Needles v. Kelley

• Decision Date: 06 February 1968
• Docket Number: No. 52744,52744
• Citation: 261 Iowa 815,156 N.W.2d 276
• Parties: Gene L. NEEDLES, Commissioner of Public Safety of the State of Iowa, Department of Public Safety, State of Iowa, John Mahnke and Drivers License Division, Appellants, v. Ed. J. KELLEY, Judge, Appellee.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 276

156 N.W.2d 276

261 Iowa 815

Gene L. NEEDLES, Commissioner of Public Safety of the State of Iowa, Department of Public Safety, State of Iowa, John Mahnke and Drivers License Division, Appellants, v. Ed. J. KELLEY, Judge, Appellee.

No. 52744.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Feb. 6, 1968.

Richard C. Turner, Atty. Gen., and Joseph W. Zeller, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellants.

William D. Guthrie, Webster City, for appellee.

BECKER, Justice.

On August 31, 1966 the Commissioner of Public Safety suspended the driver's license of Wayne Francis Kern effective September 30, 1966. Mr. Kern appealed. After trial on appeal defendant Ed J. Kelley, Judge of the Hamilton County District Court, vacated the suspension. Upon proper application writ of certiorari issued from this court ordering defendant judge to make return thereto. The pleadings, exhibits and decision of the district court were duly filed here. Petitioner alleges the trial court's action in vacating suspension of the driver's license was illegal and void. We are asked to annul trial court's order. Under the evidence and the applicable law we hold the writ should be quashed.

The trial court does not formally appear here. The real controversy is between the department of public safety and Mr. Kern, hereafter referred to as defendant, who was involved in a fatal accident on a paved county road about 7:00 P.M. July 31, 1966. The department records contained a hearing officer's report although both parties agree no hearing was actually held. This report contained information that patrolman Sturges advised the subject was very cooperative, the accident was uncalled for had subject been taking his time instead of being in a hurry, they (apparently the participants) were lucky not to have more than one person killed and the sheriff felt the accident was a result of negligence. The hearing officer concluded the violation was serious and recommended suspension of license.

The records include certificates showing two previous convictions for speeding: sixty-five miles per hour in a fifty mile zone in Albert Lea, Minnesota, in February 1962 and seventy-seven miles per hour in a seventy mile zone in September 1963. The record also showed an August 17, 1966 conviction for improper passing. This charge involved the July 31st violation for which the license was suspended.

These documents, together with copies of notice of suspension, and notice that suspension was lifted pending appeal, constituted the essential part of the department's transcript.

Defendant perfected his appeal in form of a petition filed in the district court stating he appealed the action of the department. The commissioner filed answer and transcript of the records upon which the suspension was predicated.

The transcript was the only evidence produced by the department. Mr. Kern's evidence consisted of his own testimony concerning the accident. He told of proceeding with his three children as passengers along White Fox Road at about sixty miles per hour. He overtook a car going in the same direction at about the same speed. There was a yellow line prohibiting passing. He was beyond this yellow line before he attempted to pass. There was a dip in the road ahead. A car was down in that dip. Mr. Kern did not see it. He said, 'I would like to think I did (look). I know that I looked ahead through the--how you can look through another car that is in front of you, you can look right through, I thought I did.' As he got into the left hand side of the road, Kern looked ahead but did not see the oncoming car until he was alongside the car he was passing. He tried to get on by but failed. He sideswiped the oncoming car (later identified as the Schwandt car) as he turned back to the right.

The driver testified the Schwandt car was six to seven hundred feet ahead when he first saw it. At the point of passing the road was 20 feet wide with no shoulders. Defendant did not think he could have slowed down and dropped back behind the car ahead and he could not take the shoulder.

The Schwandt car had six people in it. A 19 month old baby was thrown clear of that car and died as a result of injuries.

Defendant's appeal petition charged the commissioner acted illegally because there was no hearing on the suspension, the suspension was ex parte and arbitrary, a 'serious violation' did not in fact occur, and the effective date was not set by an authorized person. In a brief order the court sustained plaintiff's position on all four grounds and vacated the suspension.

I. This application for writ of certiorari, directed against the district court of Hamilton County, alleges defendant judge acted illegally. We determine the scope of the trial court's function before passing on the

validity of its acts. The pertinent statutes are Code, 1966, section 321.210: 'Authority to suspend; point system. The department is hereby authorized to suspend the license of an operator or chauffeur without preliminary hearing upon a showing by its records or other sufficient evidence that the licensee: * * *

'7. Has committed a serious violation of the motor vehicle laws of this state.'

Section 321.211 provides for procedures for hearing by the department: 'Notice and hearing. Upon suspending the license of any person as hereinbefore authorized the department shall immediately notify the licensee in writing and upon his request shall afford him an opportunity for a hearing before the commissioner or his duly authorized agent as early as practical within not to exceed twenty days after receipt of such request in the county wherein the licensee resides unless the department and the licensee agree that such hearing may be held in some other county. Upon such hearing the commissioner or his duly authorized agent may administer oaths and may issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses and the procedures of relevant books and papers and may require a reexamination of the licensee. Upon such hearing the department shall either rescind its order of suspension or, good cause appearing therefor, may extend the suspension of such license or revoke such license.'

Section 321.215 provides: 'Appeal. Any person denied a license or whose license has been canceled, suspended, or revoked by the department except where such cancellation or revocation is mandatory under the provisions of this chapter shall have the right to file a petition within thirty days thereafter for a hearing in the matter in a court of record in the county wherein such person shall reside and such court is hereby vested with jurisdiction and it shall be its duty to set the matter for hearing upon thirty days written notice to the commissioner, and thereupon the court shall hear and determine the matter as an original proceeding upon a transcript of all the proceedings before the commissioner, and upon additional evidence and other pleadings as the court may require. He decision of the court shall be final.'

Danner v. Hass, 257 Iowa 654, 134 N.W.2d 534, determined the constitutionality of the statutes in question. We recognized the appeal to the district court is to be tried as an original proceeding. The aggrieved party is given an opportunity to try his case fully, except that the administrative record, (at least in the absence of objection as to hearsay or other proper objection) is admissible in evidence before the district court. See Richard v. Holliday, Iowa, 153 N.W.2d 473.

In Danner v. Hass, supra, we also said: 'We do not imply that the court may overrule the factual determinations of the administrative officer or board. In the original proceeding provided for by the statute, the court's function is to determine the legality of the administrative proceedings, and whether there is substantial material and competent evidence to support the findings of fact therein made. It may not substitute its judgment on the facts for that of the administrative body.' The commissioner relies strongly on this dictum and argues: '* * * the court erred in substituting its own judgment to overrule the factual determination of the Department of Public Safety as to whether there was a 'serious violation'. This was illegal. The only question to be decided by the Court is whether there is 'substantial, material and competent evidence' before the Department which would support its findings of fact as to a 'serious violation'.'

The driver's prosition is: 'We urge seriously that if this Dictum is the law, then the legislative provision of Section 321.215 has been rendered meaningless. This rule would restrict the 'appeal' to the function of certiorari. This rule would render meaningless the provision that additional evidence could be heard by the court and that the appeal should be heard as an 'original proceeding', and that the 'decision of the court shall be final.' Further, such rule would effectively prevent the accused under Section 210 from any more review than is available under Section 209.'

Our most recent opinion on the nature of appeal from department action to the district court under section 321.210 is Richard v. Holliday, Iowa, 153 N.W.2d 473. In that unanimous opinion we also said: 'The essential issues raised by the petition filed under section 321.215, supra, and heard by defendant were whether the order of suspension was arbitrary and without sufficient foundation and the claimed unconstitutionality of section 321.210, subd. 7, asserted basis for the order.' This was said in connection with consideration of the transcript of proceedings before the department. The nature of the appeal was not raised nor was it considered. Our designation of the essential issues was understandable in view of what had been asserted in Danner v. Hass. In view of the failure to reargue we did not reexamine the point. Defendant driver's argument here requires reexamination.

This problem has confronted many courts. The statutory language varies from state to state but substantially...