O'Neil v. Neronha
| Decision Date | 15 March 2022 |
| Docket Number | C.A. No. 19-612 WES |
| Parties | Michael P. O'NEIL; Nicola Grasso, Plaintiffs, v. Peter F. NERONHA., in his capacity as Attorney General; James M. Manni, in his capacity as Superintendent of the Rhode Island State Police, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island |
Alan Alexander Beck, Pro Hac Vice, Low Office of Alan Beck, San Diego, CA, Stephen D. Stamboulieh, Pro Hac Vice, Stamboulieh Law, PLLC, Olive Branch, MS, Frank R. Saccoccio, Saccoccio Law Office, Johnston, RI, for Plaintiffs.
Jonathan Whitney, Pro Hac Vice, Katherine Connolly Sadeck, Andrea M. Shea, Neil F.X. Kelly, Department of Attorney General, Civil Division, Providence, RI, for Defendants Peter F. Neronha, James M. Manni.
Before the Court are Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, ECF Nos. 30, 35, filed by Plaintiffs, Michael O'Neil and Nicola Grasso, and Defendants, Peter Neronha, in his capacity as Attorney General, and James Manni, in his capacity as Superintendent of the Rhode Island State Police. The parties ask the Court to resolve a Second Amendment constitutional challenge to the prohibition against stun guns set forth in R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-47-42(a)(1). For the reasons stated herein, the Court finds that the statute violates the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 30, is GRANTED, and Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 35, is DENIED.
Plaintiffs Michael O'Neil and Nicola Grasso are Rhode Island residents who wish to purchase, own, possess, and carry stun guns for self-defense. Pls.’ Statement of Undisputed Facts ( ) ¶¶ 1, 5, 6, 10, ECF No. 31. These weapons are currently prohibited by Rhode Island by General Law § 11-47-42(a)(1), which provides:
No person shall carry or possess or attempt to use against another any instrument or weapon of the kind commonly known as a blackjack, slingshot, billy, sandclub, sandbag, metal knuckles, slap glove, bludgeon, stun-gun, or the so called "Kung-Fu" weapons.
R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-47-42(a) (emphasis added). On November 22, 2019, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Compl. ¶¶ 82-90, ECF No. 1. Plaintiffs allege that they are entitled to such relief because "Defendants’ laws, customs, practices and policies generally banning the acquisition, possession, carrying and use of Tasers and other electronic arms violates the Second Amendment to the United States constitution, facially and as applied against the Plaintiffs." Id. ¶ 83.
The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment addressing the constitutionality of the stun gun ban set forth in § 11-47-42(a)(1). See generally Pls.’ Mem. in Supp. Mot. Summ. J. ( ), ECF No. 30-1; Defs.’ Mem. in Supp. Mot. Summ. J. and Obj. to Pls.’ Mot. Summ. J. ( ), ECF No. 35-1. In the motions, the parties dispute: (1) the scope of the statute; (2) whether the arms regulated by § 11-47-42(a) are protected by the Second Amendment; (3) the appropriate level of scrutiny; and (4) the application of such scrutiny to the challenged statute. The Court takes each issue in turn.
"Summary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Lima v. City of East Providence, 17 F.4th 202, 206 (1st Cir. 2021) (quoting Audette v. Town of Plymouth, 858 F.3d 13, 19 (1st Cir. 2017) ). "Cross-motions for summary judgment do not alter the summary judgment standard, but instead simply ‘require [the Court] to determine whether either of the parties deserves judgment as a matter of law on the facts that are not disputed.’ " Wells Real Est. Inv. Tr. II v. Chardon/Hato Rey P'ship, S.E., 615 F.3d 45, 51 (1st Cir. 2010) (quoting Adria Int'l Group, Inc. v. Ferré Dev., Inc., 241 F.3d 103, 107 (1st Cir. 2001) ). Where the parties have filed cross-motions " ‘simultaneously, or nearly so, the district court ordinarily should consider the two motions at the same time,’ applying the same standard." Id. (quoting P.R. Am. Ins. Co. v. Rivera-Vásquez, 603 F.3d 125, 133 (1st Cir. 2010) ).
Before turning to the constitutional analysis, the Court must briefly address the parties’ dispute concerning the scope of the prohibition in § 11-47-42(a). In the Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that § 11-47-42(a) bans both Tasers and stun guns because a Taser can be used as a stun gun. Compl. ¶ 58. Plaintiffs also refer to the term "other electronic arms" and specifically request a declaration that the Court finds unconstitutional the "ban on electric arms" in § 11-47-42. Id. at 13, 14, 15.
Defendants contend that such a ruling would extend beyond the language of § 11-47-42(a) because the statute prohibits only "stun guns," not Tasers or other types of electric arms. Defs.’ Mem. 9. According to Defendants, this interpretation of the statute is supported by its plain language, as well as the cannon of construction "expression unius est exclusion alterius" or, in other words, "the expression of one thing is the exclusion of other things." Id. at 7. They argue that it would be improper to extend the reach of the provision to an object not named in the statute but which can be deployed in the same manner. Id. at 7–8. Defendants also point to the definition of "firearms" under § 11-47-2(6) to demonstrate that the prohibition of stun guns in § 11-47-42(a) was not meant to extend to Tasers, which, they contend, the General Assembly intended to regulate as firearms. 1
Id. at 8. Each party argues that an alternative interpretation of the statute leads to absurd results. Defs.’ Mem. 7; Pls.’ Mem. in Supp. Reply and Obj. to Defs.’ Cross-Mot. for Summ. J. ( ) 2, ECF No. 39-1.
When interpreting a statute, the court "give[s] the words of the statute their plain and ordinary meanings." Epic Enters. v. Bard Grp., LLC, 186 A.3d 587, 590 (R.I. 2018) (quoting Alessi v. Bowen Ct. Condo., 44 A.3d 736, 740 (R.I. 2012) ). The "ultimate goal is to give effect to the purpose of the act as intended by the Legislature." Id. at 589-90 (quoting Webster v. Perrotta, 774 A.2d 68, 75 (R.I. 2001) ). To accomplish this task, the Court "looks to the statutory scheme as a whole, and examines the statute in context." Jerome v. Prob. Ct. of Barrington, 922 A.2d 119, 123 (R.I. 2007). " ‘Literal’ interpretations which lead to absurd results are to be avoided." Summit Inv. & Dev. Corp. v. Leroux, 69 F.3d 608, 610 (1st Cir. 1995).
Beginning with the language of the statute, Section 11-47-42 (a) expressly bans possession of "stun guns" in addition to certain other enumerated weapons not at issue here. See § 11-47-42(a). The statute does not further define the term "stun gun" and also does not refer to other types of electric arms.2 See id.
The parties agree that a Taser is more than a stun gun. See Defs.’ Statement of Undisputed Facts ( ) ¶¶ 1, 2, ECF No. 38. A stun gun is a hand-held device, which "produce[s] an arc (spark) from one electrode to another to produce pain when contact is made with a person's flesh."3 Id. ¶ 1. A Taser, on the other hand, is a "multi-function conducted-energy weapon[ ]" which is capable of propelling steel projectiles up to a certain distance, but which also has a secondary feature, known as "drive stun" mode, which allows the weapon to operate as a stun gun. Pls.’ SUF ¶ 16; Defs.’ SUF ¶¶ 2, 6.
Tasers are not included in the enumerated list set forth in § 11-47-42(a), nor are they specifically referenced in any other Rhode Island statute, including those relating to firearms. So while this weapon may fit the definition of firearm under § 11-47-2(6) because it functions as "an instrument from which steel or metal projections are propelled,"4 see § 11-47-2(6), there can be little dispute that a Taser is effectively and operationally a stun gun while in "drive stun" mode. See Defs.’ SUF ¶¶ 2, 6; Pls.’ SUF ¶ 16. As such, Plaintiffs convincingly argue that it would make no logical sense for the General Assembly to ban stun guns, but allow for a firearm to have an integrated stun gun feature which would allow it to avoid the statutory ban. Pls.’ Reply 4; see O'Connell v. Walmsley, 156 A.3d 422, 428 (R.I. 2017) (). Therefore, the Court interprets the prohibition on possession and carriage set forth in § 11-47-42(a) to include both stun guns and Tasers.5
The Second Amendment provides: "[a] well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." U.S. Const. amend. II. In District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592, 628-29, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 171 L.Ed.2d 637 (2008), the Supreme Court rejected as unconstitutional a prohibition against handguns in the home, holding that the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms applies to an individual unconnected to militia service6 ; and, the Court held, "the inherent right of self-defense has been central to the Second Amendment right." Heller, 554 U.S. at 628, 128 S.Ct. 2783.7
The Court in Heller did not examine "the full scope of the Second Amendment" but emphasized that the right "is not unlimited."8 554 U.S. at 626, 128 S.Ct. 2783. More specifically, it instructed that "nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such...
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