Nations v. State
| Citation | 234 Ga. 709,217 S.E.2d 287 |
| Decision Date | 01 July 1975 |
| Docket Number | No. 30025,30025 |
| Parties | Roy NATIONS v. The STATE. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Georgia |
Martin W. Welch, Cleveland, for appellant.
Jeff C. Wayne, Dist. Atty., Roland H. Stroberg, Asst. Dist. Atty., Gainesville, Arthur K. Bolton, Atty. Gen., Kirby G. Atkinson, Atlanta, for appellee.
The defendant was tried and convicted of rape and sentenced to life imprisonment. He appeals from the conviction as well as the overruling of his motion for new trial and enumerates nine alleged errors.
1. The first enumeration of error complains of the failure to permit the defendant to inspect material in possession of the District Attorney (the results of a polygraph test of the victim). It was contended that such evidence was favorable to the appellant. Henderson v. State, 227 Ga. 68, 77, 179 S.E.2d 76, 84; Lynn v. State, 231 Ga. 559, 203 S.E.2d 221. There is no merit in this enumeration of error.
2. The second and third enumerations of error complain of the failure to grant a continuance until the next term of court to give retained counsel time to prepare to defend his client, and the failure to name the retained counsel as leading counsel. Counsel who was appointed for appellant soon after his arrest made a successful motion for bail, investigated the case and had announced 'ready' when the case was called for trial. Retained counsel had been hired the day before the trial by the appellant's family. Retained counsel also represented a juvenile co-defendant involved in the same transaction and was familiar with the case. The trial judge allowed appointed counsel to stay and assist retained counsel inasmuch as appointed counsel had announced 'ready' and retained counsel was insisting upon a continuance in order to prepare for trial. There were two hearings held on the motion for continuance, and at the conclusion of the second hearing retained counsel was still insisting upon a continuance.
' The leading counsel is he who, at the time of the trial or raising of any issue connected with the cause, is, in the judgment of the court, the counsel upon whom the client relies more than any other.' Code § 9-609. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in naming an appointed counsel as leading counsel where the defendant had expressed no preference and appointed counsel was ready for trial, while the retained counsel was insisting upon a continuance in order to prepare for trial. See also Code § 24-104(4).
The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing to grant a continuance until the next term nor was it an abuse of discretion to name appointed counsel as leading counsel. These enumerations of error are without merit.
3. The fourth enumeration of error complains that the trial court erred in restricting cross-examination of the victim as to prior sexual experiences. This court has put to rest this question by the unanimous opinion in Lynn v. State, 231 Ga. 559, 203 S.E.2d 221, where it is stated: 'It is sufficient to state that we adopt the majority rule that such evidence is inadmissible for either impeachment purposes or on the issue of consent.' There is no merit in this enumeration of error.
4. The sixth and seventh enumerations of error complain of the admission in evidence of a written statement by the juvenile co-defendant. Counsel for the defendant offered the statement in evidence. It was rejected by the court although it was allowed to be made a part of the record. Later after the GBI agent who received the statement testified, the statement was again offered by defendant's counsel and received in evidence by the court. Between the time the statement was first offered and the allowance in evidence, counsel requested and was granted a recess to confer. After the court overruled the District Attorney's objection to the statement, counsel moved to withdraw the statement. The statement being favorable to the defendant on the issue of consent, the trial judge refused to allow its withdrawal from the jury's consideration. By the admission of this statement the defense lost its right to the concluding argument. In Freeney v. State, 129 Ga. 759, 766, 59 S.E.2d 788, 791, this court said: Since the statement went to the issue of consent, which was the theory of defendant's defense, it is academic at this stage whether the concluding argument would have been more helpful than the statement.
'One cannot complain of a judgment, order, or ruling that his own procedure or conduct procured or aided in causing.' Bennett v. Bennett, 210 Ga. 721(2), 82 S.E.2d 653. It is also contended that defendant was unable to cross-examine the maker of the statement because he had taken the Fifth Amendment. A reading of the record reveals that counsel for the defendant asked the trial judge to advise the witness of his 'right to testify or not to testify,' when the witness was called. These contentions are without merit.
5. The eighth enumeration of error complains of the overruling of defendant's motion for mistrial made during the argument by State's counsel to the jury. The argument complained of in the first part of the enumeration of error is that State's counsel referred to the juvenile co-defendant as the 'Fifth Amendment man.' The witness invoked the privilege in the presence of the jury and the jury was well aware of this fact. It would be the proper subject of argument for whatever inference the jury may draw from his refusal to testify. Bennett v. State, 231 Ga. 458(2), 202 S.E.2d 99.
The other argument excepted to was simply an urging by State's counsel for conviction phrased in general terms and not subject to the objection made. This enumeration of error is without merit.
6. The ninth enumeration of error complains of the failure of the trial court to give a requested charge...
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Patrick v. State
...the defendant's request to see the results of a polygraph test that the defendant claimed was favorable to his case. Nations v. State, 234 Ga. 709, 217 S.E.2d 287 (Ga.1975). The Court stated that there was no Georgia statute or rule of practice which required the district attorney to open h......
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Baker v. State
...Henderson v. State, 227 Ga. 68, 77, 179 S.E.2d 76 (1970); Stevens v. State, 242 Ga. 34, 247 S.E.2d 838 (1978); Nations v. State, 234 Ga. 709, 217 S.E.2d 287 (1975). Moreover, the prosecution has not suppressed any evidence. The transcript of appellant's statement as prepared by the GBI agen......
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Patrick v. State
...91 Ariz. 101, 370 P.2d 261 (1962); Ballard v. Superior Ct., supra; State v. Winsett, 57 Del. 344, 200 A.2d 237 (1964); Nations v. State, 234 Ga. 709, 217 S.E.2d 287 (1975); Inman v. State, 482 N.E.2d 451, 454 (Ind.1985); Zupp v. State, 258 Ind. 625, 283 N.E.2d 540, 543 (1972); State v. Gree......
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