Navarrete v. Meyer
Citation | 188 Cal.Rptr.3d 623,237 Cal.App.4th 1276 |
Decision Date | 22 June 2015 |
Docket Number | D067454 |
Court | California Court of Appeals |
Parties | Miriam NAVARRETE et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Hayley MEYER, Defendant and Respondent. |
Shernoff Bidart Echeverria Bentley, Beverly Hills, and Gregory L. Bentley, Steven M. Schuetze, Claremont, Law Office of Luis A. Carrillo and Luis A. Carrillo, Montebello, Rogriguez & Associates and Daniel Rodriguez, Bakersfield, for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
LaFollette Johnson DeHaas Fesler & Ames, San Diego, and Donald C. Fesler, Law Offices of David J. Weiss and David J. Weiss, Greines, Martin, Stein & Richland, and Marc J. Poster, Los Angeles, for Defendant and Respondent.
Plaintiffs and appellants Miriam Navarrete and her minor children Bryan, Stephanie, and Steven Navarette (collectively Navarrete) appeal from a summary judgment in favor of defendant and respondent Hayley Meyer on plaintiffs' claims for violation of Vehicle Code section 21701 and civil conspiracy arising from allegations that Meyer, a passenger in a vehicle, told the driver to drive at an unsafe speed over a road Meyer knew had unusual conditions that would cause the car to become airborne, resulting in a fatal accident. In granting summary judgment, the trial court ruled there was no evidence to suggest Meyer's act of telling the driver to drive faster affected his control over the vehicle, and therefore no triable issues of material fact as to either cause of action. Navarrete contends the evidence raises triable issues for a jury as to whether to impose joint liability on Meyer for her conduct on the night in question on a theory of concert of action or conspiracy, and also as to whether she unreasonably interfered with the safe operation of a vehicle within the meaning of Vehicle Code section 21701 to support a cause of action. We agree and reverse.
On November 26, 2009, Meyer was the front passenger in a vehicle driven by her friend Brandon Coleman. Another person, Levi Calhoun, was in the back seat. While driving to a nearby drugstore, Meyer told Coleman to turn onto Skyview Drive as a shortcut. Skyview Drive is a residential street with a 25 mile-per-hour speed limit. Meyer had been on Skyview Drive many times before that day, and she knew it had dips that would cause a car traveling at a high rate of speed to become airborne. While Coleman was making the turn onto Skyview Drive, Meyer told him about the dips, that it was fun to drive fast on them, and that he should do it. Shortly after Coleman turned onto the street, Meyer told Coleman to “go faster.” Coleman asked Calhoun if he should speed up, and Calhoun responded, “You probably shouldn't because you may mess up the car.” Coleman sped up. He accelerated to such a degree that he caught air from the dips and lost control of the car, which veered sharply to the right and collided into Navarette's parked vehicle while Navarrete's husband, Esteban Soto, was attempting to put one of their children in a car seat. Soto's legs were severed and he was killed by the impact. A data recorder from Coleman's car indicated its speed was 81 miles per hour five seconds before the impact, and 71 miles per hour one second before the impact. Meyer estimated the car's speed at about 70 miles per hour. Meyer admitted it was her idea to drive fast on Skyview Drive.
Navarette sued Coleman and the County of Riverside, and eventually filed a first amended complaint naming Meyer as a Doe defendant. She alleged, among others, causes of action against Meyer for violation of Vehicle Code section 217011 ( ) and civil conspiracy (fifth cause of action). In the fourth cause of action, Navarette alleged Meyer willfully interfered with Coleman or the mechanism of the vehicle in such manner as to affect Coleman's control of the car; that Meyer's acts caused a lapse of Coleman's control as to cause serious injury and death; and that certain physical features of Skyview Drive increased and intensified the dangers to the decedent and plaintiffs from Coleman and Meyer's conduct. In the fifth cause of action for conspiracy, Navarrete alleged that Coleman and Meyer “formed an oral and/or implied agreement [to] commit a wrongful act, including but not limited to driving on Skyview Drive at unsafe speed” and “[s]uch agreement, conspiracy, and/or joint venture between Defendants to cause wrongful acts caused injuries to Plaintiffs and Decedent.” She alleged that the “conspiracy and agreement is evidenced by the fact, inter alia, that [Coleman and Meyer]: (a) aided, abetted, approved, ratified, and/or deliberately and knowingly failed, refused and/or refrained from intervening in or preventing or stopping the wrongful conduct; and/or (b) deliberately and knowingly failed, refused, and/or refrained from promptly and accurately reporting such wrongful conduct.”
Meyer moved for summary judgment or alternatively summary adjudication. She argued Navarette's fourth and fifth causes of action were without merit; that undisputed facts showed she did not interfere with Coleman's control of the vehicle as needed to impose liability under Vehicle Code section 21701, and there was no evidence of a tacit agreement between her and Coleman to support a conspiracy cause of action or conspiracy to commit any tort. Meyer argued that simply encouraging Coleman to increase his speed was insufficient to support liability under either cause of action. In opposition, Navarette argued Meyer was liable as a joint tortfeasor for Coleman's negligence under the Restatement Second of Torts, section 876 and as a coconspirator; that Meyer “formulated and communicated the plan for ... Coleman to race at high speed on Skyview Drive to become airborne when he hit the dips in the roadway”; and “[v]erbal encouragement and solicitation to commit a wrongful act can constitute a civil conspiracy.” Navarette maintained the evidence demonstrated “an agreement and a plan to commit the wrongful act” because “[a]s a result of and in response to Meyer's instructions, Coleman began accelerating.” According to Navarette, the court could infer that Coleman was trying to impress Meyer and acquiesced to her wishes, and an agreement could be inferred from his actions in response to her encouragement. Finally, Navarette argued there were triable issues of material fact as to whether Meyer unreasonably interfered with the safe operation of the vehicle within the meaning of Vehicle Code section 21701 by her words and actions: “[A] reasonable inference from the evidence is that as the engine roared and the vehicle started accelerating down the road, that [Meyer's] instruction to ‘Go faster’ was unlikely stated in a calm, sterile manner, but rather the instruction itself was animated and enthusiastic.”
The trial court granted summary judgment in Meyer's favor. It acknowledged that the material facts were undisputed; that Meyer told Coleman to drive faster to catch air over the dips on Skyview Drive, but ruled “there is no evidence to suggest that Meyer's act of telling Mr. Coleman to drive faster affected Mr. Coleman's control over the vehicle” and thus there was no triable issue of material fact as to the fourth cause of action for violation of Vehicle Code section 21701. The court applied the same reasoning to grant summary judgment on the conspiracy cause of action.
Navarette filed this appeal.
“ ” (Conroy v. Regents of University of Cal. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1244, 1249–1250, 91 Cal.Rptr.3d 532, 203 P.3d 1127 ; see DiCola v. White Bros. Performance Products, Inc. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 666, 675, 69 Cal.Rptr.3d 888 (DiCola ).)
(DiCola, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at p. 674, 69 Cal.Rptr.3d 888.)
(Conroy v. Regents of University of Cal., supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 1250, 91 Cal.Rptr.3d 532, 203 P.3d 1127 ; see also Coral Const., Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco (2010) 50 Cal.4th 315, 336, 113 Cal.Rptr.3d 279, 235 P.3d 947 ; Judicial Council of California v. Superior Court (2014) 229...
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