanent total disability, which the commission denied on the ground that it was too early at that time to determine his permanent disability. Thereafter he filed another motion for an award for permanent total disability and before that motion was heard he fell out of bed, and died a few days later.

¶2 After his death his parents filed a motion to revive the proceedings in their name, and to award compensation. The commission found that death had resulted from causes other than the injury, and entered the order of revivor. The insurance carrier of the employer then filed this original action in this court to review the order of revivor, which order also made awards to doctors and nurses and for payment of drug bills.

¶3 The order of revivor was made under authority of chapter 29, section 2, page 66, of the Session Laws of 1933, amending certain sections of the Workmen's Compensation Act, and particularly section 13365, O. S. 1931, 85 Okla. St. Ann. § 41. The particular provision of the section under which the revivor was made prescribes that "an award for disability may be made after the death of the injured employee, when death results from causes other than the injury."

¶4 It is contended by the petitioning insurance carrier that the above quoted portion of the 1933 amending act is violative of section 57 of article 5 of the Oklahoma Constitution; first, because it is not mentioned in the title of the amending act and, second, because it is not germane to the provisions of the old section, 13365, supra, which it purported to amend.

¶5 We first consider the question whether the title is sufficient. The title of the 1933 act reads:

"An Act amending Sections 13365, 13367 and 13372, Oklahoma Statutes, 1931, relating to Awards made under Workmen's Compensation Act; providing for procedure thereunder; amount and tenure of Compensation in certain cases; enforcement of Awards made; for survival of Awards in case of death of Claimant; limiting time for Awards upon application based upon change of condition; and declaring an emergency."

¶6 The body of the amending act then amended each of the sections mentioned by adopting a new section as to each thereof, setting forth each of said new sections at length, in quotations. We do not quote it further than the necessities of the present case require. That portion amending and extending section 13365 begins as follows:

"Payments -- Hearing -- Periodical or Lump Sum -- Death of Claimant -- Other Cases.

"Section 2. Section 13365, Oklahoma Statutes 1931, be and the same is hereby amended to read as follows: * * *."

¶7 Then follow many provisions, one of which is the provision under which the present claim was revived, reading that "An award for disability may be made after the death of the injured employee, when death results from causes other than the injury." This provision had not theretofore appeared in the Workmen's Compensation Act. It should be borne in mind that at this time we are not considering the question whether it is germane to the old section, as it existed prior to the amendment, or questions growing therefrom. For the time being, we are considering only the question whether it is sufficiently germane to the title of the amending act, as set forth above, within the meaning of the Constitution.

¶8 Section 57 of article 5 of the Oklahoma Constitution reads:

"Every act of the Legislature shall embrace but one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title, except general appropriation bills, general revenue bills, and bills adopting a code, digest, or revision of statutes; and no law shall be revived, amended, or the provisions thereof extended or conferred, by reference to its title only; but so much thereof as is revived, amended, extended or conferred shall be reenacted and published at length; Provided, That if any subject be embraced in any act contrary to the provisions of this section, such act shall be void only as to so much of the law as may not be expressed in the title thereof."

¶9 It is apparent that the above section of the Constitution treats both of new legislation and old sections. In considering the section confusion will be prevented by considering whether the particular phrase or portion being read at the time relates to the new act or the old section. The beginning portion of the section, however, providing that every act shall embrace but one subject, which subject shall be clearly expressed in its title, relates both to original and new legislation and to legislation which is amendatory in character.

¶10 The word "subject" in the above section is given a broad definition, not a restricted one. The general subject to which the act relates may be broad and comprehensive, and if the title sufficiently brings the attention of the mind to that general subject it is sufficient, and there is no need of expressing, in the title, details or subdivisions of the subject to which the body of the act relates. The provision is satisfied if an act has a general subject fairly indicated by the title, and the fact that the act involves many details does not offend the section if all of those details relate to the same general subject which is expressed in the title. C. C. Julian Oil & Royalty Co. v. Capshaw, 145 Okla. 237, 292 P. 841; Oklahoma Light & Power Co. v. Corporation Comm. of Oklahoma, 96 Okla. 19, 220 P. 54. The title may be very general and need not specify every clause in the statute if said clauses or portions are reasonably cognate to the general subject expressed. Prudential Ins. Co. of Amer. v. Hill, 174 Okla. 33, 49 P.2d 1067. The title should be brief, clear, broad and comprehensive, and sufficient to call attention to the subject dealt with by the act, but it is not essential that the title should be so worded as to be a complete index to all of the provisions and details of the act. Perry v. Carter, 173 Okla. 267, 48 F.2d 278; Cooper v. King, 171 Okla. 121, 42 P.2d 249; Oklahoma City v. Grigsby, 171 Okla. 23, 41 P.2d 697. Where there are many details provided in a statute but they all relate to the same general subject indicated in the title, the title is sufficient. Meek v. State, 54 Okla. Cr. 415, 22 P.2d 933; Dowell v. Board of Education of Oklahoma City, 185 Okla. 342, 91 P.2d 771; Musick v. State ex rel. Miles, 185 Okla. 140, 90 P.2d 631; Pure Oil Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm., 179 Okla. 479, 66 P.2d 1097, 302 U.S. 635, 82 L. Ed. 494, 58 Sup. Ct. 15; Davis v. State Board of Medical Examiners, 181 Okla. 385, 74 P.2d 610.

¶11 Perhaps no more explicit explanation of the question is to be found than that employed in Griffin v. Thomas, 86 Okla. 70, 206 P. 604, quoting a part of the following from 25 R. C. L. 842:

"The term 'subject,' as used in these provisions, is to be given a broad and extended meaning, so as to allow the Legislature full scope to include in one act all matters having a logical or natural connection. If all parts of an act relate directly or indirectly to the general subject of the act, it is not open to the objection of plurality. To constitute duplicity of subject, an act must embrace two or more dissimilar and discordant subjects, that by no fair intendment can be considered as having any legitimate connection with or relation to each other. This constitutional provision does not contain any limitation on the comprehensiveness of the subject, which may be as comprehensive as the Legislature chooses to make it, provided it constitutes, in the constitutional sense, a single subject and not several; it may include innumerable minor subjects, provided that all the minor subjects, when combined, form only one general subject or topic. The connection or relationship of the minor subjects need not be logical; it is enough that they are connected with and related to a single subject in popular significance. Matters which constitute, apparently, two distinct and separate subjects are not so, in the meaning of the constitutional provision, unless they are incongruous and diverse to each other. While this provision is mandatory, yet it is to

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