National Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Knapp

• Decision Date: 24 April 1968
• Docket Number: No. 87,87
• Citation: 430 S.W.2d 84
• Parties: The NATIONAL LIFE AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant, v. Beverly J. KNAPP, a widow, Appellee. . Houston (14th Dist.)
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 84

430 S.W.2d 84

The NATIONAL LIFE AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant, v. Beverly J. KNAPP, a widow, Appellee.

No. 87.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas Houston (14th Dist.).

April 24, 1968.

Rehearing Denied May 22, 1968.

Tom C. Primm, Patterson, McDaniel, Moore & Browder, Houston, for appellant.

Lloyd M. Lunsford, South Houston, for appellee.

SAM D. JOHNSON, Justice.

This suit was brought by the appellee, Beverly J. Knapp, against the appellant, National Life and Accident Insurance Company for accidental death benefits provided by a supplemental agreement to a policy of life insurance on her deceased husband, William M. Knapp. The basic policy of life insurance provided coverage in the sum of $3,000.00 which was paid. Attached to the policy was a supplemental agreement, providing $5,000.00 additional insurance if William M. Knapp's death resulted from bodily injuries effected 'through external, violent and accidental means.'

The supplemental agreement provides for additional coverage 'Upon receipt * * * of due proof that * * * the death of the insured resulted from bodily injuries as herein defined * * *.' The agreement then defines the bodily injuries. 'As used in this agreement, 'bodily injuries' shall mean injuries which are effected directly and independently of all other causes through external, violent and accidental means, as evidenced by a visible contusion or wound on the exterior of the body * * *.' The supplemental agreement then proceeds to enumerate certain exclusions from coverage. Reliance by the appellant is placed on only one of the exclusions, it providing, 'No payment shall be made under this agreement if the death of the insured * * * (5) resulted from the intentional act of another during an altercation in which the Insured participated otherwise than as a spectator * * *.'

William M. Knapp's death occurred during the early morning of February 25, 1965 at about 12:30 a.m. He was struck and killed by a bullet from a 30.06 rifle discharged by Gerald T. Hartwell as he was trying to gain entry through the front door of Hartwell's home. The house in which Hartwell lived was in the same block and was the second house from that of Knapp.

On this particular evening, Hartwell was at home with his wife and three-year old child who were asleep. Hartwell was watching television when he heard what sounded like a knock on the door. As he got up to answer, the knocking increased considerably in intensity. By the time he reached the door, the knocking had increased to a pounding. Hartwell asked who was there and received the reply, 'It didn't make any difference, he just wanted in.' Other requests for identification obtained similar answers, including profanity. Hartwell could not see through the solid door so he went to the double windows just to the left and attempted to see who was outside. The angle was too great between the windows and the door and he could not see who was pounding on the door. Hartwell testified that the person at the door began wriggling the door knob and began kicking and beating on the door, continuing to demand that he be admitted. As this continued, Hartwell got his 30.06 deer rifle from his bedroom and went back into the living room where the front door was located. Hartwell then fired one shot from the rifle into the door facing three or four inches below the upper left-hand corner. As the beating and kicking on the door continued, Hartwell fired a second shot through the approximate center of the door, about waist high. Following the second shot, Hartwell heard a moan from outside the door and the beating and kicking on the door terminated. Shortly after this, William M. Knapp was found dead on the front porch of the Hartwell house and it was determined that he was killed as a result of a gunshot wound.

Prior to the occurrence described, Knapp had been in the company of Henry E. Dressler and Joseph Roy Mouton. Dressler was a bartender at Buck's Bar where, he testified, he had served Knapp one bottle of beer. Mouton was a motion picture operator who customarily drove his car by Buck's Bar after work and picked up Dressler and drove him home. On this particular night Knapp had asked for a ride to his house which was located in the same general area where they were going. After Mouton arrived at Buck's Bar he waited in his car. Knapp went to Mouton's car and they sat and waited until Dressler closed the bar and came out and got in with them. The three of them then proceeded to drive home together shortly after midnight on a particularly cold night. Both Dressler and Mouton were generally familiar with the area but depended on Knapp to direct them to his particular home. Driving to the block where Knapp lived, they stopped at one house which had a gas light in front, whereupon Knapp stated that they had passed his house. Mouton, the driver, then backed up a number of houses until Knapp said, 'This is it,' and stopped again. Knapp got out of the car and as Mouton and Dressler drove away, was proceeding toward this second house.

All of the homes in the block were somewhat similar. Only two of the houses those of Knapp and Hartwell, had gas lights and only one house separated them. In addition to the gas lights there appear to be substantial similarities between the Knapp and Hartwell residences. Though Knapp's wife and two daughters had lived there for approximately two years, Knapp, a merchant seaman, was away from home for a substantial part of the time. Knapp and Hartwell had never seen or met each other.

The plaintiff's case was presented on the theory that Knapp mistook the Hartwell residence for his own and everything that followed was predicated upon his mistaken assumption and belief that he was at his own home. Arriving at what he thought was his house, he attempted to gain admittance as he normally would. Hearing a strange man's voice inside of what he thought was his home, he intensified his efforts to gain admittance thinking of his wife and two minor daughters inside.

In response to special issues propounded by the trial court, the jury found that Knapp's death was a result of accidental means, that the death of Knapp was not the result of the intentional act of Hartwell, and that Hartwell and Knapp were not involved in an altercation on the date and time in question.

By numerous points of error, appellant presents two fundamental contentions. First, that Knapp's death did not occur as a result of 'accidental means.' Second, that Knapp's death was a result of an 'intentional act' on the part of Hartwell.

We first consider appellant's contention that Knapp's death did not occur as a result of 'accidental means.' To be entitled to the benefits of the supplementary agreement the burden of pleading and proving its applicability was upon the claimant. Combined American Ins. Co. v. Blanton, 163 Tex. 225, 353 S.W.2d 847, rev'd on other grds., Tex.Civ.App., 348 S.W.2d 85; Tix v. Employers Casualty Co., Tex.Civ.App., 368 S.W.2d 105, no writ hist.; Gipson v. Aetna Ins. Co ., Tex.Civ.App., 373 S.W.2d 311, no writ hist. It was here stipulated by the parties that William M. Knapp died as a result of a gunshot wound in his abdomen, obviously an 'external and violent' bodily injury. The inquiry must then focus on whether or not the jury's finding that Knapp's death was the result of 'accidental means' is sufficiently supported by the evidence.

The test of whether death is accidental, within the terms of the policy supplement is a fact question to be determined by the jury and is to be determined from the viewpoint of the insured and not from the viewpoint of the one that does the killing. Releford v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 154 Tex. 228, 276 S.W.2d 517; Hutcherson v. Sovereign Camp, W.O.W., 112 Tex. 551, 251 S.W. 491; Life & Casualty Ins. Co. of Tennessee v. Martinez, Tex.Civ.App., 299 S.W.2d 181, no writ hist.; Spencer v. Southland Life Ins. Co., Tex.Civ.App., 340 S.W.2d 335, err. ref.

Here, as previously stated, the jury affirmatively found that Knapp's death occurred as a result of 'accidental means.' The word 'means' as employed in the term 'accidental means' is synonymous with 'cause.' Bryant v. Continental Casualty Co., 107 Tex. 582, 182 S.W. 673. From the time of this definition, the courts of this state have had numerous instances in which 'accidental means' has been given interpretation. A partial and interesting summarization appears in the dissent of Justice Calvert in Pan American Life Ins. Co. v. Andrews, 161 Tex. 391, 340 S.W.2d 787 (1960).

In Hanna v. Rio Grande Nat. Life Ins. Co., Tex.Civ.App., 181 S.W.2d 908, err. ref., the courts states, 'Where the effect is not the natural and probable consequence of the means which produce it--an effect which does not ordinarily follow and cannot be reasonably anticipated from the use of the means, or an effect which the actor did not intend to produce, and which he cannot be charged with a design of producing--it is produced by accidental means.' What were the 'means' that produced the bodily injuries resulting in death of the insured in the case at bar? The record shows that the insured and Hartwell, though they lived in close proximity, were unknown to each other. Their homes were similar. Others had mistaken these homes both before and after the event in question. Both had the only gas lights in the block, it was late at night and no other plausible reason for Knapp's being at the Hartwell home was suggested. The insured identified Hartwell's house as his own saying, 'This is it.' The jury was obviously persuaded to the plaintiff's theory, that of mistaken identity of the houses by Knapp. Within a matter of a few short minutes this was the 'means' that produced the bodily injuries resulting in Knapp's death. This was the initiating action or the cause of what immediately followed. This was not an effect which ordinarily follows or could be reasonably anticipated. The insured had no...