Mason v. Wayne County Bd. of Com'rs
| Decision Date | 01 October 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 5,Docket No. 94911,5 |
| Citation | 523 N.W.2d 791,447 Mich. 130 |
| Parties | Anthony MASON, a Minor, by his Next Friend, Tajuana Mason, and Tajuana Mason, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. The WAYNE COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS and County of Wayne, Jointly and Severally, Defendants-Appellants. Calendar, |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
The question presented is whether a governmental agency is immune from liability arising out of an accident involving a driver who drove through a red light near an elementary school and a ten-year-old student who had raced into the street. The student and his mother sued Wayne County on the theory that it was negligent because it failed to post school warning signs on that street. We hold that the trial court should have granted the defendant's motion for summary disposition on the ground of governmental immunity.
This case arises out of an accident that occurred on June 10, 1987, at the intersection of Outer Drive and Mendota in the City of Detroit. The plaintiff, Anthony Mason, who was engaged in a race with a friend, ran out into the street and struck the side of a car that had just run the red light at the intersection. He sustained a closed head or traumatic brain injury.
Anthony Mason and his mother sued numerous defendants. Count V of the plaintiffs' sixth amended complaint alleged that the City of Detroit, Wayne County, and their employees breached their duties pursuant to M.C.L. § 691.1402; M.S.A. § 3.996(102) to maintain the streets and the intersection in reasonable repair. The complaint alleged that the defendants failed to install stop signs, a pedestrian overhead walkway, a flashing red stop light, school advance signs, school crossing signs, school speed limit signs, and school pavement markings.
Before trial, the plaintiffs settled with the driver of the automobile. In addition, the court granted defendant City of Detroit's motion for summary disposition on the ground that the county had exclusive jurisdiction over the streets in question. Defendant Wayne County's motion for summary disposition on the basis of governmental immunity was denied.
The plaintiffs proceeded to trial against both Wayne County and the crossing guard who was stationed at the intersection. The jury found in favor of the crossing guard, but against Wayne County and awarded the plaintiffs two million dollars in damages. 1 Both the plaintiffs and Wayne County appealed. The Court of Appeals resolved several issues, all in favor of the plaintiff. With respect to governmental immunity, the Court affirmed the trial court's ruling denying the county's motion for summary disposition. It reasoned that the duty to repair and maintain the highway "includes the duty to post adequate traffic signage, including school signs, because they serve an integral part of the highway designed for vehicular travel." Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued June 11, 1992 (Docket No. 127003), slip op., p. 6.
The county appealed, and we granted leave to appeal. 442 Mich. 924, 503 N.W.2d 900 (1993). 2
By statute, governmental agencies are immune from tort liability while engaging in a governmental function, except activities that fall within one of the narrowly drawn exceptions. See M.C.L. § 691.1407; M.S.A. 3.996(107); Ross v. Consumers Power Co. (On Rehearing), 420 Mich. 567, 618, 363 N.W.2d 641 (1984). This case involves the highway exception. See M.C.L. § 691.1402(1); M.S.A. § 3.996(102)(1). 3
Defendant Wayne County argues that it cannot be liable under the highway exception for failing to install school warning signs because a school crossing is not a danger to vehicles and the vehicle passengers. We agree. The plaintiffs' action does not fall within the highway exception because a school does not present a special danger to vehicles. The highway exception abrogates governmental immunity at "points of special danger to motorists...." Grof v. Michigan, 126 Mich.App. 427, 434, 337 N.W.2d 345 (1983); Comerica v. Transportation Dep't, 168 Mich.App. 84, 86, 424 N.W.2d 2 (1987). 4 The plaintiffs' argument that prior decisions abrogate governmental immunity for all "traffic control devices," which include signs, reads those decisions far too expansively. The cases cited by the plaintiff involve signs warning vehicular traffic as opposed to pedestrians.
The highway exception specifically excepts the state and counties from liability for defects in crosswalks, the defect alleged by the plaintiff: "[t]he duty of the state and county road commissions to repair and maintain highways, and the liability therefor, shall extend only to the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel and shall not include sidewalks, crosswalks, or any other installation outside of the improved portion...." 5 That limiting sentence definitively excludes from the exception specific installations whose only rational purposes narrowly service the unique needs of pedestrians. 6 As we explained in Roy v. Dep't of Transportation, 428 Mich. 330, 336, 408 N.W.2d 783 (1987), "the exclusion of sidewalks, crosswalks, and other installations from the duty of maintenance and repair, reflects a [legislative] conclusion that pedestrians and users of these installations have been sufficiently protected by the separation of them from motorists, without any need to impose a duty of maintenance and repair enforced by liability for resultant injuries." The fact that liability under the statute does not extend to those using the excluded installations may seem harsh. However, the phrase "designed for vehicular travel" can only be reasonably interpreted to mean "intended for vehicular travel." The explicit removal of exclusively pedestrian installations from the highway exception, coupled with the express language of the provision itself, permits but one conclusion: Pedestrians who trek upon Michigan highways must and do venture beyond the protective mandates of M.C.L. § 691.1402(1); M.S.A. § 3.996(102)(1). 7
The exclusion of crosswalks from the highway exception is consistent with the idea underlying the highway exception--that drivers of vehicles should be able to keep their minds on the traffic, and should not have to worry that dangerous surprises lie ahead. Pedestrians are situated differently than vehicular traffic, which may approach obstacles in the highway too quickly to avoid them, or may avoid obstacles only by jeopardizing traffic in the adjoining lanes.
This legislative line drawing is also explicable on the ground that expanding the right to sue past a certain point does not prevent accidents, and amounts to nothing more than an expanded obligation to pay. 8 The Legislature may well have concluded that governmental liability for injuries to pedestrians crossing the street will not enhance vehicular safety.
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and hold that the trial court erred when it denied the defendant's motion to dismiss on the basis of governmental immunity. The case is remanded to the trial court with instructions to grant the defendant's motion for summary disposition on the ground of governmental immunity.
ROBERT P. GRIFFIN, RILEY and BRICKLEY, concur.
I agree with the conclusion that the trial court should have granted the defendant's motion for summary disposition on the ground of governmental immunity because "[t]he highway exception specifically excepts the state and counties from liability for defects in crosswalks, the defect alleged by the plaintiff...." Op. p. 793 (opinion of Boyle, J.). I write separately to distance myself from the dicta contained in my sister's opinion: "The highway exception abrogates governmental immunity at 'points of special danger to motorists....' " Id., p. 793 (citations omitted). The instant case can be decided on the basis of the highway exception's specific exclusion of crosswalks.
The question presented is whether Wayne County is subject to liability for failure to post school warning signs. I would hold that it is.
The highway exception to the governmental tort liability act 1 provides that a governmental agency shall be subject to liability for failure to keep a highway under its jurisdiction "in reasonable repair, and in condition reasonably safe and fit for travel...."
The majority states that the "highway exception abrogates governmental immunity at 'points of special danger to motorists'...." 2 For reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in Chaney v. Dep't of Transportation, 3 the county is obliged to post signs necessary to keep the road "in condition reasonably safe and fit for travel." Joslyn v. Detroit, 74 Mich. 458, 460, 42 N.W. 50 (1889); McEvoy v. Sault Ste. Marie, 136 Mich. 172, 176, 98 N.W. 1006 (1904); Kowalczyk v. Bailey, 379 Mich. 568, 153 N.W.2d 660 (1967); Tuttle v. Dep't of State Hwys., 397 Mich. 44, 243 N.W.2d 244 (1976); Salvati v. Dep't of State Hwys., 415 Mich. 708, 330 N.W.2d 64 (1982); Mullins v. Wayne Cty., 16 Mich.App. 365, 168 N.W.2d 246 (1969).
The obligation to keep the road "in condition reasonably safe and fit for travel" extends not only to motorists and their passengers, but also to pedestrian travelers, and, indeed, to others injured as a result of the failure of a governmental agency to discharge its duty...
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