National Bank of the Republic v. Banholzer

• Decision Date: 21 June 1897
• Docket Number: Nos. 10,486 - (165).,s. 10,486 - (165).
• Citation: 69 Minn. 24
• Parties: NATIONAL BANK OF THE REPUBLIC OF NEW YORK v. WILLIAM BANHOLZER.<SMALL><SUP>1</SUP></SMALL>
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

69 Minn. 24

NATIONAL BANK OF THE REPUBLIC OF NEW YORK v. WILLIAM BANHOLZER.¹

Nos. 10,486 - (165).

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

June 21, 1897.

Appeal by plaintiff from an order of the district court for Ramsey county, Bunn, J., denying its application for the appointment of a receiver in supplementary proceedings. Affirmed.

Morphy, Ewing & Gilbert, for appellant.

W. P. Westfall and F. G. B. Woodruff, for respondent.

CANTY, J.

The plaintiff is a judgment creditor of defendant. Execution was returned unsatisfied on the judgment, and supplementary proceedings were instituted against defendant, who, on the examination, disclosed no property except a five-acre tract of land, on which he and his family reside, and which he claims as his homestead. On the report of the referee, the plaintiff moved for the appointment of a receiver, and appeals from an order denying the motion.

The only question discussed on this appeal is whether or not the judgment debtor is entitled to hold as his homestead, exempt from execution, the whole of the tract in question. This tract is situated within the corporate limits of the city of St. Paul, a city of more than 5,000 inhabitants, and has never been platted, but is surrounded for a considerable distance with lands that have been platted into city lots and blocks, except that adjoining it on the east is an acre of unplatted land owned by defendant's father, and immediately adjacent thereto is a tract occupied by railroad car shops, which last-named tract does not appear to be platted. The five-acre tract in question is on the north bank of the Mississippi river 2½ or 3 miles west of the Wabasha street bridge, and upon it there is situated a brewery, boiler house, ice house, store house, stable, carriage house, and two dwelling houses, in one of which the defendant resides.

In this state, the value of the homestead and the uses to which it is put are immaterial, so long as it is the place of residence of the debtor. Kelly v. Baker, 10 Minn. 124 (154); Umland v. Holcombe, 26 Minn. 286, 3 N. W. 341; Jacoby v. Parkland, 41 Minn. 227, 43 N. W. 52. The legislature has placed upon the homestead merely the limit of area. G. S. 1894, § 5521 provides:

"A homestead consisting of any quantity of land not exceeding eighty acres * * * not included in the laid-out or platted portion of any incorporated town, city or village, or instead thereof, * * * a quantity of land not exceeding in amount one lot * * * if within the laid-out or platted portion of any incorporated town, city or village, having over 5,000 inhabitants, or one half acre if within the laid-out or platted portion of any incorporated town, city or village, having less than 5,000 inhabitants, * * * shall not be subject to attachment." * * *

This court has struggled with this statute ever since its passage in 1875, and has made many attempts to construe it, but was finally forced to adopt the distinction between rural and urban as the controlling principle by which to determine the area or size of the homestead. In order to avoid the most extraordinary and absurd results, — results which the legislature never intended, — this court was compelled to hold that the mere matter of platting within the corporate limits is not controlling. The boundaries of cities and villages have been extended so as to include large tracts of agricultural land, and within those boundaries the boomer and speculator has platted the cow pasture and the virgin forest. Again, pieces of land and large and small angles and remnants have been left between the different plats in the laid-out and platted portion of the city, even in the very business center. Again, lots platted together and lying side by side, are often most unequal in size, one being several times larger than another.

The first case in which this court held the mere matter of platting within the corporate limits not to be controlling, and laid down, as controlling, the distinction between the rural and the urban portions of the city, was In re Smith, 51 Minn. 316, 53 N. W. 711. The city of New Ulm had in an early day been laid out and platted. The central part of the tract was platted into lots of the ordinary size of city lots. The lots around the outer edge of the plat were much larger. The one in question, containing four acres, was, with all other similar lots in that part of the city, used for agricultural purposes. This court held that it was not a city lot, but a mere subdivision of agricultural land.

The next case in which this court laid down the distinction between the rural and the urban portion of the city is Heidel v. Benedict, 61 Minn. 170, 63 N. W. 490. The homestead claimed was within the corporate limits of St. Paul, and had, with the surrounding property, been platted, but the particular block in question had never been subdivided into lots. The debtor owned nearly one-half of this block, and resided on the same. The property was strictly urban in character, and the court, in order to carry out the intention of the legislature, completed the platting of the land, by subdividing it into lots, and allowing the debtor, as his homestead, only the amount of one lot. This, in effect, is what was done in the case. It is said in the opinion, at page 172:

"It is not to be presumed that the legislature intended that where a part of the platted portion of an incorporated city, strictly urban in character, was not subdivided into lots on the plat, a party might claim an exemption to the extent of acres; while his neighbor across the street, residing on a block of exactly the same kind of property, but subdivided on the plat into lots, could only claim two or three thousand square feet."

Of course, if this block was out in the rural portion of the city, the court would never have attempted thus to complete the platting as a means of determining the area of the homestead, but would have held the debtor entitled to the whole tract so owned by him, although the other blocks in the addition were all subdivided into lots.

In the case of Ford v. Clement, 68 Minn. 484, 71 N. W. 672, the judgment debtor claimed, as his homestead, a lot more than twice the ordinary size of the lots in the addition. The lot was in a portion of the city of Minneapolis which was thickly settled...