Perez v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.
Citation | 520 N.E.2d 198,35 Ohio St.3d 215 |
Decision Date | 09 March 1988 |
Docket Number | SCRIPPS-HOWARD,No. 87-34,87-34 |
Parties | , 15 Media L. Rep. 1318 PEREZ, Appellee, v.BROADCASTING COMPANY et al., Appellants. |
Court | United States State Supreme Court of Ohio |
Syllabus by the Court
1. The inquiry into actual malice in a public-official defamation case should focus on the publisher's attitude toward the truth rather than upon the publisher's attitude toward the plaintiff.
2. In a public-official defamation case, summary judgment is properly granted for the defendant where no genuine issue of fact exists on the question of whether the publication was made with a high degree of awareness of its falsity.
The appellee, Robert Perez, filed a libel action against appellant Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Company, which owns and operates television station WEWS, Channel 5 in Cleveland, Ohio, and appellant William Younkin, a reporter for the station. The complaint arose from a series of televised, investigative reports which plaintiff claimed represented that Perez, then a captain in the Stark County Sheriff's Department, seized illegal narcotics, resold them on the streets and solicited a drug dealer to sell drugs for him.
In the summer of 1980, a heated political campaign for the office of Stark County Sheriff pitted George Papadopulos, the incumbent, against Robert Berens, a deputy. Deputy Sheriff Sam Sainer, who was apparently campaigning for Berens, told Younkin that he could introduce him to people who might establish a link between the sheriff's department and the sale of illegal drugs. Sainer had been a reliable source of information in the past. A meeting was arranged between Younkin, Sainer and several individuals.
As a result of the meeting and other investigations, WEWS broadcast the following report on September 25, 1980, during the 11:00 p.m. edition of the news:
After the broadcast, Sheriff Papadopulos appointed five deputies to investigate Ferren's allegations. Subsequently, the sheriff's department issued a press release stating that the board of inquiry had cleared Perez and that the department considered the case closed. On October 17, 1980, WEWS reported the board's determination:
After extensive discovery, appellants filed a motion for summary judgment, supporting the motion with an affidavit by Younkin which detailed his investigation of Ferren and of Ferren's charges. Younkin described his futile efforts to contact Perez and other departmental officers for a response to Ferren's statements. Younkin professed his belief in Ferren's credibility and claimed that the charges concerning Perez were fairly and accurately reported.
Perez countered by affidavit, stating that as a member of a special unit to eliminate drug trafficking in Stark County, he had talked to Ed Ferren about drug sources in Columbus and Michigan. Perez decided that Ferren could not be helpful as an informant and the discussion between the two was not followed by further action. Perez did not deny the specific statements made by Ferren on the WEWS broadcast. Instead, Perez attached Ferren's deposition to his affidavit, saying: "a casual examination of this deposition shows it [the interview] was not only done with reckless disregard but with actual malice."
In the deposition, Ferren said he talked to Perez three times. During the first two meetings, Perez asked Ferren to work as an undercover agent. However, at the third meeting, Perez did not mention working undercover. Ferren told Younkin about the earlier solicitations to work as an undercover agent. That part of his story was omitted from the broadcasts. Nor were all portions of the taped interview put on the air. In addition, Younkin rehearsed Ferren two or three times before taping, asked him to re-phrase some statements, told him to make his charges stronger, and offered to pay his fees in the event legal problems arose from the broadcast.
The trial court granted summary judgment, holding that Perez was a public official and that a jury, acting reasonably, could not find actual malice with convincing clarity.
The court of appeals reversed and remanded, finding a genuine dispute as to five material facts:
The cause is before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.
Harry W. Schmuck and James P. Adlon, Canton, for appellee.
Baker & Hostetler, Louis A. Colombo and Charles E. Jarrett, Cleveland, for appellants.
This case calls upon us to decide whether summary judgment was properly entered against the plaintiff in a public-official defamation case. For the reasons which follow, we find that it was.
The law of defamation has been given much attention by the federal courts and by this court. Rather than repetitiously plough old ground, we think it sufficient to sketch the law which serves as the foundation on which this case must be decided.
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964), 376 U.S. 254, 279-280, 84 S.Ct. 710, 726, 11 L.Ed.2d 686, "prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice'--that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." The proof of actual malice must be clear and convincing. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. (1974), 418 U.S. 323, 342, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 3008, 41 L.Ed.2d 789. In making that...
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