National Football League Management Council v. Superior Court

• Citation: 138 Cal.App.3d 895,188 Cal.Rptr. 337
• Decision Date: 04 January 1983
• Docket Number: No. A018542,A018542
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE MANAGEMENT COUNCIL et al., Petitioners, v. The SUPERIOR COURT OF ALAMEDA COUNTY, Respondent; Leanell JONES, Real Party in Interest.

Page 337

188 Cal.Rptr. 337

138 Cal.App.3d 895

NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE MANAGEMENT COUNCIL et al., Petitioners, v. The SUPERIOR COURT OF ALAMEDA COUNTY, Respondent;

Leanell JONES, Real Party in Interest.

No. A018542.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 3, California.

Jan. 4, 1983.

Richard D. Givens, Randall F. Wright, Leahy, O'Dea & Givens, San Francisco, for petitioners.

James R. Ritchie, Henning, Walsh & Ritchie, San Francisco, for real party in interest.

SCOTT, Acting Presiding Justice.

This petition challenges a trial court ruling requiring the Oakland Raiders (who have since become the Los Angeles Raiders) to turn over medical reports prepared by a team doctor during his examination and treatment of former Raiders football player Leanell Jones, real party in interest in this proceeding. Petitioners contend that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to require production because federal law preempts state law in the area. We have concluded that federal law does not preempt Evidence Code section 1158 rights. Therefore, we deny the petition for a peremptory writ.

In June of 1979, Leanell Jones was signed by the Raiders. During the preseason, he sustained an injury and became disabled from playing football. Donald M. Fink, M.D., was hired by the Raiders to examine and treat Mr. Jones. In August of 1979, the Raiders terminated Mr. Jones' contract to play football. Thereafter, he filed an "injury grievance" against the Raiders pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement between the National Football League Players Association and petitioner National Football League Management Council ("Management Council").

In May of 1982, Mr. Jones signed an authorization, pursuant to California Evidence Code section 1158 ¹ to permit his attorneys to obtain his medical records. Copies of the authorization were served upon the Raiders and Dr. Fink. Both have refused to produce Mr. Jones' medical records.

Mr. Jones petitioned the superior court for an order to show cause why production should not be ordered. The court granted the order to show cause and, after hearing, issued an order compelling production of all medical records in the custody and control of the Raiders and Dr. Fink describing the physical condition of and the treatment provided to Mr. Jones. The date for compliance, originally set for July 6, 1982, was extended to July 22, 1982, to permit the court to consider a petition by the Management Council to intervene in the proceeding. The court denied the petition to intervene. This petition by the Management Council, the Raiders, and Dr. Fink followed.

Petitioners contend that the superior court lacked jurisdiction to rule in an area covered by the collective bargaining agreement entered into by the National Football League players and management. They point out that the agreement provides for a grievance/arbitration procedure to cover injury grievances and that the arbitration procedure does not authorize discovery by the grievant. They contend that because the agreement does not mention discovery, the decision whether to release medical reports is one of the residual "management rights" retained in article I, section 4 of the agreement: "Management Rights: The NFL clubs maintain and reserve the right to manage and direct their operations in any manner whatsoever, except as specifically limited by the provisions of this Agreement." To bolster their argument, they note that article II, section 1 of the agreement provides: "... This Agreement represents the complete understanding of the parties on all subjects covered herein, and there will be no change in the terms and conditions of this Agreement without mutual consent...."

Real party in interest asserts that his production request in no way requires interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement but only involves an attempt by a patient to obtain access to his medical records as permitted by state law. He contends that case authority which restricts state courts from interfering in certain areas of federal labor law does not prevent a state court from enforcing state law in an area of merely peripheral concern to federal labor law. Real party also challenges petitioners' logic in finding that because the matter of medical records production is not included within the collective bargaining agreement, that subject is not one for state court concern.

Simply stated, the main issue in this case is whether the existence of a collective bargaining agreement, which does not specifically authorize discovery, in an industry subject to federal labor law deprives state courts of jurisdiction to enforce the provisions of Evidence Code section 1158 in a dispute between an employee and management. Since the collective bargaining agreement is silent on the subject of production of medical records, the petition raises no issue of conflict between such provision and state law and no issue of waiver of the protections of state law.

Two California opinions rendered on appeals brought by the Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bartenders Union have traced and considered the doctrine of federal preemption in labor law. Hotel & Restaurant Employees etc. Union v. Anaheim Operating, Inc. (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 737, 147 Cal.Rptr. 510 (referred to as "Anaheim Operating, Inc.") raised the question of whether a civil suit for defamation could be maintained where the alleged defamatory statements were made during a union organizing campaign. The appellate court concluded that the suit could be maintained. It noted that: "Early cases suggested that states could apply their own common law, but could not apply state rules specifically enacted to regulate labor regulations. (Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 290 [29 L.Ed.2d 473, 484-485, 91 S.Ct. 1909, 1919].) Other early decisions allowed the states to interject themselves into labor relations where they could provide a remedy not available under federal law. (Id., at p. 291 [91 S.Ct. at p. 1920, 29 L.Ed.2d at p. 485].) Still others allowed state intervention so long as state court decisions were not inconsistent with federal labor law. (Id.) All these approaches were eventually rejected by the court. (Id.)

"A workable rule finally began to emerge beginning with the 1953 decision in San Diego Unions v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 [79 S.Ct. 773, 3 L.Ed.2d 775].

"...

"The court then formulated the following general rule: 'When it is clear or may fairly be assumed that the activities which a State purports to regulate are protected by § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, or constitute an unfair labor practice under § 8, due regard for the federal enactment requires that state jurisdiction must yield. To leave the States free to regulate conduct so plainly within the central aim of federal regulation involves too great a danger of conflict between power asserted by Congress and requirements imposed by state law.' (Id., at p. 244 [79 S.Ct. at p. 779, 3 L.Ed.2d at p. 782].)

"However, the court recognized two exceptions to this general rule: it would 'not [withdraw] from the States [the] power to regulate where the activity regulated was a merely peripheral concern of the Labor Management Relations Act[,]' and (2) 'where the regulated conduct touched interests so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility that, in the absence of compelling congressional direction, we could not infer that Congress had deprived the States of the power to act.' (Id., at pp. 243-244 [79 S.Ct. at pp. 778-779, 3 L.Ed.2d at p. 782].) The court concluded that the peaceful picketing and economic pressure which formed the basis of the suit did not fit within either of the categories excepted. Therefore, under the general rule formulated, it held that the state court could not exercise jurisdiction in the case before it." (Id., at pp. 744, 746-747, 79 S.Ct. at pp. 780-781, fn. omitted.)

Following Garmon, the Supreme Court extended the state court's authority in Linn v. Plant Guard Workers (1966) 383 U.S. 53, 86 S.Ct. 657, 15 L.Ed.2d 582, by permitting a suit for defamation where the National Labor Relations Board had rejected an unfair labor practice complaint filed by the aggrieved employer. As interpreted by the Anaheim Operating, Inc., court: "This 'departure from [the] well-established rule' (id. 383 U.S. at p. 72 [86 S.Ct. at p. 668, 15 L.Ed.2d at p. 595] ) announced in Garmon was justified on several grounds: First, statements uttered with malice are not entitled to the protection of section 7 of the act, which allows employees to form, join, or assist labor organizations and to bargain collectively and engage in concerted activity, and to refrain from any of the above activities. Because section 7 does not protect the utterance of malicious defamation, state regulation of such defamation is 'a "merely peripheral concern of the Labor Management Relations Act[.]" ' (Linn v. Plant Guard Workers, supra, 383 U.S. 53, 61 [86 S.Ct. 657, 662, 15 L.Ed.2d 582, 589].) As stated above, Garmon specifically held that state regulation of matters which peripherally concerned the act constituted an exception to the general rule and was permissible.

"Second, the opinion declared that the state has 'an overriding ... interest' in protecting its citizens from malicious libel, and this interest 'is "so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility" that it fits within the exception specifically carved out by [Garmon].' (Linn v. Plant Guard Workers, supra, 383 U.S. 53, 62 [86 S.Ct. 657, 663, 15 L.Ed.2d 582, 589].)

"Third, it continued, ' "[t]o the extent ... that Congress has not prescribed procedure for dealing with the consequences of tortious conduct already committed, there is no ground for concluding that existing criminal penalties or liabilities for tortious conduct have been eliminated...." ' (Id., at pp. 61-62 [86 S.Ct. at pp. 661-662, 15 L.Ed.2d at p. 589].)

"Fourth, '[w]hile the Board might find that an employer or...