Suttles v. State, Dept. of Transp., Docket Nos. 106119

• Decision Date: 09 June 1998
• Docket Number: 106359,Docket Nos. 106119,Nos. 10-11,s. 10-11
• Citation: 457 Mich. 635,578 N.W.2d 295
• Parties: Rex SUTTLES, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Pansy Suttles, deceased Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STATE of Michigan, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Defendant-Appellee. Kathy BROWN, as Next Friend for Abby DeRusha, a minor, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STATE of Michigan, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Defendant-Appellee. and City of Harbor Springs, Defendant. Calendar
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 295

578 N.W.2d 295

457 Mich. 635

Rex SUTTLES, Individually and as Personal Representative of

the Estate of Pansy Suttles, deceased Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STATE of Michigan, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Defendant-Appellee.

Kathy BROWN, as Next Friend for Abby DeRusha, a minor, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STATE of Michigan, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Defendant-Appellee. and City of Harbor Springs, Defendant.

Docket Nos. 106119, 106359.

Calendar Nos. 10-11.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued Nov. 5, 1997.

Decided June 9, 1998.

Blum, Konheim & Elkin, P.C. by Joshua A. Lerner and David J. Elkin, Southfield, for plaintiff-appellant in Suttles.

Gruel, Mills, Nims & Pylman, L.L.P. by Scott R. Melton and Brion J. Brooks, Grand Rapids, for plaintiff-appellant in Brown.

Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, and Brenda E. Turner and Harold J. Martin, Assistant Attorneys General, Escanaba, for defendant.

Opinion

MALLETT, Chief Justice.

In these combined cases, we granted leave to determine whether the highway exception to governmental immunity applies to accidents involving pedestrians. M.C.L. § 691.1402(1); M.S.A. § 3.996(102)(1). In Suttles, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's grant of defendant's motion for summary disposition. 216 Mich.App. 166, 548 N.W.2d 671 (1996). In Brown, the Court of Appeals, by peremptory order, reversed the trial court's denial of defendant's motion for summary disposition. Because the factual record in Suttles is unclear, we would remand the case with instructions to the trial court. We would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals in Brown because it correctly applied Mason v. Wayne Co. Bd. of Comm'rs, 447 Mich. 130, 523 N.W.2d 791 (1994).

I

A SUTTLES v. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION

On March 15, 1992, plaintiff's decedent got out of the passenger side of an automobile that was parked outside a church on Saginaw Street in downtown Flint, Michigan. She alleges that she slipped and fell because of an unnatural accumulation of ice and snow on the highway next to the curbed parking area. Her personal representative originally filed a complaint in the Genesee Circuit Court against the city of Flint. The city filed a motion for summary disposition, alleging that before the accident the state of Michigan had jurisdiction over Saginaw Street because it was a designated state trunkline. The circuit court granted the city's motion. Plaintiff then refiled the complaint in the Court of Claims, naming the state of Michigan, Department of Transportation, as defendant. The Court of Claims granted defendant's motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7) and this Court's opinion in Mason, supra. Plaintiff appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the Court of Claims order dismissing plaintiff's complaint on governmental immunity grounds.

B BROWN v. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION

On July 1, 1993, plaintiff's next friend was struck and injured while attempting to cross the intersection of M-119, West Bluff Street, and State Street in the city of Harbor Springs, Michigan. M-119 is a part of the state trunkline in Harbor Springs that runs in an east-west direction. State Street runs north-south and West Bluff Street runs east-west until it deadends into M-119, which, at the intersection in dispute, angles in a northerly direction into West Bluff Street. At all times relevant to this appeal, State and West Bluff streets were under the jurisdiction of the city of Harbor Springs.

As plaintiff's next friend and her companion approached the intersection on M-119 while heading toward downtown Harbor Springs, they intended to cross the intersection by way of the crosswalk installed as part of the traveled portion of the M119 highway. ¹ As plaintiff's next friend attempted to traverse the M-119 crosswalk, she was struck by an automobile traveling westbound on M-119. Plaintiff alleges that the intersection design was unreasonably dangerous because it is necessary for vehicular traffic heading south on State Street and attempting to turn left on eastbound M-119 to proceed into the intersection to adequately view oncoming traffic. Plaintiff claims the state owed a duty to plaintiff's next friend because it was foreseeable that an injury to a pedestrian would occur as a result of the negligently designed intersection.

Plaintiff filed the instant action against the city of Harbor Springs in the Emmet Circuit Court and against the Department of Transportation in the Court of Claims. The two cases were consolidated in the circuit court. The city and department moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (8), which the trial court denied. ² The Court of Appeals reversed by peremptory order, relying on this Court's decision in Mason, supra. We granted leave to appeal in both cases, ³ consolidated for the purpose of this appeal, to address whether the Legislature intended to include pedestrians within the highway exception to governmental immunity.

II

A

It is well settled in this state that governmental agencies are immune from tort liability while engaging in a governmental function unless an exception applies. M.C.L. § 691.1407; M.S.A. § 3.996(107); Ross v. Consumers Power Co. (On Rehearing), 420 Mich. 567, 618, 363 N.W.2d 641 (1984). It is also well settled that the exceptions are to be narrowly construed. Id.; Reardon v. Dep't of Mental Health, 430 Mich. 398, 411, 424 N.W.2d 248 (1988). Here, this Court is again faced with the task of interpreting the highway exception to governmental immunity. M.C.L. § 691.1402(1); M.S.A. § 3.996(102)(1). ⁴

In Suttles, the trial court granted defendant's motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7). In Brown, the lower court granted defendant's motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (8). In determining whether a plaintiff's claim is barred by governmental immunity, we must consider all documentary evidence, including any pleadings, depositions, admissions, or any other documentary evidence submitted by the parties. Wade v. Dep't of Corrections, 439 Mich. 158, 162, 483 N.W.2d 26 (1992); Gibson v. Grand Rapids, 162 Mich.App. 100, 412 N.W.2d 658 (1987). In order to survive a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), the plaintiff must allege facts in the complaint "justifying application of an exception to governmental immunity." 439 Mich. at 163, 483 N.W.2d 26.

A motion pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint and allows only consideration of the pleadings. Id. Under both (C)(7) and (8) motions, courts must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and construe them in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. at 162-163, 483 N.W.2d 26. A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8) may only be granted where the claims alleged are so clearly unenforceable as a matter of law that no factual development could possibly justify recovery. Id. at 163, 483 N.W.2d 26.

B

We acknowledge that the notion of governmental immunity, its interpretation, and its practical application have been difficult at times, stemming in part from the decisions of this Court and from the confusing nature of the statute itself. ⁵ The history of governmental immunity has been well documented in prior decisions of this Court, but, we believe, the facts of these cases require a brief look at the history once again. This Court concisely set forth the history underlying the highway exception to governmental immunity in Scheurman v. Dep't of Transportation, 434 Mich. 619, 629, 456 N.W.2d 66 (1990):

The cases before us today center on the highway exception statute, M.C.L. § 691.1402; M.S.A. § 3.996(102). The origin of the statute is the enactment of 1879 P.A. 244; 1 How Stat. 1442, which imposed liability upon municipalities "in favor of any person 'sustaining bodily injury upon any of the public highways or streets in the state, by reason of neglect to keep such public highways or streets, and all bridges, cross-walks and culverts on the same in good repair, and in a condition reasonably safe and fit for travel....' " Roy v. Dep't of Transportation, 428 Mich. 330, 336-337, 408 N.W.2d 783 (1987). With the passage of 1887 P.A. 264; 3 How Stat 1446c, the Legislature amended the statute and expanded its scope of liability to include sidewalks. Id. at 337, 408 N.W.2d 783.

However, when the Legislature codified governmental immunity in 1964, it specifically reduced the purview of the highway exception statute. Section 2 of the governmental immunity act expressly excludes the state and the counties from liability for "sidewalks, crosswalks or any other installation outside of [sic] the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel." M.C.L. § 691.1402; M.S.A. § 3.996(102). Furthermore, the duty of the state and the counties created under § 2, "shall extend only to the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel...." [Emphasis in original.]

We find this synopsis of the history underlying the highway exception instructive. The 1879 enactment articulated a broad exception to immunity that allowed "any person" a cause of action for an injury sustained on or by any of the areas listed. The 1887 amendment increased the scope of the liability to include sidewalks, perhaps the only area not provided for in the original exception. With the codification of governmental immunity in 1964, the highway exception was significantly narrowed and no longer allowed liability for the state and county for injuries incurred in three specific areas: (1) sidewalks, (2) crosswalks, or (3) any other installation outside the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel.

The import of this specific limitation indicates, we believe, the Legislature's intent to significantly limit a pedestrian's ability to recover. With this background in mind, we proceed with these cases, while keeping to our mandate of interpreting the exceptions to governmental...