National Treasury Emp. Union v. Reagan

• Decision Date: 26 February 1981
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 81-0195,81-0240 and 81-0284.,81-0199,81-0198
• Citation: 509 F. Supp. 1337
• Parties: NATIONAL TREASURY EMPLOYEES UNION et al., Plaintiffs, v. Ronald W. REAGAN et al., Defendants. Melody A. TROTT, Plaintiff, v. Ronald W. REAGAN et al., Defendants. Marc R. WINE et al., Plaintiffs, v. Ronald W. REAGAN et al., Defendants. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES et al., Plaintiffs, v. Ronald W. REAGAN et al., Defendants. Elaine M. BOUTILIER, Plaintiff, v. Ronald W. REAGAN et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

509 F. Supp. 1337

NATIONAL TREASURY EMPLOYEES UNION et al., Plaintiffs, v. Ronald W. REAGAN et al., Defendants.

Melody A. TROTT, Plaintiff, v. Ronald W. REAGAN et al., Defendants.

Marc R. WINE et al., Plaintiffs, v. Ronald W. REAGAN et al., Defendants.

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES et al., Plaintiffs, v. Ronald W. REAGAN et al., Defendants.

Elaine M. BOUTILIER, Plaintiff, v. Ronald W. REAGAN et al., Defendants.

Civ. A. Nos. 81-0195, 81-0198, 81-0199, 81-0240 and 81-0284.

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

February 26, 1981.

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Joseph B. Scott, Irving Kator, Kator & Scott, Washington, D. C., for plaintiffs Marc R. Wine et al.

Robert M. Tobias, John F. Bufe, Sharyn Danch, William F. White, National Treasury Emp. Union, Washington, D. C., for plaintiffs National Treasury Emp. Union and Elaine M. Boutilier.

Philip L. Chabot, Jr., Carol MacKinnon, Duncan, Weinberg & Miller, P. C., Washington, D. C., for plaintiff Melody A. Trott.

Michael J. Grealy, Raymond J. Malloy, National Ass'n of Government Emp., Washington, D. C., for plaintiffs Nat. Ass'n of Government Emp. et al.

Phillip Sturman, John J. Boyd, Jr., Smith, Somerville & Case, Baltimore, Md., for intervenor in No. 81-0195.

Alphonse M. Alfano, Shiela Lieber, R. Lawrence Dessem, U. S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

CHARLES R. RICHEY, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Court has before it complaints in five (5) cases which have been consolidated for all purposes.¹ All seek declaratory and injunctive relief in the form of cross-motions for summary judgment, there being no material facts in dispute growing out of President Reagan's hiring freeze signed on January 20, 1981, and by its terms made effective from November 5, 1980, forward.² The plaintiffs also seek damages in amounts less than $10,000.00. The Presidential action was followed by two bulletins issued pursuant thereto by Acting Director McComber of the Office of Management and Budget and David Stockman, the Director of OMB.³ The President's hiring freeze and the two subsequent bulletins contained provisions for exemption from such freeze in certain limited circumstances generally on the basis of hardship and the essential character of the work to be performed. It appears that some of the class members herein have been granted such exemptions since this litigation commenced on January 28, 1981.

The plaintiffs herein have all sought to be certified as a class within the meaning of Rule 23(b)(1) and (2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court has considered this question and, by separate Order issued today, has conditionally certified the class for the reasons stated therein. Although not pertinent to the propriety of the class action, the Court notes that this action will also facilitate the processing of this litigation at the least possible cost and in the least amount of time.

At the outset, it must be understood that the courts have a limited role in this area of federal employment relations. See Yacavone v. Bolger, Postmaster General of the United States, 645 F.2d 1028 (D.C. Cir. 1981). As long as the decision here involved was not arbitrary and capricious and did not otherwise violate the Constitution, laws of Congress or any relevant procedural requirements, the decision of the President and his inferior officers with respect to the hiring freeze must be affirmed. After careful analysis of the applicable law, including the Constitution, Congressional enactments, regulations, and judicial decisions, it appears clear that the instant claims cannot be sustained because they are based upon mere offers of jobs which do not rise to the level of "appointments" to the federal civil service between the time frame of November 5, 1980, and January 20, 1981.

The plaintiffs also argue that the President's action was retroactive from the time he took office to the day after the 1980 Presidential Election and was, therefore, invalid. This cannot withstand legal analysis because the plaintiffs merely got "offers" or "expectations" of jobs from people with or without authority to make appointments to the federal civil service, and, since the claimants did not execute or complete the Office of Personnel Management Forms 50 or 52, and, since this was a discretionary act, it did not affect legitimate or vested rights of any claimant accruing prior to January 20, 1981.

Next, the plaintiffs argue that even if they did not have a valid "appointment", the offers created a protected property interest based upon substantive and procedural due process considerations under the Fifth Amendment. This, again, is erroneous because, as indicated, they were not "appointed" to their jobs but at best had only an expectancy as opposed to a protected property interest.

Lastly, the plaintiffs assert that the defendants and their agents are estopped from denying their employment, whether or not they were "appointed" (which they were not). As the defendants point out in their Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, the Supreme Court, from the very beginning of the Republic, has recognized the rule that the government cannot be estopped even though hardship to private parties might result in individual cases. Lee v. Munroe and Thornton, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 366, 3 L.Ed. 373 (1813). This principle is founded on the view that a contrary rule would make it "very difficult for the public to protect itself." Id. at 369.

Plaintiffs, however, assert that this principle which exempts the government from the normal principles of equitable estoppel only applies to unauthorized acts of agency officials. Therefore, it is argued that estoppel does apply to the government when letters were sent by agents with appointment authority. However, even when applying the elements of equitable estoppel to defendants' authorized actions, the requirements are not met. The Supreme Court, in Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Hibi, 414 U.S. 5, 94 S.Ct. 19, 38 L.Ed.2d 7 (1973), implicitly acknowledged that the government might be estopped for its "affirmative misconduct," and, subsequently, the Ninth Circuit has held that this requires a showing of an affirmative misrepresentation or affirmative concealment of material facts. See Santiago v. INS, 526 F.2d 488 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971, 91 S.Ct. 2167, 48 L.Ed.2d 794 (1976). See also Parker v. Sager, 174 F.2d 567, 661 (D.C.Cir.1948). It is undisputed that the government officials who notified plaintiffs of their selection for federal jobs did so in good faith and did not misrepresent the true facts or attempt to conceal a material fact. Thus, even if the doctrine of estoppel applied here, the first element of the doctrine as it relates to the party estopped is missing.

In conclusion, the hiring freeze is neither unconstitutional nor otherwise contrary to law and it is supported by explicit statutory authority. See 5 U.S.C. § 3301(1); 31 U.S.C. § 18a. Moreover, President Reagan's action freezing federal employment at November 5, 1980 levels is addressed to the problems of efficiency and economy in the executive departments and establishments of the United States. It is in accord with the President's constitutional duty to "take care that the laws of the United States shall be faithfully executed"⁴ as implemented by appropriate congressional enactments which authorize the President to prescribe such regulations for the admission of individuals into the civil service in the executive branch as will best promote the efficiency of that service. 5 U.S.C. § 3301(1). The President is also obliged to direct that the executive department and establishments make such changes as may be necessary to secure greater economy and efficiency in the conduct of the public service. 31 U.S.C. §§ 18 and 18a.

In addition to the foregoing, the judiciary is legally bound to give deference to the presumption of regularity of the actions taken by a coordinate and equal branch of government (here the executive) unless it is contrary to law. Therefore, this Court cannot and should not intervene because the President's actions are not only constitutional and legally permissible, but, as asserted by the President in his capacity as Chief Executive, they are essential for the well being and general welfare of the American people at this time.

This result reached today by the Court does not indicate any lack of concern or sympathy for those who may have thought they were about to be employed by the federal government. They and others in the civil service are essential to the general welfare and well being of this great republic. It may be difficult for those who lost and did not gain employment in the public sector this time to understand, but the Court is sure that they will agree that this is a country of law and not of men. Without that fundamental principle, our country could not survive.

II. THE COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CLAIMS ASSERTED.

At the February 16, 1981 hearing, this Court requested the parties to address the limitation imposed by the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346, which provides, in substance, that the District Courts of the United States shall have original jurisdiction concurrent with the Court of Claims of civil actions or claims against the United States not exceeding ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00) in amount which are "founded either upon the Constitution — or upon contract with the United States ...."

All the claims herein are either based upon the Constitution, statutes, or a contract theory. They seek declaratory and injunctive relief and have additionally requested the assessment of damages against the United States in compensation for alleged injuries sustained by them as a result of the Presidential "hiring freeze." The individual plaintiffs have amended their complaints specifically invoking...