Nebraska State Bd. of Agriculture v. Nebraska State Racing Com'n

Decision Date03 January 1992
Docket NumberNo. 89-809,89-809
Citation478 N.W.2d 270,239 Neb. 762
PartiesNEBRASKA STATE BOARD OF AGRICULTURE, Appellee, v. NEBRASKA STATE RACING COMMISSION, Appellant.
CourtNebraska Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court

1. Declaratory Judgments: Judicial Construction: Statutes. A declaratory judgment action, pursuant to Neb.Rev.Stat. §§ 25-21,149 et seq. (Reissue 1989), is an appropriate method to obtain judicial construction of a statute.

2. Declaratory Judgments: Statutes. A declaratory judgment action to construe a statute presents a question of law.

3. Declaratory Judgments: Appeal and Error. In an appeal from a declaratory judgment, the appellate court, regarding questions of law, has an obligation to reach its conclusion independent of the conclusion reached by the trial court.

4. Statutes. When statutory language is plain and unambiguous, no judicial interpretation is needed to ascertain the statute's meaning, so that, in the absence of a statutory indication to the contrary, words in a statute will be given their ordinary meaning.

5. Statutes. An expressed object of a statute's operation excludes the statute's operation on all other objects unmentioned by the statute.

Robert M. Spire, Atty. Gen., and L. Jay Bartel, Lincoln, for appellant.

Hal Bauer, of Bauer, Galter & O'Brien, Lincoln, for appellee.

Kim M. Robak, of Rembolt Ludtke Parker & Berger, Lincoln, for amicus curiae Platte County Agr. Soc.

HASTINGS, C.J., and BOSLAUGH, WHITE, CAPORALE, SHANAHAN, GRANT, and FAHRNBRUCH, JJ.

SHANAHAN, Justice.

The Nebraska State Racing Commission (Racing Commission) appeals from a declaratory judgment granted by the district court for Lancaster County in favor of the Nebraska State Board of Agriculture (Board), namely, the judicial determination that the Board's racetrack at the State Fairgrounds in Lincoln had a "total annual parimutuel handle" of less than $12 million in 1987 and, therefore, was a "recipient track" entitled to receive money from the Track Distribution Fund under Neb.Rev.Stat. §§ 2-1208.03 and 2-1208.04 (Reissue 1987). To reach the foregoing conclusion, the district court construed the phrase "total annual parimutuel handle" to exclude any wagers accepted on simulcast races for the purposes of § 2-1208.03(5), which states: "Recipient track shall mean a racetrack with a total annual parimutuel handle, based on the previous racing year, of twelve million dollars or less." We reverse the district court's judgment.

This case involves interaction of two legislative programs, separately enacted to strengthen the "racing, breeding, and parimutuel wagering industry" in Nebraska. See, Neb.Rev.Stat. §§ 2-1224 through 2-1227 (Reissue 1987); §§ 2-1208.03 and 2-1208.04. The first of these programs is the Track Distribution Fund, by which revenue, based on a racetrack's total annual parimutuel handle, is distributed from larger racetracks to smaller racetracks. See §§ 2-1208.03 and 2-1208.04. The second program is a 1987 law authorizing "experimental" intrastate telecasting of horseraces, or "simulcasting," which permits Nebraska racetracks to accept wagers on races taking place at other locations, but which are broadcast by television to an authorized site where wagers are accepted on the televised race. See §§ 2-1224 et seq.

The question to be resolved is how wagers on simulcast races are involved in computing the total annual parimutuel handle for purposes of the Track Distribution Fund. The Racing Commission contends that wagers on simulcast races are part of the total annual parimutuel handle of the track where the wagers are accepted. The Board insists that the total amount wagered on simulcast races should be assigned to the total annual parimutuel handle of the track where the races are run and which is the origin of the racing telecast. The outcome of this case and a potential $200,000 distribution to the Board from the Track Distribution Fund depend on the definition of "total annual parimutuel handle," which is included in the legislation under examination, but which phraseology is undefined by Nebraska statutes.

TRACK DISTRIBUTION FUND

In 1986, the Legislature established the Track Distribution Fund, codified at §§ 2-1208.03 and 2-1208.04, for the purpose of subsidizing smaller Nebraska racetracks at the expense of the state's larger and more successful tracks. Money for the Track Distribution Fund is supplied by the tracks themselves, which are required to withhold a small percentage of their gross daily receipts from so-called "exotic wagers," such as the daily double, exacta, trifecta, pick six, and others. Each month, the racetracks pay the withheld funds to the Racing Commission, which maintains the Track Distribution Fund. Annual collections for the fund are subsequently distributed to qualifying tracks during the following year based on the formula provided in § 2-1208.04(2). To qualify for distributions from the Track Distribution Fund, a racetrack must be a recipient track under § 2-1208.03(5), previously set forth in this opinion.

INTRASTATE SIMULCASTING

In 1987, the Legislature authorized simulcasting of horseracing in Nebraska on an experimental basis. Simulcasting is a procedure under which a racetrack is permitted to accept wagers on races which are simultaneously televised from other Nebraska racetracks, or, as expressed in § 2-1225(6): "Simulcast shall mean the telecast of live audio and visual signals conducted in the state for the purpose of parimutuel wagering." The Board's Lincoln track is a "simulcast facility," that is, "a facility within the state which is authorized to display simulcasts for parimutuel wagering purposes...." See § 2-1225(7).

Section 2-1227 provides in pertinent part:

(4) Any simulcast between a sending track and receiving track ... shall result in the combination of all wagers placed at the receiving track with the wagers placed at the sending track so as to produce common parimutuel betting pools for the calculation of odds and the determination of payouts from such pools, which payout shall be the same for all winning tickets, irrespective of whether the wager is placed at a sending track or receiving track.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The salient facts are either stipulated or undisputed.

In August 1987, the Board entered into a simulcast agreement with the Platte County Agricultural Society, which operated the racetrack at Columbus, Nebraska. Under this agreement, the Board, at its Lincoln racetrack, accepted bets on races simulcast from Columbus. Also, the agreement provided that the Board's track and the Columbus track would equally share expenses incurred and revenue generated by the simulcast races. During the 7 days of simulcasting in 1987, the Board accepted $508,553 in wagers at its Lincoln track on simulcast races run at Columbus. During the entire year of 1987, the Board's racetrack in Lincoln accepted a total of $12,034,795 in wagers, which included $11,526,242 bet on races run at the Board's Lincoln track and the $508,553 bet at the Lincoln track on races simulcast from Columbus.

In February 1988, the Board claimed that it was entitled to money from the Track Distribution Fund, since its total annual parimutuel handle for 1987 was $11,526,242, based on $12,034,777 (sic) in total wagers placed at the Board's Lincoln track during 1987 less $508,535 (sic) bet on simulcast races from Columbus. The Racing Commission rejected the Board's claim and refused to make a distribution to the Board from the Track Distribution Fund.

On August 8, 1988, the Board filed a declaratory judgment action in the district court for Lancaster County, seeking judicial declaration that the Board was a recipient track under § 2-1208.03(5), and requested that the Racing Commission be ordered to distribute to the Board the appropriate amount from the Track Distribution Fund.

DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION

The district court concluded that "the simulcast handle resulting from the simulcast participation by [the Board] and Columbus during the year 1987, should be treated as part of the handle at the sending track (Columbus) during the year 1987." In other words, the district court excluded from the Board's handle all wagers placed at the Board's Lincoln track on races simulcast from Columbus. On that basis, the district court decided that the Board's Lincoln track was "a recipient track for the year 1987 pursuant to Neb.Rev.Stat. § 2-1208.03," since the total annual parimutuel handle of the Board's Lincoln track was less than $12 million, and then ordered the Racing Commission "to distribute to [the Board] from the Track Distribution Fund an amount pursuant to Neb.Rev.Stat. § 2-1208.04, for the year 1987."

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

In its appeal, the Racing Commission contends that the district court erred by excluding from the Board's total annual parimutuel handle for 1987 all wagers placed at the Board's Lincoln track on simulcast races from the Columbus track.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A declaratory judgment action, pursuant to Neb.Rev.Stat. §§ 25-21,149 et seq. (Reissue 1989), is an appropriate method to obtain judicial construction of a statute. See, State ex rel. Spire v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 233 Neb. 262, 445 N.W.2d 284 (1989); Mullendore v. School Dist. No. 1, 223 Neb. 28, 388 N.W.2d 93 (1986). "A declaratory judgment action to construe a statute presents a question of law." Pump & Pantry, Inc. v. City of Grand Island, 233 Neb. 191, 194, 444 N.W.2d 312, 315 (1989). "In an appeal from a declaratory judgment, the appellate court, regarding questions of law, has an obligation to reach its conclusion independent from the conclusion reached by the trial court." State ex rel. Spire, supra 233 Neb. at 265, 445 N.W.2d at 287. See, also, County of York v. Johnson, 230 Neb. 403, 432 N.W.2d 215 (1988); Cornhusker Christian Ch. Home v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 227 Neb. 94, 416 N.W.2d 551 (1987); Boisen v. Petersen Flying Serv., 222 Neb. 239, 383 N.W.2d 29 (1986).

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