Neasman v. City of Boston

• Decision Date: 19 May 2022
• Docket Number: 21-P-317
• Parties: SHERRI NEASMAN v. CITY OF BOSTON [1]
• Court: Appeals Court of Massachusetts

SHERRI NEASMAN v. CITY OF BOSTON ^[1]

No. 21-P-317

Appeals Court of Massachusetts

May 19, 2022

Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass.App.Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass.App.Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass.App.Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

In November 2019, the plaintiff, Sherri Neasman, filed a complaint, pursuant to G. L. c. 151B, against the defendant the city of Boston, alleging racial discrimination. The plaintiff claims that in 2014 she was denied a promotion due to her race when the defendant named an unqualified white woman as principal of the Murphy School instead of her. Following a hearing on the defendant's motion to dismiss pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974), a judge of the Superior Court allowed the motion finding that the plaintiff's claims were barred by the statute of limitations.^[2] We affirm.

Discussion.

We review the allowance of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6) de novo. See Curtis v. Herb Chambers 1-95, Inc., 458 Mass. 674, 676 (2011). In so doing, we must treat the facts asserted in the complaint as true, drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor, "look[ing] beyond the conclusory allegations in the complaint[, ] and focus[ing] on whether the factual allegations plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief." Id., citing Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 636 (2008).

A motion to dismiss under rule 12(b)(6) "lies against a complaint which shows on its face that the statute of limitations has run prior to the date the action was commenced." Babco Indus., Inc. v. New England Merchants Nat'1 Bank, 6 Mass.App.Ct. 929, 929 (1978) . In this case, the plaintiff filed her complaint after the applicable statute of limitations had expired. Thus dismissal of her complaint under rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate.

The statute of limitations begins to run when a plaintiff knows or reasonably should have known that he or she has been harmed by the defendant's conduct. See Silvestris v. Tantasqua Regional Sch. Dist., 446 Mass. 756, 766 (2006). Here, the plaintiff argues that since she became aware that she had been a victim of racial discrimination only after receiving documentary evidence on December 2, 2016, that the woman appointed as principal was not properly certified, her complaint was timely filed. However, the plaintiff specifically identified information in her complaint that was known to her beginning in 2014 for a reasonable person to have known he or she was discriminated against, the latest being in February 2016 when she complained to the superintendent about the conduct that gave rise to this lawsuit. The complaint, therefore, shows that the plaintiff was aware, as early as 2014 and in any event at least as of February 2016, of the defendant's conduct enough to request damages for her alleged injuries and to start the clock for the statute of limitations. See Riley v. Presnell, 409 Mass. 239, 246 (1991) ("Accrual of the cause of action occurs when the ordinary reasonable person who had been subject to the experience would have discovered that the injury was caused by that experience").

Even though the plaintiff alleges that it was not until December 2, 2016 that she found out that she was a victim of racial discrimination, merely claiming that she was unaware of the discrimination until that date, is a conclusory statement that does little to further the plaintiff's argument. See Iannacchino, 451 Mass. at 636. While it was not until December 2, 2016 that she had documentary evidence of discrimination, it is clear from her complaint that she was aware of the discrimination at an...