Martin v. State Liquor Authority

• Decision Date: 31 July 1964
• Citation: 43 Misc.2d 682,252 N.Y.S.2d 365
• Parties: Vlasta MARTIN and Herbert Goldberg, as Licensed Owners of Retail Liquor Package Stores, on Behalf of Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs, v. STATE LIQUOR AUTHORITY, Defendant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court

Page 365

252 N.Y.S.2d 365

43 Misc.2d 682

Vlasta MARTIN and Herbert Goldberg, as Licensed Owners of Retail Liquor Package Stores, on Behalf of Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs, v. STATE LIQUOR AUTHORITY, Defendant.

Supreme Court, Special Term, Albany County.

July 31, 1964

Charles B. Torche, Albany, for plaintiffs, in support of original application and in opposition to cross motion.

Louis J. Lefkowitz, Atty. Gen. (Ruth Kessler Toch, Asst. Sol. Gen., Albany, of counsel), for defendant, in opposition to original application and in support of cross motion.

LAWRENCE H. COOKE, Justice.

Plaintiffs, the owners of two retail liquor package stores in Queens County, on behalf of themselves and all other licensed owners of such stores, institute this action for a declaratory judgment that section 13 and 14 of chapter 531 of the Laws of 1964 are invalid and for injunctive relief. At this point, plaintiffs apply for a preliminary injunction restraining defendant from enforcing the provisions of said sections and defendant cross moves for dismissal of the complaint on the ground that it fails to state a cause of action. Because of said cross motion, plaintiffs urge that they are entitled to summary judgment under CPLR Rule 3211(c).

Said chapter 531 was enacted at an Extraordinary Session of the Legislature and became a law the April 16, 1964 with the approval of the Governor. Section 13 and 14, as controverted here and which took effect immediately, provide:

' § 13. Subdivisions four and four-a of section one hundred five of such law, subdivision four having been amended by chapter five hundred twenty of the laws of nineteen hundred forty-seven, and subdivision four-a having been amended by chapter five hundred sixty-six of the laws of nineteen hundred forty-one, are hereby repealed.

' § 14. Nothing contained in section thirteen of this act shall be construed as impairing or affecting the power of the state liquor authority to determine, in accordance with other provisions of the alcoholic beverage control law, whether public convenience and advantage will be promoted by the issuance of licenses to traffic in alcoholic beverages, the increase or decrease in the number thereof and the location of premises licensed thereby.'

Subdivision 4 of section 105 of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law, as repealed by section 13 and as pertinent here, had specified:

'4. No ratail license to sell liquor and/or wine for off-premises consumption shall be granted in cities having a population of one million or more for any premises which shall be located within 1500 feet of any premises holding a similar license on the same street or avenue; elsewhere, no such license may be granted for premises which are located within 70 feet of any other premises so licensed on the same street or avenue. * * *'

Subdivision 4-a had provided that the Liquor Authority could permit, in its discretion, premises first licensed prior to January 1, 1941 to be removed not to exceed 100 feet in order to carry out or improve the purpose of subdivision 4, notwithstanding the provisions of said subdivision 4.

We start with the legal principles that a legislative enactment carries with it an exceedingly strong presumption of constitutionality, that while this presumption is rebuttable unconstitutionality must be demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt, that every intendment is in favor of the statute's validity, that the party alleging unconstitutionality has a heavy burden and that only as a last resort will courts strike down legislative enactments on the ground of unconstitutionality (I. L. F. Y. Co. v. Temporary State Housing Rent Comm., 10 N.Y.2d 263, 269, 219 N.Y.S.2d 249, 252, 176 N.E.2d 822, 825, app. dsmd. 369 U.S. 795, 82 S.Ct. 1155, 8 L.Ed.2d 285; Wiggins v. Town of Somers, 4 N.Y.2d 215, 218-219, 173 N.Y.S.2d 579, 581-582, 149 N.E.2d 869, 871-872; Lincoln Bldg. Associates v Barr, 1 N.Y.2d 413, 415, 418, 153 N.Y.S.2d 633, 634, 637, 135 N.E.2d 801, 802, 804; Farrington v. Pinckney, 1 N.Y.2d 74, 78, 150 N.Y.S.2d 585, 591, 133 N.E.2d 817, 821; Definance Milk Products Co. v. Du Mond, 309 N.Y. 537, 540-541, 132 N.E.2d 829, 830-831; Matter of Ahern v. South Buffalo Ry. Co., 303 N.Y. 545, 555, 104 N.E.2d 898, 903, affd. 344 U.S. 367, 73 S.Ct. 340, 97 L.Ed. 395). Nor may courts substitute their judgment for that of the Legislature as to the wisdom and expediency of the legislation and the convictions expressed by plaintiffs as to the soundness and efficacy of the statute have no bearing on its constitutionality (Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730, 83 S.Ct. 1028, 10 L.Ed.2d 93; American Communications Assn. v. Douds, CIO, 339 U.S. 382, 400-401, 70 S.Ct. 674, 94 L.Ed. 925; Nat. Psycho. Assn. for Psychoanalysis, Inc. v. Univ. of State of New York, 8 N.Y.2d 197, 203, 203 N.Y.S.2d 821, 825, 168 N.E.2d 649, 652, app. dsmd. 365 U.S. 298, 81 S.Ct. 691, 5 L.Ed.2d 688; Thompson v. Willin, 301 N.Y. 476, 488, 95 N.E.2d 806, 810, affd. sub nom. Adler v. Board of Educ. of City of New York, 342 U.S. 485, 801, 951, 72 S.Ct. 380, 96 L.Ed. 517).

There is a further presumption that the Legislature has investigated for and found facts necessary to support the legislation (I. L. F. Y. Co. v. Temporary State Housing Rent Comm., 10 N.Y.2d 263, 269, 219 N.Y.S.2d 249, 252, 176 N.E.2d 822, 825; Lincoln Bldg. Associates v. Barr, 1 N.Y.2d 413, 415, 153 N.Y.S.2d 633, 634, 135 N.E.2d 801, 802; East New York Sav. Bank v. Hahn, 293 N.Y. 622, 628, 59 N.E.2d 625, 626, affd. 326 U.S. 230, 66 S.Ct. 69, 90 L.Ed. 34; Szold v. Outlet Embroidery Supply Co., 274 N.Y. 271, 278, 8 N.E.2d 858, 860). But, besides this generality, the Legislature had before it on April 16, 1964, when it passed chapter 531, five Study Papers and four Reports of the Moreland Commission on the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law, said Commission having been appointed by the Governor on February 15, 1963 and directed to undertake a 'thorough study and reappraisal of the Law with respect to the sale and distribution of alcoholic beverages in the State' and to propose any revisions of the law which might be found necessary 'in the light of experience and current social and economic conditions.' See: the Commission's 'Report and Recommendations No. 1--The Licensing and Regulation of Retail Package Liquor Stores', submitted on January 3, 1964, pp. 15, 44, 46.

Plaintiff's attack is centered in the argument that the sections in question are an invalid delegation of legislative power to defendant, the effect of the repeal of subdivisions 4 and 4-a of said section 105 being to grant to defendant an uncontrolled and unguided power to license liquor stores with, at most, only vague standards.

Section 1 of article III of the Constitution of this State provides: 'The legislative power of this State shall be vested in the Senate and Assembly' and, because of this provision, the Legislature cannot pass on its law-making functions to other bodies (Packer Collegiate Inst. v. University of State of New York, 298 N.Y. 184, 189, 81 N.E.2d 80, 81; Matter of Mooney v. Cohen, 272 N.Y. 33, 37, 4 N.E.2d 73, 74; Darweger v. Staats, 267 N.Y. 290, 304-305, 196 N.E. 61, 65-66; Stanton v. Board of Supervisors of Essex County, 191 N.Y. 428, 432, 84 N.E. 380, 381). There is, however, no constitutional prohibition against the delegation of power, with reasonable safeguards and standards, to an agency or commission to administer the law as enacted by the Legislature (Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470, 496, 24 S.Ct. 349, 48 L.Ed. 525; Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 12 S.Ct. 495, 36 L.Ed. 294; Matter of Federal Tel. & Radio Corp. (Corsi), 301 N.Y. 95, 99, 92 N.E.2d 907, 908; Packer Collegiate Institute v. University of State of New York, 298 N.Y. 184, 190, 81 N.E.2d 80; Trustees of Vil. of Saratoga Spgs. v. Saratoga G., etc., Co., 191 N.Y. 123, 136-138, 83 N.E. 693, 696-697, 18 L.R.A.,N.S., 713; Matter of Aloe v. Dassler, 278 App.Div. 975, 106 N.Y.S.2d 24, affd. 303 N.Y 878, 105 N.E.2d 104; Mtr. of Barone v. Waterfront Comm. of New York Harbor, 18 Misc.2d 1066, 1069, 187 N.Y.S.2d 617, 621, affd. 8 A.D.2d 783, 187 N.Y.S.2d 622, affd. 7 N.Y.2d 613, 197 N.Y.S.2d 479, 165 N.E.2d 427). It has been stated that the true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law; that the first cannot be done; but, to the latter, no valid objection can be made. (Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 12 S.Ct. 495, 36 L.Ed. 294; Tropp v. Knickerbocker Village, 205 Misc. 200, 211-212, 122 N.Y.S.2d 350, 361-362, affd. 284 App.Div. 935, 135 N.Y.S.2d 618; Matter of Olp v. Town of Brighton, 173 Misc. 1079, 19 N.Y.S.2d 546, affd. 262 App.Div. 944, 29 N.Y.S.2d 956).

The Legislature may constitutionally confer discretion upon an administrative agency only if it limits the field in which that discretion is to operate and provides standards to govern its exercise; but this does not mean that a precise or specific formula must be furnished in a field where flexibility and the adaptation of the legislative policy to infinitely variable conditions constitute the essence of the program and the standards or guides need only be prescribed in so detailed a fashion as is reasonably practicable in the light of the complexities of the particular area to be regulated, as necessity fixes a point beyond which it is unreasonable and impracticable to compel the Legislature to prescribe detailed rules (Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 785, 68 S.Ct. 1294, 92 L.Ed. 1694; Chiropractic Assn. of New York, Inc. v. Hilleboe, 12 N.Y.2d 109, 120, 237 N.Y.S.2d 289, 296, 187 N.E.2d 756, 761; Mtr. of City of Utica v. Water Pollution Control Bd., 5 N.Y.2d 164, 168-170, 182 N.Y.S.2d 584, 586-588, 156 N.E.2d 301, 303-305). The courts have long recognized that the Legislature may and, indeed...