O`Neill v. City of Shoreline, 145 Wn. App. 913, 187 P.3d 822
| Decision Date | 28 April 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. 59534-2-I,59534-2-I |
| Citation | 145 Wn. App. 913,187 P.3d 822 |
| Parties | O'NEILL v. CITY OF SHORELINE. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Beth O'Neill et al., Appellants,
v.
The City of Shoreline et al., Respondents.
No. 59534-2-I
COURT OF APPEALS OF
WASHINGTON, DIVISION ONE
July 21, 2008, Filed
NOTICE:
As amended by order of the Court of Appeals September 25, 2008.
Michael G. Brannan (of Law Office of Michael G. Brannan) and Michele L. Earl-Hubbard (of Allied Law Group, LLC), for appellants.
Ramsey E. Ramerman (of Foster Pepper, PLLC) and Ian R. Sievers, City Attorney, and Flannary P. Collins, Assistant, for respondents.
Written by: Judge Cox. Concurred by: Judge Appelwick, Judge Lau.
OPINION
[145 Wn. App. 919] [As amended by order of the Court of Appeals September 25, 2008.]
[187 P.3d 824] ¶1 Cox, J. — This is an action under the Public Records Act (PRA) of the state of Washington. 1 At issue is whether metadata in the electronic version of an e-mail is subject to disclosure under the PRA. 2
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1 We cite to the 2006 version of the PRA that was recodified in chapter 42.56 RCW and became effective on July 1, 2006. We note that portions of the PRA were further amended in 2007. E.g., Laws of 2007, ch. 197, § 1.
2 “Metadata” is not defined in standard English dictionaries. But other sources generally describe the term as “data about data,” or more specifically, “‘information describing the history, tracking, or management of an electronic document.’” Williams v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 230 F.R.D. 640, 646 (D. Kan. 2005) (discussing the evolving state of the law concerning discovery of electronic documents and associated metadata in litigation) (quoting proposed advisory committee note to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(f)).
----------End Footnotes----------
¶2 In November 2006, Beth and Doug O'Neill commenced this action, claiming that the city of Shoreline (City) and its deputy mayor violated the PRA in responding to Ms. O'Neill's multiple requests for public records. They also contend that the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing the case after the show cause hearing, which was held solely on declarations and briefs. They further claim this procedure violated due process. Finally, they contend that the trial court erroneously awarded costs to the City and its deputy mayor, Maggie Fimia. For the reasons that follow, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings.
¶3 The material facts are not substantially in dispute. At a public meeting of the Shoreline City Council on September 18, 2006, Deputy Mayor Maggie Fimia stated that she had received an e-mail that related to a pending zoning [145 Wn. App. 920] matter. According to her, the e-mail stated serious allegations of improper influence by members of the city council over that zoning matter. She said the message came to her from “a Ms. Hettrick and a Ms. O'Neill.” 3
----------Footnotes----------
3 Clerk's Papers Sub 4, at 3 (O'Neill declaration).
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¶4 Ms. O'Neill was present at the public meeting and claims that Deputy Mayor Fimia's remarks “came as a complete shock to [her].” 4 She orally requested “to see that e-mail.” 5 Deputy Mayor Fimia stated that she would be “happy to share” the e-mail with Ms. O'Neill. 6
----------Footnotes----------
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Clerk's Papers at 20 (Fimia declaration).
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[187 P.3d 825] ¶5 Central to the dispute on appeal are actions the deputy mayor took after Ms. O'Neill's request. The deputy mayor deleted the top four lines of the header on the e-mail when she forwarded it from her personal computer to herself. Sometime thereafter, it appears she deleted the e-mail from her personal computer. Whether the editing of the e-mail and the failure to provide the entire e-mail with all metadata violates the PRA are at issue.
¶6 Further communication between Ms. O'Neill and the City (including Deputy Mayor Fimia) occurred the following day and thereafter. O'Neill made six more oral or written requests for records following the oral request at the public meeting on September 18. No one argues that any of the City's responses were untimely. We discuss the details of the requests and the responses later in this opinion.
¶7 Dissatisfied with the City's responses to the requests, the O'Neills commenced this action pursuant to the PRA, simultaneously moving for an order to appear and show cause directed to the City and Deputy Mayor Fimia. At the same time, they also moved for an order requiring the City and its agents, including the deputy mayor, to lodge public records for in camera review and to prepare a detailed record of documents withheld and exemptions claimed. All [145 Wn. App. 921] parties submitted declarations and briefing on the requests for relief.
¶8 The trial court reviewed the briefing, the declarations, and one record submitted for in camera review as exempt from disclosure. 7 In its order, the trial court made several findings, denied the O'Neills' motions, dismissed the action, and awarded costs to the City and the deputy mayor. 8 The trial court also denied the O'Neills' motion for reconsideration.
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7 Id. at 141.
8 Id.
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¶9 They appeal.
PUBLIC RECORDS ACT
¶10 O'Neill argues that the City violated the PRA by, among other things, altering and destroying public records following her request. 9
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9 Id. at 5-6.
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WA(1)[1] ¶11 The PRA was enacted in 1972 by initiative as part of the public disclosure act, formerly chapter 42.17 RCW. 10 The relevant portions were later recodified at chapter 42.56 RCW and renamed the Public Records Act. 11 The PRA states: Each agency, in accordance with published rules, shall make available for public inspection and copying all public records, unless the record falls within the specific exemptions of … this chapter, or other statute which exempts or prohibits disclosure of specific information or records. [12] [145 Wn. App. 922] The supreme court has recognized that the PRA “‘is a strongly worded mandate for broad disclosure of public records.’” 13
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10 Soter v. Cowles Publ'g Co., 162 Wn.2d 716, 730, 174 P.3d 60 (2007).
11 Id.
12 RCW 42.56.070(1).
13 Soter, 162 Wn.2d at 730 (quoting Hearst Corp. v. Hoppe, 90 Wn.2d 123, 127, 580 P.2d 246 (1978)).
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WA(2)[2-5] ¶12 Judicial review of challenged agency actions under the PRA is de novo, and a court may examine the records in camera to determine whether disclosure is proper. 14 In light of the PRA's purpose, we liberally construe its disclosure provisions and narrowly construe its exemptions. 15 In interpreting the PRA, we “shall take into account” the following policy: that free and open examination of public records is in the public interest, even though such examination may cause inconvenience or embarrassment to public officials or others. [16]
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14 RCW 42.56.550(3).
15 Progressive Animal Welfare Soc'y v. Univ. of Wash., 125 Wn.2d 243, 251, 884 P.2d 592 (1994) (PAWS) (citing RCW 42.17.010(11), recodified at RCW 42.56.030).
16 RCW 42.56.550(3).
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[187 P.3d 826] Public Records
WA(6)[6] ¶13 A threshold issue under the PRA is whether the requested documents are public records. 17 O'Neill argues that the e-mail to which Deputy Mayor Fimia referred at the September 18 public meeting of the Shoreline City Council and its associated metadata are public records. The City does not dispute that the e-mail is a public record but argues that the electronic version of the e-mail was properly deleted under its then-existing records retention policy. Deputy Mayor Fimia contends that the electronic version of the e-mail and its metadata are not public records.
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17 See Tiberino v. Spokane County, 103 Wn. App. 680, 687, 13 P.3d 1104 (2000).
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¶14 The PRA specifies that a “public record” is any writing containing information relating to the conduct of government or the performance of any governmental or proprietary [145 Wn. App. 923] function prepared, owned, used, or retained by any state or local agency regardless of physical form or characteristics. [18] A “writing” is defined as handwriting, typewriting, printing, photostating, photographing, and every other means of recording any form of communication or representation, including, but not limited to, letters, words, pictures, sounds, or symbols, or combination thereof, and all papers, maps, magnetic or paper tapes, photographic films and prints, motion picture, film and video recordings, magnetic or punched cards, discs, drums, diskettes, sound recordings, and other documents including existing data compilations from which information may be obtained or translated. [19]
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18 Former RCW 42.17.020(41) (2005) (emphasis added). The 2006 version of the PRA incorporated the definitions from former RCW 42.17.020. See former RCW 42.56.010 (2005). The PRA was amended in 2007, and the identical definition of “public record” now appears in the PRA. See RCW 42.56.010(2). RCW 42.17.020 was also amended in 2007. Those amendments likewise did not change the definition of “public record.” See Laws of 2007, ch. 358, § 1.
19 Former RCW 42.17.020(48) (2005). The 2007 amendments to former RCW 42.17.020 and to former RCW 42.56.010 did not affect the definition of “writing.” See Laws of 2007, ch. 358, § 1; Laws of 2007, ch. 197, § 1.
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WA(7)[7] ¶15 It is undisputed that the City is a “local agency” under the PRA. 20 Moreover, there can be no serious dispute that the e-mail to which Deputy Mayor Fimia referred at the September 18 public meeting is a public record. It is (a) a “writing” that (b) “relat[es] to the conduct of government or the performance of [a] governmental … function” that the deputy mayor (c)...
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