Baker v. State

• Decision Date: 22 April 1980
• Docket Number: No. 35800,35800
• Parties: BAKER v. The STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

Page 477

266 S.E.2d 477

245 Ga. 657

BAKER v. The STATE.

No. 35800.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Argued Jan. 22, 1980.

Decided April 22, 1980.

Donald W. Huskins, Eatonton, for appellant.

Lilton Baker, pro se.

Joseph H. Briley, Dist. Atty., Arthur K. Bolton, Atty. Gen., W. Davis Hewitt, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

NICHOLS, Justice.

Lilton Baker appeals his convictions of murder, aggravated battery, two counts of incest and simple battery. He was sentenced to life imprisonment for murder, to fifteen years each for aggravated battery and incest, and to twelve months for simple battery.

From the evidence presented at trial the jury was authorized to find the following facts: On Sunday, November 26, 1978, the victim, Bobby Lee Simmons, and his family were visiting appellant's neighbor. Earlier that week, Simmons and appellant had talked about the sale of a car motor, and Simmons walked over to appellant's trailer to check on it. As Simmons approached, appellant called him over to look at the motor in a blue chevrolet. While Simmons was looking at the motor, appellant began hitting Simmons with an ax handle. Appellant beat Simmons on the head, arms, back and legs causing extensive injuries. Appellant continued to beat Simmons until the victim was on the ground and almost dead. When the victim's wife came over to appellant's yard, appellant told her she had seven minutes to remove the victim from appellant's property or he would kill him. A deputy sheriff arrived on the scene and witnessed the victim being pulled from appellant's yard and heard appellant's threat to the victim's wife. An ambulance arrived and took the victim to the hospital. The victim suffered a fractured jaw and severe injury to the head. The victim died either from brain hemorrhage, caused by trauma to the head, or from pulmonaryedema, caused by breathing blood into the lungs as a result of bleeding in the victim's mouth.

Later that evening, a Georgia Bureau of Investigation Agent went to appellant's trailer. The agent found appellant's wife, Willie Mae Baker, and his two daughters, Barbara (age 15) and Lisa (age 13), in the trailer. All three were taken to the hospital. Mrs. Baker suffered from multiple bruises on her head, chest, legs and buttocks. Lisa suffered from multiple bruises and swelling on her body and face. Barbara had a fractured jaw.

At trial, Mrs. Baker testified that appellant had beaten her with part of a chair. Appellant's purpose was to ascertain if she had had sexual relations with other men. Mrs. Baker denied any sexual activity, but appellant continued to beat her on the legs, head, and face. Appellant also took her crutch, which she was using because of a previously broken ankle, and he used it to punch her in the stomach. Appellant continued to beat his wife until she "admitted" having sexual relations with other men and with appellant's father. Mrs. Baker testified that she only admitted such activity so appellant would stop beating her. In addition Mrs. Baker testified that upon her return home one evening she found appellant lying nude with Lisa in the living room.

At trial, Lisa testified that her father beat her and had sexual intercourse with her. Lisa testified that her father committed incest upon her both at home and in the sleeping compartment of his truck. Lisa also testified that appellant had sexual intercourse with Barbara. Lisa said she knew this because she was in the same motel room and in the truck with them.

Barbara testified that her father beat her and broke her jaw. According to Barbara, appellant beat her after accusing her of "fooling around with a hundred men." Barbara said she told her father that she had never "fooled around" with the victim. But when appellant continued to beat her she relented and said she had. Barbara also testified that her father had sexual intercourse with her in their mobile home and in the truck. She also testified that appellant had sexual relations with Lisa. The appellant, in his testimony, admitted "whipping" his wife and both daughters. He also admitted hitting Barbara with his fist breaking her jaw. Additional facts from the record will be mentioned as required in the following discussion.

Enumerations of Error

1. Appellant's first two enumerations of error assert the general grounds that the verdict is contrary to law and the evidence. The evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Crawford v. State, 245 Ga. 89, 263 S.E.2d 131 (1980); Stinson v. State, 244 Ga. 219, 259 S.E.2d 471 (1979).

2. Appellant's third enumeration of error asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a change of venue. Specifically, appellant contends that half the jury panel had some knowledge of the case, and because of this and the case's notoriety, the appellant could not obtain a fair trial. On the other hand, appellant also states that none of the jurors admitted having a biased or fixed opinion about the case. The record supports the latter statement.

The well established law in Georgia is that "a motion for a change of venue addresses itself to the sound discretion of the trial judge, and that discretion will not be disturbed on appeal unless it can be shown that there was an abuse of this discretion." Coleman v. State, 237 Ga. 84, 90, 226 S.E.2d 911 (1976), cert. den., 431 U.S. 909, 97 S.Ct. 1707, 52 L.Ed.2d 394. The test is whether the prospective jurors have formed fixed opinions as to appellant's guilt or innocence based upon reports in the media. Id. at 91, 226 S.E.2d 911.

Even though appellant states that none of the jurors admitted having a fixed opinion about his guilt or innocence, he argues that it is unusual for a juror to admit such a bias either out of legal ignorance or from shyness. He goes on to argue that some prospective jurors discussed the case, and therefore, they must have had an opinion about it. This court disagrees with these arguments. First, several jurors readily admitted having read newspaper accounts of the incident. But when asked by defense counsel, these jurors stated they had formed no opinion about appellant's guilt or innocence. Furthermore, they stated that they remained fair and impartial and would base their decision on the evidence presented at trial. Second, it is completely illogical to assume that because someone discussed the case they had formed a fixed opinion about it. "The appellant has presented no evidence of fixed opinions on the part of the . . . jurors as to his guilt or innocence, and a reading of the record of the voir dire examination does not show that any of the jurors summoned to try the case had been prejudiced by the (pretrial publicity)." Potts v. State, 241 Ga. 67, 76, 243 S.E.2d 510 (1978). There was no abuse of discretion by the trial court in overruling appellant's motion for a change of venue.

The law does not set an impossible standard on the state to obtain jurors completely free of "the mere existence of any preconceived notion as to the guilt or innocence of an accused . . . It is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court." Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 1642-1643, 6 L.Ed.2d 751) (1961). "Qualified jurors need not . . . be totally ignorant of the facts and issues involved." Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 799, 95 S.Ct. 2031, 2036, 44 L.Ed.2d 589) (1975). A review of the voir dire of the jurors shows that these standards were met. Therefore, there is no merit to appellant's third enumeration of error. Accord, Jarrell v. State, 234 Ga. 410, 216 S.E.2d 258 (1975), cert. den. 428 U.S. 910, 96 S.Ct. 3223, 49 L.Ed.2d 1218 and Allen v. State, 235 Ga. 709, 221 S.E.2d 405 (1975).

3. Appellant's fourth enumeration of error asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to compel the state to allow appellant's counsel the opportunity to read notes taken during the appellant's interrogation which could have been favorable to him. The notes in question were made by a GBI agent while interviewing appellant during the investigation of the crime. These handwritten notes were later reduced to a standard typed report which the agent dictated based upon her notes as well as what she remembered appellant stating during the interview. Appellant filed a Brady motion to compel the state to disclose all exculpatory information and "any and all tape recordings and stenographic transcriptions of admissions, confessions, and statements of the defendant . . ." which were made to the GBI or other law enforcement agency. The trial court granted appellant's disclosure motion, and the typewritten report was furnished to appellant's counsel. At trial, the court ruled that the disclosure order did not apply to the agent's handwritten notes which were not in the district attorney's files. Rather, the disclosure order only required the district attorney to furnish the final typewritten GBI report to appellant. In essence, the court ruled that the district attorney had complied with the disclosure order by furnishing appellant with the same report which the GBI had given to the district attorney.

Appellant claims these notes could have been exculpatory, and that he could not determine if the final typewritten report was what he had stated to the GBI agent. Since the report was prepared from both the agent's notes and her memory, appellant argues, the typed report could well be "what the G.B.I. agent wanted him to say" and not what he actually said. In response to this argument, we note that appellant had ample opportunity at trial to cross examine the GBI agent regarding the accuracy of the typed report. Furthermore, appellant himself testified at the trial, and he could have refuted any erroneous testimony by the GBI agent. However, he did not do so.

Appellant claims...