National Bank of Commerce v. Chicago, Burlington & Northern Railroad Company

• Decision Date: 06 August 1890
• Parties: National Bank of Commerce v. Chicago, Burlington & Northern Railroad Company. Same v. Wisconsin Central Company. Chicago, Burlington & Northern Railroad Company v. L. T. Sowle Elevator Company. Wisconsin Central Company v. Same
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

46 N.W. 342

44 Minn. 224

National Bank of Commerce v. Chicago, Burlington & Northern Railroad Company. Same v. Wisconsin Central Company. Chicago, Burlington & Northern Railroad Company v. L. T. Sowle Elevator Company. Wisconsin Central Company v. Same

Supreme Court of Minnesota

August 6, 1890

44 Minn. 224 at 236.

Original Opinion of August 6, 1890, Reported at 44 Minn. 224.

The petition for reargument denied.

OPINION

Mitchell, J.

A motion for a reargument of the "Bank Cases" was denied October 1, 1890; the following opinion being filed:

Mitchell, J. The plaintiff in these actions asks for a reargument on the ground that counsel and the court overlooked Gen. St. 1878, c. 124, § 17, which provides that bills of lading or receipts for any goods, wares, merchandise, etc., when in transit by cars or vessels, "shall be negotiable, and may be transferred by endorsement and delivery of such receipt or bill of lading; and any person to whom the said receipt or bill of lading may be transferred shall be deemed and taken to be the owner of the goods, wares, or merchandise therein specified," etc. This statute was not called to our attention upon the argument, but an examination of it upon this motion satisfies us that it has no bearing upon the questions involved in these cases. It was not intended to totally change the character of bills of lading, and pet them on the footing of bills of exchange, and charge the negotiation of them with the consequences which attend or follow the negotiation of bills or notes. On the contrary, we think the sole object of the statute was to prescribe the mode of transferring or assigning bills of lading, and to provide that such transfer and delivery of these symbols of property should for certain purposes be equivalent to an actual transfer and delivery of the property itself. See Shaw v. Railroad Co., 101 U.S. 557, 25 L.Ed. 892.

We cannot see that section 471 of the Penal Code, cited in the petition for reargument, has any bearing whatever on the cases. The petition for reargument is therefore denied.