Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Arcata Nat. Corp.

• Decision Date: 08 July 1976
• Citation: 59 Cal.App.3d 959,131 Cal.Rptr. 172
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: , 10 ERC 1224, 6 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,623 NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC., et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. ARCATA NATIONAL CORPORATION et al., Defendants and Appellants, California Forest Protective Association, Intervenor and Appellant. Civ. 37555.

Page 172

131 Cal.Rptr. 172

59 Cal.App.3d 959, 10 ERC 1224, 6 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,623

NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC., et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. ARCATA NATIONAL CORPORATION et al., Defendants and Appellants California Forest Protective Association, Intervenor and Appellant.

Civ. 37555.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 2, California.

July 8, 1976.

As Amended On Denial of Rehearing Aug. 4, 1976.

Hearing Denied Oct. 21, 1976.

McCutchen, Doyle, Brown & Enerson, Craig McAtee, San Francisco, Robert A. Dunaway, Eureka, Howard, Prim, Rice, Nemerovski, Canady & Pollack, Dennis T. Rice, Stuart R. Pollack, Jerome B. Falk, Jr., Robert E. Gooding, Jr., Fred H. Altshuler, San Francisco, for appellant Arcata National Corp.

Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro, George A. Sears, Robert M. Westberg, David R. Jackson, San Francisco, Huber & Goodwin, Murray, Cissna & Prior, Norman C. Cissna, Eureka, for appellant Simpson Timber Co.

Mitchell, Dedekam & Angell, R. C. Dedekam, Eureka, Thelen, Marrin, Johnson & Bridges, Roger McPike, San Francisco, for appellant Louisiana-Pacific Corp.

Vaughan, Paul & Lyons, Varnum Paul, San Francisco, for intervenor and appellant California Forest Protective Ass'n.

John D. Leshy, Ballard Jamieson, Jr., Palo Alto, for respondents.

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Carl Boronkay, Asst. Atty. Gen., Joel S. Moskowitz, Deputy Atty. Gen., Sacramento, for respondent California State Forester.

KANE, Associate Justice.

This appeal concerns a determination whether the timber harvesting operations carried on pursuant to the Z'Berg-Nejedly Forest Practice Act of 1973 (PUB. RESOURCES CODE, S 4511¹ et seq.) ('Forest Practice Act') and the Forest Practice Rules (Cal.Admin.Code, tit. 14, § 911 et seq.) ('Rules') are subject to the provisions of the California Environmental Quality Act of 1970 (§ 21000 et seq.) ('CEQA') and the guidelines for the Implementation of the California Environmental Quality Act (Cal.Admin.Code, tit. 14, § 15000 et seq.) ('Guidelines'). Appellants (defendants below ²) are three timber companies: Arcata National Corporation, Louisiana-Pacific Corporation, Simpson Timber Company, and intervenor California Forest Protective Association, a nonprofit corporation formed by the owners of timberlands. Respondents are the Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., an environmental group, Northern California Council of Fly Fishing Clubs, an unincorporated association, and Rudolph W. Becking and Arthur J. Hammond as individuals.

The action at bench was commenced by respondents, in June 1973, asserting that appellants' timber operations in the Redwood Creek watershed constituted a public nuisance. In May 1974 respondents filed an amended complaint which added three new causes of action. The second cause of action sought a writ of mandate to compel the state forester to set aside existing timber harvesting plans submitted by appellant companies without environmental impact reports ('EIRs'). In the third cause of action respondents sought a declaration that the provisions of CEQA are applicable to timber harvesting plans submitted to the state forester under the Forest Practice Act. The fourth cause of action sought to enjoin appellants from conducting timber operations in the area in dispute.

Respondents' motion for a preliminary injunction was denied. Thereafter, the trial court granted respondents' motion for a separate trial of the second, third and fourth causes of action. Pursuant to stipulation, both appellants and respondents moved for a summary judgment on the question of whether CEQA requires preparation of EIRs in connection with timber operations conducted pursuant to the Forest Practice Act. The trial court held that the state forester was required to comply with the EIR provisions of CEQA in reviewing timber harvesting plans submitted under the Forest Practice Act and ordered the issuance of a writ of mandamus directing the state forester to set aside timber harvesting plans submitted without an EIR. At the same time the trial court denied injunctive relief to halt appellants' timber operations and stayed the execution of the judgment pending appeal.

On appeal appellants vigorously contend that the ruling of the trial court is erroneous and should be reversed for two main reasons. First, it is argued that in enacting the Forest Practice Act the Legislature demonstrated an intention not to require preparation of EIRs in conjunction with the review of timber harvesting plans. This intention of the Legislature, say appellants, should be inferred from the following circumstances: (a) the Forest Practice Act, enacted in 1973, is a later specific act which prevails over CEQA, a general act enacted in 1970; (b) pursuant to the express language of the Forest Practice Act there is no statutory requirement that the state forester 'approve' the timber harvesting plans, which implicitly means therefore that timber harvesting plans do not constitute a 'project' within the purview of CEQA; (c) the review of timber harvesting plans is a 'ministerial act' which does not require an EIR; (d) the time period provided in the Forest Practice Act for the review of timber harvesting plans is inconsistent and cannot be harmonized with the time frame set out for the preparation of EIRs and is thus a further indication that the Legislature did not contemplate the submission of EIRs with respect to the review of timber harvesting plans. Secondly, it is maintained that the Forest Practice Act, which is a comprehensive, self-contained regulatory system for the protection of the environment, is a 'functional equivalent' of CEQA.

Specific-General Statutes: Broadly speaking, a specific provision relating to a particular subject will govern in respect to that subject as against the general provision, although the latter, standing alone, would be broad enough to include the subject to which the more particular provisions relate (Rose v. State of California (1942) 19 Cal.2d 713, 724, 123 P.2d 505). However, it is well settled that the statutes and codes blend into each other, and are to be regarded as constituting but a single statute (Ryder v. City of Los Altos (1954) 125 Cal.App.2d 209, 211, 270 P.2d 532). One should seek to consider the statutes not as antagonistic laws but as parts of the whole system which must be harmonized and effect given to every section (People v. Seeley (1902) 137 Cal. 13, 15, 69 P. 693; People v. Darby (1952) 114 Cal.App.2d 412, 424, 250 P.2d 743). Accordingly, statutes which are in Pari materia should be read together and harmonized if possible. Even when one statute merely deals generally with a particular subject while the other legislates specially upon the same subject with greater detail and particularity, the two should be reconciled and construed so as to uphold both of them if it is reasonably possible to do so (Pierce v. Riley (1937) 21 Cal.App.2d 513, 518, 70 P.2d 206; see also: Moyer v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd. (1973) 10 Cal.3d 222, 230, 110 Cal.Rptr. 144, 514 P.2d 1224; Select Base Materials v. Board of Equal. (1959) 51 Cal.2d 640, 645, 335 P.2d 672; County of Los Angeles v. Craig (1942) 52 Cal.App.2d 450, 452, 126 P.2d 448).

We entertain no doubt that the two acts in question are not in conflict, but rather supplement each other and, therefore, must be harmonized. While the Forest Practice Act is silent on the question whether or not the timber harvesting plans should be accompanied by an EIR, CEQA provides in all-inclusive terms that 'All state agencies, boards, and commissions Shall prepare, or cause to be prepared by contract, and certify the completion of An environmental impact report on any project they propose to carry out or Approve which may have a significant effect on the environment . . .' (§ 21100; see also, §§ 21061, 21151; emphasis added). Since under the rules of interpretation we are to harmonize the two statutes, the provisions of CEQA are deemed to be a part of the Forest Practice Act as well.

This conclusion carries great significance. It is undisputed that the Division of State Forestry headed by the state forester is a state agency and also that the logging operations and timber harvesting activities may have a significant effect on the environment (Bayside Timber Co. v. Board of Supervisors (1971) 20 Cal.App.3d 1, 6--8, 97 Cal.Rptr. 431). It is likewise well recognized that CEQA is perceived as a logical and carefully devised program of wide application and broad public purpose; that the EIR, the heart of CEQA, is to be viewed as an environmental 'alarm bell' whose purpose is to alert the public and its responsible officials to environmental changes before they have reached ecological points of no return (County of Inyo v. Yorty (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 795, 810, 108 Cal.Rptr. 377); that CEQA in general and its provisions relating to the EIR in particular are to be interpreted broadly in order to afford the fullest protection to the environment within the reasonable scope of the statutory language (No Oil, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1974) 13 Cal.3d 68, 83, 118 Cal.Rptr. 34, 529 P.2d 66; Friends of Mammotn v. Board of Supervisors (1972) 8 Cal.3d 247, 259, 104 Cal.Rptr. 761, 502 P.2d 1049). The deduction is thus inescapable that timber harvesting activities must be held subject to the requirements of CEQA if the activities in question qualify as 'projects' within the meaning of the statute. This, of course, leads us to examine the further questions of whether the timber harvesting activities constitute a 'project' requiring agency 'approval' and whether the project is 'discretionary' within the meaning of the statute (§§ 21061, 21080, subd. (a)). ³

' Approval' of Project: Preliminarily, it is to be noted that the word 'project' has already been defined broadly. Thus, our Supreme Court delineated 'project' in broad terms so as to include any private activity for which a permit is required, and pointed out that before an...