National Psychological Ass'n for Psychoanalysis, Inc. v. University of State of N.Y.

• Decision Date: 08 July 1960
• Citation: 203 N.Y.S.2d 821,168 N.E.2d 649,8 N.Y.2d 197
• Parties: , 168 N.E.2d 649 NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION FOR PSYCHOANALYSIS, INC., et al., Appellants, v. UNIVERSITY OF the STATE OF NEW YORK, Respondent.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 821

203 N.Y.S.2d 821

8 N.Y.2d 197, 168 N.E.2d 649

NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION FOR PSYCHOANALYSIS, INC.,

et al., Appellants,

v.

UNIVERSITY OF the STATE OF NEW YORK, Respondent.

Court of Appeals of New York.

July 8, 1960.

Lyman Stansky, New York City (Osmond K. Fraenkel, New York City, of counsel), for appellants.

Louis J. Lefkowitz, Atty. Gen. (Samuel A. Hirshowitz, New York City, paxton Blair, Albany, and Philip Watson, New York City, of counsel), for respondent.

John H. Mariano, New York City, for New York State Psychological Association, Inc., amicus curiae.

FROESSEL, Judge.

The constitutionality of article 153 (§§ 7601-7614) of the Education Law Consol.Laws, c. 16 (L.1956, ch. 737), which deals with the certification of psychologists, was unsuccessfully challenged by plaintiff membership corporation, dedicated to the advancement of psychoanalysis (herein called NPAP), and four of its members, each of whom has since been certified under the statute. Since the question involved is of important public interest and one likely to arise again, we deem it appropriate to entertain the appeal on the merits (United Press Associations v. Valente, 308 N.Y. 71, 76, 123 N.E.2d 777, 778).

Drafted by State agencies and interested professional groups, and widely approved by the psychological fraternity (see Governor's Message. Public Papers of, governor Harriman, 1956, pp. 416-417; Memoranda of Education Department, L.Y.Legis.Ann., 1956, pp. 214-215, and Mental Hygiene Department, McKinney's 1956 Session Laws, pp. 1928-1929), article 153 is a certification rather than a licensing law, i. e., it does not prohibit anyone from rendering psychological services, but proscribes the professional use by noncertificants of the title 'psychologist' and its derivatives, for remuneration. Section 7602 prohibits noncertified individuals from representing themselves as psychologists, and section 7601 defines a person who 'represents himself to be a 'psychologist" as one who 'holds himself out to the public by any title or description of services incorporating the words 'psychological', 'psychologist' or 'psychology', and under such title or description offers to render or renders services to individuals, corporations, or the public for remuneration.' (Emphasis supplied.)

Section 7605 empowers the Department of Education to issue 'a certificate as psychologist' to a citizen (or one who has declared his intention), of good moral character, at least 21 years of age, who pays a $40 fee, 'passes a satisfactory examination in psychology', has 'received the doctoral degree based on a program of studies whose content was primarily psychological from an educational institution having a graduate program registered by the department, or its substantial equivalent in both subject matter and extent of training' (emphasis supplied), and has had 'at least two years of satisfactory supervised experience in rendering psychological services'. For a specified period, the board is empowered to waive examination for those meeting prescribed standards of academic achievement and professional experience.

The statute further provides for biennial registration of certified psychologists (§ 7606); nondisclosure of privileged communications (§ 7611); and revocation or suspension of certificates, after notice and hearing before the Commissioner of Education, with the right of judicial review by way of an article 78 proceeding of the suspension, revocation, 'or refusing to issue or renew a certificate' (§ 7607). Employees of governmental agencies and chartered educational institutions are exempt from the operation of the statute (§ 7609); the practice of medicine is not authorized (§ 7610); and violation of the statute is made a misdemeanor (§ 7608).

Article 153 was designed to accomplish a two-fold purpose. On the one hand, it 'recognizes and gives status to the profession of psycholgy' (Governor's Message, supra) by 'giving qualified psychologists official recognition' (Memo., Mental Hygiene Dept., supra), and by placing the 'confidential relations and communications' between a registered psychologist and his client 'on the same basis as those provided by law between attorney and client' (§ 7611). In this aspect, its sponsors felt that the statute would encourage bona fide psychologists with university training and professionally supervised experience to offer their needed professional services to the public in increasing numbers.

On the other hand, it was 'apparent to all who are concerned with the field of public health that the public (was) entitled to protection in the form of state supervision' over the increasingly important field of psychology (Memo., Education Dept., supra). By prohibiting the use of the word 'psychologist' and its variants in connection with the rendition of professional services for pay, it was felt that the statute would 'make it possible to eliminate unqualified persons who are presently able to hold themselves out to the public as psychologists' (Mome., Education Dept., supra), and help to protect the public against charlatans and quacks who, despite inadequate training and professional experience, guarantee easy solutions to psychological problems. ¹

Aside from the presumption of constitutionality which must be accorded a legislative enactment (Lincoln .bldg. Assciates v. Barr, 1 N.Y.2d 413, 415, 153 N.Y.S.2d 633, 635), it cannot be gainsaid that the statute is reasonably related to the public health and welfare, and thus constitutes a proper exercise of the State's police power under the due process clause of the State and Federal Constitutions, Const. art. 1, § 6; U.S.Const. Amend. 14. Through the medium of official certification of qualifications, it helps the public to identify those who have appropriate training and background in the profession of psychology. At the same time, it affords protection against the incompetent practitioner by providing a yardstick by which the public can judge the competence of persons offering psychological services.

We have upheld the certification as opposed to the complete licensing approach in the fields of accountancy (Berkowitz v. Wilson, 307 N.Y. 851, 122 N.E.2d 743), and plumbing (People ex rel. Nechamcus v. Warden of City Prison, 144 N.Y. 529, at pages 538-539, 39 N.E. 686, at page 689, 27 L.R.A. 718), and, as stated in the latter case, 'if the act is a step in the direction of something which will enure to the public health and comfort, that it does not go as far as it might, is not a reason for invalidating it' ². Since 'we may not, of course, substitute our judgment for that of the Legislature as to the wisdom or expediency of the legislation' (Thompson v. Wallin (and two companion cases), 301 N.Y. 476, 488, 95 N.E.2d 806, 811, affirmed 342 U.S. 485, 801, 951, 72 S.Ct. 92, 96 L.Ed. 607), the strong convictions expressed by the plaintiffs against the soundness and efficacy of the statute have no bearing on its constitutionality (see Beauharnais v. People of State of Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 262, 72 S.Ct. 725, 96 L.Ed. 919; People v. Schweinler Press, 214 N.Y. 395, 406-407, 108 N.E. 639, 641-642, appeal dismissed 242 U.S. 618, 37 S.Ct. 214, 61 L.Ed. 530).

The constitutional arguments pressed on this appeal revolve around the fact that the statute does not contain a formal definition of 'psychologist' or its proscribed derivatives. Plaintiffs contend that the absence of such a definition renders the statute violative of due process in two respects: (1) it arbitrarily restricts the carrying on of a lawful occupation in that it prohibits a noncertified psychologist from truthfully describing his professional services, and (2) the statute's qualifying standards are meaningless without a definition to which they can attach, and hence the statute unlawfully delegates legislative power without accompanying standards to guide the exercise of administrative discretion.

The omission of a formal definition of 'psychology' or its variants was no legislative oversight. Attempts to draft a definition that would sufficiently delineate the nature and scope of psychology had failed (Memos., Mental Hygiene and Education Depts., supra), and, as noted by Special Term, 'the law was enacted in a form that was acceptable to interested groups and that requires no interpretation of that term for its enforcement'. The standards of fitness established by the Legislature imbue the title 'psychologist' with meaningful content, and a person with a bona fide claim to that title will meet those qualifications and be accorded official recognition, as were the individual plaintiffs herein. To 'assure adequate representation of the diverse fields of psychology' on the State Board of Examiners, the Legislature specifically provided that 'the board shall at all times, except for vacancies, have two members representing the training institutions in psychology, three members who engage in rendering service in psychology and two members who devote a majority of their time to rendering...