NegrÓn–santiago v. San Cristobal Hosp.

• Decision Date: 16 February 2011
• Docket Number: Civil Nos. 10–1287 (JAF), 10–1289 (JAF).
• Citation: 764 F.Supp.2d 366
• Parties: José Antonio NEGRÓN–SANTIAGO, et al., Plaintiffs,v.SAN CRISTOBAL HOSPITAL, et al., Defendants.José Antonio Negrón–Santiago, et al., Plaintiffs,v.Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

764 F.Supp.2d 366

José Antonio NEGRÓN–SANTIAGO, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.SAN CRISTOBAL HOSPITAL, et al., Defendants.José Antonio Negrón–Santiago, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority, et al., Defendants.

Civil Nos. 10–1287 (JAF), 10–1289 (JAF).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

Feb. 16, 2011.

Juan Ramon Rodriguez–Lopez, Rodriguez Lopez Law Office, Ponce, PR, for Plaintiffs.Jorge Martinez–Luciano, M.L. & R.E. Law Firm, Luis O. Soto–Colon, De Corral & De Mier, Harry Anduze–Montano, Jose A. Morales–Boscio, Harry Anduze Montano Law Office, Angel A. Valencia–Aponte, San Juan, PR, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

JOSÉ ANTONIO FUSTÉ, Chief Judge.

Plaintiffs, José Antonio Negrón–Santiago, Carmen Iris Matos–Torres, and their conjugal partnership; Marta Elisa Molina–Matos; María del Carmen Negrón–Matos; and Keila Alvarez–Nieves, a minor represented by her parents, Héctor Alvarez–Fernández and Iris Nieves–Ruiz, bring this consolidated action arising from the death of José A. Negrón–Matos against Defendants, San Cristóbal Hospital (“SCH”), Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (“PREPA”), Unión de Trabajadores de la Industria Eléctrica y Riego (“UTIER”), and various unnamed persons. (Case No. 10–1287, Docket No. 1; Case No. 10–1289, Docket No. 7.) Plaintiffs assert claims against SCH, as well as unknown doctors and insurers under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”), P.L. 104–91; the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (“EMTALA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd; and supplemental claims under Puerto Rico tort law. (Case No. 10–1287, Docket No. 1.) Against PREPA, UTIER, and unknown insurers, Plaintiffs bring claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e–17; HIPAA; the “whistleblower act;” ¹ the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (“OSHA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 651– 678; 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of the First, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments; and supplemental claims under Puerto Rico law. (Case No. 10–1289, Docket No. 7). SCH moves to dismiss the complaint (Case No. 10–1287, Docket No. 4), and Plaintiffs oppose (Case No. 10–1287, Docket No. 5). UTIER and PREPA move to dismiss (Case No. 10–1289, Docket Nos. 13 (UTIER); 16 (PREPA)) and Plaintiffs oppose (Case No. 10–1289, Docket No. 38). Following our order consolidating these two cases (Case No. 10–1287, Docket No. 22), UTIER and PREPA replied to Plaintiffs' opposition. (Docket Nos. 23 (PREPA); 24 (UTIER).)

I.Factual and Procedural Summary

We draw the following factual summary from Plaintiffs' complaints (Case No. 10–1287, Docket No. 1; Case No. 10–1289, Docket No. 7). In ruling on a motion to dismiss, we assume all of Plaintiff's allegations to be true and make all reasonable inferences in its favor. See Gagliardi v. Sullivan, 513 F.3d 301, 305 (1st Cir.2008). José A. Negrón–Matos worked for the “Technical Brigade” of PREPA's office in Juana Díaz. On December 5, 2007, a coworker threw a 4?x4? wooden board at Negrón–Matos' head, causing a laceration. Following this injury, Negrón–Matos returned to the Juana Díaz office and then went to PREPA's infirmary facility in Ponce. Later that afternoon, Negrón–Matos went to SCH's emergency room, where he received twelve stitches to his head and was released. On January 2, 2008, Negrón–Matos again went to SCH's emergency room, complaining of a headache and liquid leaking from his ears. SCH put Negrón–Matos under observation and released him that same day. Negrón–Matos' condition worsened, and on the morning of February 5, 2008, he was found dead by his parents.

After Negrón–Matos' death, his father, Plaintiff Negrón–Santiago, learned of the injury caused by Negrón–Matos' coworker on December 5, 2007. Negrón–Santiago requested that PREPA and UTIER conduct investigations of Negrón–Matos' injury. No investigations took place. Furthermore, Plaintiffs have not received the insurance benefits owed to them by UTIER as next-of-kin to Negrón–Matos. Plaintiff Negrón–Santiago filed various administrative complaints before federal and Commonwealth agencies. In the wake of these complaints, Negrón–Santiago was randomly drug tested by PREPA three times within a year. Plaintiffs also make a murky allegation of retaliation based on tampering with Negrón–Santiago's electric meter.

Plaintiffs first filed suit in this district in February 2009 before Judge Acosta, alleging the same causes of action against the Defendants here plus the deceased's coworkers and the Fondo del Seguro del Estado. (Case No. 09–1109, Docket No. 1.) Following SCH's motion to dismiss (Case No. 09–1109, Docket No. 5), Plaintiffs sought and were granted voluntary dismissal of all claims against SCH. (Case No. 09–1109; Docket No. 10.) Negrón–Matos' coworkers prevailed in their motion to dismiss the claims against them. (Case No. 09–1109, Docket No. 27.) On September 2, 2009, Judge Acosta granted Plaintiffs' motion to voluntarily dismiss claims against the remaining parties. (Case No. 09–1109, Docket No. 61.)

On April 7, 2010, Plaintiffs filed two separate actions before us. The first, Case No. 10–1287, arises from medical care provided by SCH to Negrón–Matos; Plaintiffs claim damages for violations of EMTALA, HIPAA, and Puerto Rico's tort laws by SCH and unknown doctors and insurers. The second suit, Case No. 10–1289, presents a litany of allegations against PREPA, UTIER, and unknown defendants. Claims in that case include violations of HIPAA, OSHA, half of the Bill of Rights, Puerto Rico tort law, and “retaliation and violations to the whistleblower act and other criminal, civil, and labor laws.” (Case No. 10–1289, Docket No. 7.)

In its motion to dismiss, SCH argues that: (1) HIPAA provides no private right of action; (2) Plaintiffs' EMTALA claim is time-barred; and (3) Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim under EMTALA. (Case No. 10–1287, Docket No. 4.) SCH also moves for attorney's fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1927. ( Id.) Plaintiffs respond by arguing that they have properly pleaded a claim under EMTALA and that equitable tolling preserves that claim. (Civil No. 10–1287, Docket No. 5.)

UTIER moves to dismiss based on Plaintiffs' failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (Case No. 10–1289, Docket No. 13.) PREPA also argues that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim and, in addition, argues that the case should be dismissed for failure to join a party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19. (Case No. 10–1289, Docket No. 16.)

II.Dismissal Under Rule 12(b)(6)

A defendant may move to dismiss an action against him, based solely on the complaint, for the plaintiff's “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). In assessing this motion, we “accept[ ] all well-pleaded facts as true, and we draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the [plaintiff].” Wash. Legal Found. v. Mass. Bar Found., 993 F.2d 962, 971 (1st Cir.1993).

The complaint must demonstrate “a plausible entitlement to relief” by alleging facts that directly or inferentially support each material element of some legal claim. Gagliardi v. Sullivan, 513 F.3d 301, 305 (1st Cir.2008) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). “Specific facts are not necessary; the statement need only give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559, 127 S.Ct. 1955). An “unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation” will not suffice to demonstrate a plausible entitlement to relief. See Sanchez v. Pereira–Castillo, 590 F.3d 31, 37 (1st Cir.2009) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ––– U.S. ––––, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)).

III.Analysis

A. Claims Under HIPAA and OSHA

Plaintiffs assert claims under HIPAA against all parties and claims under OSHA against PREPA and UTIER. HIPAA creates no private right of action. See Miller v. Nichols, 586 F.3d 53, 59–60 (1st Cir.2009). Thus, Plaintiffs' claims for damages under HIPAA fail.

Likewise, OSHA confers no private right of action and so these claims also fail. See Pedraza v. Shell Oil, Co., 942 F.2d 48, 52 (1st Cir.1991) (citing Pratico v. Portland Terminal Co., 783 F.2d 255, 266 (1st Cir.1985)).

B. Whistleblower Protection Act

Plaintiffs claim that UTIER and PREPA violated an unspecified Whistleblower Protection Act. UTIER has not addressed this claim and PREPA mentions the Whistleblower Protection Act as part of its discussion of retaliation under Title VII, failing to explain how Plaintiffs have not stated a claim under the Whistleblower Protection Act.

To the extent Plaintiffs claim a violation of 5 U.S.C. § 2302 we order dismissal sua sponte. See Gonzalez–Gonzalez v. United States, 257 F.3d 31, 36–37 (1st Cir.2001) (holding that sua-sponte dismissals will be upheld where “the allegations contained in the complaint, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff are patently meritless and beyond all hope of redemption.”) The Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, by its terms, applies only to federal employees. See generally 5 U.S.C. § 2103 (defining “employee,” as later used in § 2302, to be one who is employed in the federal civil service). We see no manner in which employees of a Commonwealth-affiliated utility company could be classified as federal employees for purposes of the Whistleblower Protection Act. Therefore, we find any claims under the Whistleblower Protection Act to be patently meritless. We consider claims under Puerto Rico's Whistleblower Protection Act in part III.F., infra.

C. EMTALA Claims Against SCH and Unknown Parties

Plaintiffs claim that the care SCH and its physicians provided to Negrón–Santiago violated EMTALA. SCH argues that Plaintiffs' EMTALA claims are time-barred because this suit...