Neal v. St. Louis County Board of Police Commissioners
| Decision Date | 12 April 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 99-2938,99-2938 |
| Citation | 217 F.3d 955 |
| Parties | (8th Cir. 2000) JENNIFER NEAL, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF DECEASED WILLIE NEAL, JR.; JENNIFER NEAL, ON HER OWN BEHALF, APPELLANTS, WILLIE NEAL, SR.; JAMELAH NEAL; WHITNEY NEAL, BY THEIR NEXT FRIEND NFR JENNIFER NEAL, PLAINTIFFS, v. ST. LOUIS COUNTY BOARD OF POLICE COMMISSIONERS; ST. LOUIS COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT; RONALD BATTELLE, CHIEF OF ST. LOUIS COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT; ROBERT FLAGG, CHAIRMAN; GENE WARMANN, VICE CHAIRMAN; PATRICK PWARDOWSKI, SECRETARY; SHEILA HOFFMEISTER, MEMBER; LEON BURKE, MEMBER, COMPRISING THE ST. LOUIS COUNTY BOARD OF POLICE COMMISSIONERS; CARL PETERSON, APPELLEES. Submitted: |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri.
Before Wollman, Chief Judge, Magill, Circuit Judge, and Frank,* District Judge.
This appeal requires us to decide whether a police officer violates the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of substantive due process by accidently shooting another officer while attempting to protect the other officer from an armed suspect. We answer no, and hold that in such circumstances only a purpose to cause harm to the threatened officer will satisfy the element of conscience-shocking conduct necessary for a due process violation.
On January 29, 1997, Officer Willie Neal asked Officer Carleton Peterson to accompany him on an undercover operation that Neal had arranged for later that day. Peterson agreed to assist Neal, subject to the approval of Peterson's supervisor, Sergeant Bill Hines. After learning of the planned operation, Sergeant Hines asked Neal if he wanted additional backup officers to participate in the operation. Neal, the senior officer involved in the operation, refused the offer of additional backup.
Later that afternoon, Neal and Peterson drove to Mac's Package Liquor Store (Mac's), located at 5956 Natural Bridge Road in Saint Louis. Neal parked his car perpendicular to and facing the west wall of the building. Within minutes of arriving at Mac's, a person later identified as Jerome Baker approached the car from the passenger side and looked in the window at Peterson. Baker then walked around the car and headed towards Neal. Neal exited the vehicle and approached Baker. Baker shook Neal's hand and engaged Neal in conversation. As Baker and Neal talked, they walked to the southwest corner of Mac's building.
After observing Baker and Neal talk for a few moments, Peterson saw Neal raise his left hand in what he recognized as a sign of trouble. Peterson also realized that he could no longer see Baker, although Neal had never left his sight. Peterson got out of the undercover car and slowly moved to where he could see the southwest corner of the building. When he looked around the building's corner, he was surprised to see Baker pointing a pistol directly at Neal's head, jabbing the weapon in a hostile and threatening manner, and forcing Neal to lower himself to the ground.
Peterson announced he was a police officer and ordered Baker to drop his gun. Upon hearing Peterson's announcement, Baker whirled around and immediately started firing at Peterson. Peterson returned two shots at Baker in an attempt to defend himself and Neal. Baker continued to fire, forcing Peterson to dodge to his left. Baker fled the scene before Peterson had the opportunity to fire any additional shots at the armed suspect.
Peterson noticed Neal was injured and assisted him back into the vehicle. Peterson then requested nearby witnesses to inform the police that Neal had been shot during the gunfight. When Emergency Medical Services personnel arrived at the scene, they examined Neal and declared him dead at 4:02 p.m. The Saint Louis Medical Examiner determined that Neal died due to a single bullet wound which entered the left side of his chest, traveled through both of his lungs and through his right arm. It was later determined that Peterson fired the bullet which struck and killed Neal. At the time of the shootout, Peterson did not realize that he had shot Neal. Moreover, he did not believe that Neal would be endangered by the shots he fired at Baker as Neal was lying on the ground.
On January 30, 1998, Neal's surviving family members initiated suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Peterson violated Neal's Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights by not following departmental procedures during the undercover operation. Plaintiffs also named the County of Saint Louis, the Chief of the Saint Louis County Police Department, and Members of the Saint Louis County Board of Police Commissioners as defendants in this case, arguing that these defendants failed to train and supervise Peterson in the proper procedures for undercover operations, or otherwise maintained policies or customs which contributed to the accidental shooting of Neal.
The district court 1 dismissed plaintiffs' claims against Officer Peterson, finding that plaintiffs' allegation that Peterson acted with "deliberate indifference" towards Officer Neal did not state a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim. Rather, given the circumstances of this case, the district court held that only a purpose to cause harm unrelated to the legitimate objective of making an arrest will satisfy the element of arbitrary conduct that shocks the conscience. The district court also dismissed plaintiffs' claims against Saint Louis County, the Chief of Police, and the police board members, finding that these defendants could not be held liable because Officer Peterson did not violate Officer Neal's constitutional rights. For reasons to be discussed, we affirm.
Appellants first argue that the district court erred in holding an allegation of "deliberate indifference" or "recklessness" is insufficient to state a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim based on an officer's accidental shooting of a fellow officer during a shootout with an armed suspect. We reject appellants' argument.
The Supreme Court has recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment's provision that "[n]o state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law," U.S. Const. amend. XIV, 1, "guarantees more than fair process," Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719 (1997), and covers a substantive sphere as well, "barring certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them," Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986). The allegation in this case amounts to such a claim. Plaintiffs essentially allege that Peterson's actions in causing Neal's death were an abuse of executive power so clearly unjustified as to be barred by the Fourteenth Amendment. Whether Peterson's actions were such an abuse of power turns on whether Peterson's actions towards Neal shocks the conscience in such a way as to violate the rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 118 S. Ct. 1708, 1716-21 (1998).
In situations where a state actor is afforded a reasonable opportunity to deliberate various alternatives prior to electing a course of action, the chosen action will be deemed "conscience shocking" if the action was taken with "deliberate indifference." See Lewis, 118 S. Ct. at 1719. However, in rapidly evolving, fluid, and dangerous situations which preclude the luxury of calm and reflective deliberation, a state actor's action will shock the conscience only if the actor intended to cause harm. See id. at 1720. In the latter situations, as a practical matter, state actors do not have time to engage in actual deliberation. Thus,...
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