Nelson By and Through Sanders v. Meadows

• Decision Date: 01 March 1996
• Citation: 684 So.2d 145
• Parties: Mike NELSON, By and Through His Mother and Next Friend, Cheryl SANDERS v. Christopher Eugene MEADOWS and the City of Dothan. Patricia HARPER, as Administratrix of the Estate of Jason Spallino v. Christopher Eugene MEADOWS and the City of Dothan. 2941289, 2941290.
• Court: Alabama Court of Civil Appeals

Page 145

684 So.2d 145

Mike NELSON, By and Through His Mother and Next Friend, Cheryl SANDERS v. Christopher Eugene MEADOWS and the City of Dothan.

Patricia HARPER, as Administratrix of the Estate of Jason Spallino v. Christopher Eugene MEADOWS and the City of Dothan.

2941289, 2941290.

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

March 1, 1996.

Rehearing Denied April 19, 1996.

Certiorari Quashed Nov. 15, 1996

Alabama Supreme Court 1951310.

Banks T. Smith of Hall & Smith, Dothan, and William S. Stone of William S. Stone, P.C., Blakely, Georgia, for appellants.

William L. Lee III of Lee & McInish, Dothan, for Christopher Eugene Meadows.

Freddie L. White II, Dothan, for City of Dothan.

ROBERTSON, Presiding Judge.

Mike Nelson, by and through his mother and next friend, Cheryl Sanders, and Patricia Harper, as administratrix of the estate of Jason Spallino, appeal from summary judgments for Christopher Eugene Meadows and the City of Dothan in their negligence actions alleging that Charles Tracy McCord, Christopher Eugene Meadows, and the City of Dothan were liable for injuries Nelson and Spallino sustained in an automobile collision.

In the evening on February 5, 1994, Charles Tracy McCord was driving an automobile north on Ross Clark Circle in Dothan, Alabama. Nelson and Spallino were passengers in McCord's vehicle. When McCord entered the intersection of Ross Clark Circle and Hartford Highway, he attempted to make a left turn west onto Hartford Highway and turned into the path of the vehicle driven by Meadows that was traveling south on Ross Clark Circle. The vehicles collided, resulting in the death of Spallino and serious injuries to Nelson. At the time of the accident, the traffic lights at the intersection were green for traffic traveling north and south on Ross Clark Circle. The light did not have a turn signal, but had a sign stating "left turn yield on green."

Thereafter, Nelson, by and through his mother and next friend, Cheryl Sanders; and Patricia Harper, as administratrix of the estate of Spallino, filed separate complaints in the Houston County Circuit Court against McCord, Meadows, and the City of Dothan. Count one of Nelson's complaint alleged that McCord and Meadows had wantonly or negligently operated their vehicles and had thereby caused Nelson's injuries. Count one of Harper's complaint alleged that McCord and Meadows had wantonly or negligently operated their vehicles and had thereby caused Spallino's death. Count two of each complaint alleged that the City of Dothan had failed to properly design, construct, and maintain the traffic lights at the intersection.

On August 1, 1995, the trial court entered summary judgments for Meadows and the City of Dothan in both actions. Subsequently, the trial court made its judgment final pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala.R.Civ.P. Nelson and Harper appealed. ¹ The Supreme Court transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to § 12-2-7, Ala.Code 1975.

On appeal, Nelson and Harper contend that the summary judgments were not proper as to Meadows because, they say, genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether Meadows's actions were negligent or wanton. Nelson and Harper also contend that the summary judgments were not proper as to the City of Dothan because, they say, genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether the City of Dothan was negligent in designing, constructing, and maintaining the intersection.

A summary judgment is proper when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Rule 56(c)(3), Ala.R.Civ.P. The burden is on the movant to show that there exists no genuine issue of material fact; however, once a party moving for a summary judgment makes a prima facie showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists, then the burden shifts to the nonmovant to rebut the prima facie showing. McClendon v. Mountain Top Indoor Flea Market, Inc., 601 So.2d 957 (Ala.1992).

After the movant has made a prima facie showing that he is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, the opposing party must show by substantial evidence that there is a genuine issue of material fact that would require a resolution by a factfinder. Johnson v. Citizens Bank, 582 So.2d 576 (Ala.Civ.App.1991). Substantial evidence is "evidence of such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved." West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So.2d 870, 871 (Ala.1989).

To prove negligence, a plaintiff must establish four elements: (1) a duty to a foreseeable plaintiff; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) proximate causation; and (4) damage or injury. Crowne Investments, Inc. v. Bryant, 638 So.2d 873 (Ala.1994). A summary judgment is rarely appropriate in a negligence action. Nunnelee v. City of Decatur, 643 So.2d 543 (Ala.1993). See also, Vick v. H.S.I. Management, Inc., 507 So.2d 433 (Ala.1987); Allen v. Mobile Infirmary, 413 So.2d 1051 (Ala.1982); and Folmar v. Montgomery Fair Co., 293 Ala. 686, 309 So.2d 818 (1975).

I. Meadows

Meadows maintains that the summary judgments were proper as they related to him, because, he says, there was no evidence showing that he acted negligently or wantonly. In support of this position, Meadows presented his affidavit, which stated as follows:

"On February 5, 1994, I was proceeding in the right or outside lane of the Ross Clark Traffic Circle. I was not speeding. As I approached the intersection of the Ross Clark Traffic Circle and the Hartford Highway a vehicle driven by Charles Tracy McCord and occupied by Jason Spallino and Mike Nelson turned left in front of the vehicle I was driving. My light was green. I had the right-of-way. I slammed on my brakes and cut to the right. I did nothing to cause the accident."

In opposition to Meadows's motion for summary judgment, Nelson and Harper relied on the deposition testimony of Meadows and Robbie Harrison, a passenger in Meadows's vehicle at the time of the accident. Meadows testified that at the time of the accident, the street was wet and his vehicle was traveling at 50 miles per hour (the posted speed limit). Meadows also testified that he did not slow down as he approached the intersection. Harrison testified that the weather was "misty" and that "the roads were kind of wet." Nelson and Harper argued that, although Meadows was not exceeding the speed limit and had the right-of-way, he could still have acted negligently. Their argument was based on § 32-5A-170, Ala.Code 1975, which provides:

"No person shall drive a vehicle at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions and having regard to the actual and potential hazards then existing. Consistent with the foregoing, every person shall drive at a safe and appropriate speed when approaching and crossing an intersection or railroad grade crossing, when approaching and going around a curve, when approaching a hill crest, when traveling upon any narrow or winding roadway, and when special hazards exist with respect to pedestrians or other traffic or by reason of weather or highway conditions."

(Emphasis added). Specifically, Harper and Nelson argued that a jury should decide the question of negligence because Meadows did not slow down as he approached the intersection and because, they said, he was not traveling at a reasonable speed on the wet streets.

Given the facts of this case, we conclude that the trial court erred by entering the summary judgments as to Meadows. The fact that Meadows was not exceeding the speed limit is not conclusive evidence that he acted in a manner that a jury would consider reasonable and prudent under the conditions present at the time of the accident. § 32-5A-170, Ala.Code 1975. Moreover, our Supreme Court has said that "[w]hether a person involved in an [automobile] accident acted reasonably in operating his motor vehicle depends on all of the circumstances surrounding the accident; the question is ordinarily one for the jury." Senn v. Alabama Gas Corp., 619 So.2d 1320, 1322 (Ala.1993) (holding that a trial court properly denied the defendant's motion for a directed verdict where the defendant was not speeding, but the evidence showed that the streets were wet and that the defendant was towing a utility trailer on a downhill slope). See also, Partridge v. Miller, 553 So.2d 585 (Ala.1989) (holding that a jury question existed as to whether a motorist who was driving within the speed limit was contributorily negligent). Accordingly, the summary judgments are reversed as to Meadows.

II. City of Dothan

Count two of Harper and Nelson's complaints alleged that the City of Dothan ("City") had negligently designed, constructed, and maintained the traffic lights at the intersection where the accident occurred. The City supported its motion for summary judgment with affidavits and deposition...