Nawrocki v. Macomb County Road Com'n

• Decision Date: 28 July 2000
• Docket Number: Docket No. 9.,Docket No. 8,Docket No. Calendar,Docket No. 107903,Docket No. 109921
• Citation: 615 N.W.2d 702,463 Mich. 143
• Parties: Rachel NAWROCKI and Lawrence Nawrocki, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. MACOMB COUNTY ROAD COMMISSION, Defendant-Appellee. Brian Evens, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Shiawassee County Road Commissioners, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

615 N.W.2d 702

463 Mich. 143

Rachel NAWROCKI and Lawrence Nawrocki, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. MACOMB COUNTY ROAD COMMISSION, Defendant-Appellee.

Brian Evens, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Shiawassee County Road Commissioners, Defendants-Appellants.

Docket Nos. 107903, 109921, Calendar Nos. 8, 9.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued December 7, 1999.

Decided July 28, 2000.

Berger, Miller & Strager, P.C. (by Allen S. Miller), Detroit, for plaintiffs-appellants in Nawrocki.

Miller, Shpiece & Andrews, P.C. (by Wayne J. Miller, Michael R. Shpiece, and Daniel J. Cherrin), Southfield, for plaintiff-appellee in Evens.

Peterson, Hay & Comsa, P.C. (by John M. Ketzler and William L. Hay), Mount Clemens, for defendant-appellee in Nawrocki.

Highland & Zanetti, P.C. (by R. Michael John), Southfield, for defendant-appellant in Evens.

Jennifer M. Granholm, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, and Brenda E. Turner, Assistant Attorney General, Lansing, for amicus curiae, Michigan Department of Transportation.

Opinion

MARKMAN, J.

I. INTRODUCTION

In these consolidated cases, we granted leave to once again consider the scope of the so-called "highway exception" to governmental immunity. MCL 691.1402(1); MSA 3.996(102)(1). Specifically, we must decide the extent, if any, to which the highway exception accords protection to pedestrians injured by a condition within the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel. Further, we must decide whether the highway exception creates a duty, with regard to the state and county road commissions, to install, maintain, repair, or improve traffic control devices, including traffic signs.¹

In Ross v. Consumers Power Co (On Rehearing), 420 Mich. 567, 363 N.W.2d 641 (1984), this Court confronted and resolved conflicting case law defining the scope of governmental immunity. The Ross Court explained its goals in tackling the issue, and its approach, stating:

In resolving the questions presented by this [governmental immunity] act, our goal has been to create a cohesive, uniform, and workable set of rules which will readily define the injured party's rights and the governmental agency's liability. We recognize that our case law on these questions is confused, often irreconcilable, and of little guidance to the bench and bar. We have made great efforts to reexamine our prior collective and individual views on this subject in order to formulate an approach which is faithful to the statutory language and legislative intent. Wherever possible and necessary, we have reaffirmed our prior decisions. The consensus which our efforts produce today should not be viewed as this Court's individual or collective determinations of what would be most fair or just or the best public policy. The consensus does reflect, however, what we believe the Legislature intended the law to be in this area. [Id. at 596, 363 N.W.2d 641.]

Ross, constituting a significant change in governmental immunity jurisprudence², held that the immunity conferred on governmental agencies is broad, with narrowly drawn exceptions. Id. at 618, 363 N.W.2d 641. The failure to consistently follow Ross, specifically with regard to the interpretation and application of the highway exception, has precipitated an exhausting line of confusing and contradictory decisions. These decisions have created a rule of law that is virtually impenetrable, even to the most experienced judges and legal practitioners.³ Further, these conflicting decisions have provided precedent that both parties in highway liability cases may cite as authority for their opposing positions. This area of the law cries out for clarification, which we attempt to provide today.⁴

Accordingly, we return to a narrow construction of the highway exception predicated upon a close examination of the statute's plain language, rather than merely attempting to add still another layer of judicial gloss to those interpretations of the statute previously issued by this Court and the Court of Appeals. We believe that such an approach will maintain fidelity to the requirements set forth by the Legislature, while providing the lower courts with a clearer standard to follow when applying the highway exception in individual cases. However, we refuse to impose upon the people of this state our individual determinations of proper public policy, relating to the availability of lawsuits arising from injuries on the public highways. Rather, we seek to faithfully construe and apply those stated public policy choices made by the Legislature when it drafted the statutory language of the highway exception.

Because prior decisions of this Court have improperly broadened the scope of the highway exception and provided a variety of contradictory and conflicting interpretations of this exception's statutory language, we believe it is impossible to avoid overruling some precedent, if we are to set forth a clear rule of law. While we emphasize that we do not lightly overrule existing precedent, we are duty-bound to overrule past decisions that depart from a narrow construction and application of the highway exception and the plain language of the statutory clause, especially when they directly disregard, and are inconsistent with, other decisions of this Court.

In Nawrocki v. Macomb Co. Rd. Comm., we believe that the circuit court erred in granting summary disposition in favor of the governmental defendant. We hold that the highway exception applies when a plaintiff's injury is proximately caused by a dangerous or defective condition of the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel. We therefore reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the circuit court, and remand to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. In Evens v. Shiawassee Co. Rd. Comm'rs, we hold that the state or county road commissions' duty, under the highway exception, does not extend to the installation, maintenance, repair, or improvement of traffic control devices, including traffic signs, but rather is limited exclusively to dangerous or defective conditions within the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel; that is, the actual roadbed, paved or unpaved, designed for vehicular travel. We therefore reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the circuit court's grant of summary disposition in favor of defendant road commission.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. NAWROCKI V. MACOMB CO. RD. COMM.

On May 28, 1993, plaintiff Rachel Nawrocki was a passenger in a truck driven by her husband. He parked the truck next to the curb on Kelly Road, in Macomb County,⁵ and Nawrocki exited from the passenger side onto the grass between the street curb and the sidewalk. She walked the length of the truck and stepped off the curb onto the paved roadway. Nawrocki allegedly stepped on cracked and broken pavement on the surface of Kelly Road and sustained serious injuries to her right ankle, necessitating several operations.

Nawrocki sued defendant Macomb County Road Commission,⁶ arguing that it negligently failed to maintain Kelly Road in reasonable repair and in a condition safe and convenient for public travel. The MCRC moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (8), arguing that Nawrocki's claim was barred by governmental immunity because the highway exception did not apply to pedestrians. The circuit court initially denied the motion, relying on Gregg v. State Hwy. Dep't, 435 Mich. 307, 458 N.W.2d 619 (1990), for the proposition that pedestrians traveling on the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel are covered by the highway exception. On the MCRC's motion for reconsideration, the circuit court granted summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), on the ground that pedestrians are covered by the highway exception only when their injuries resulted from vehicular accidents, relying on Mason v. Wayne Co. Bd. of Comm'rs, 447 Mich. 130,135, n. 4, 523 N.W.2d 791 (1994).

Nawrocki appealed as of right to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed,⁷ in reliance on its previous opinion in Suttles v. Dep't of Transportation, 216 Mich.App. 166, 548 N.W.2d 671 (1996), a case subsequently remanded by this Court for further factual findings, Suttles v. Dep't of Transportation, 457 Mich. 635, 578 N.W.2d 295 (1998). We granted Nawrocki's application for leave to appeal.⁸

B. EVENS V. SHIAWASSEE CO. RD. COMM'RS

On May 18, 1992, plaintiff Brian Evens sustained serious injuries in an automobile accident at the intersection of Newburg Road and Byron Road in Shiawassee County.⁹ Traffic on both northbound and southbound Byron Road was regulated by stop signs, posted on both the left and right sides of the roadway. Traffic on eastbound and westbound Newburg Road was not required to stop, but posted traffic signs warned of the approaching intersection. Both Newburg Road and Byron Road were posted with 55 MPH speed limit signs.

Evens was driving northbound on Byron Road at the time of his accident. After stopping at the stop signs, Evens entered the intersection, where he collided with a westbound car traveling on Newburg Road, which had the right of way.¹⁰ Evens sued defendant Shiawassee County Road Commissioners, arguing that they negligently failed to maintain the intersection in reasonable repair and in a condition safe and convenient for public travel. Specifically, Evens argued that the SCRC owed him a duty to install additional stop signs or traffic signals at the intersection.¹¹

The SCRC moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10), on two separate grounds. First, the SCRC argued that county road commissions could not be held liable for a failure to install traffic signs on the theory that signs are outside the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel and are not covered by the highway exception. Second, the SCRC argued that Evens' intervening negligence of failing to...