Nelson v. Colorado, 15–1256.

• Court: United States Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: Justice GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court.
• Citation: 137 S.Ct. 1249,197 L.Ed.2d 611
• Parties: Shannon NELSON, petitioner v. COLORADO. Louis A. Madden, petitioner v. Colorado.
• Docket Number: No. 15–1256.,15–1256.
• Decision Date: 19 April 2017

137 S.Ct. 1249
197 L.Ed.2d 611

Shannon NELSON, petitioner
v.
COLORADO.

Louis A. Madden, petitioner
v.
Colorado.

No. 15–1256.

Supreme Court of the United States

Argued Jan. 9, 2017.
Decided April 19, 2017.

Fred A. Rowley, Jr., Daniel B. Levin, Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP, Los Angeles, CA, Douglas K. Wilson, Ned R. Jaeckle, Office of the State Public Defender, Denver, CO, Stuart Banner, UCLA School of Law, Supreme Court Clinic, Los Angeles, CA, Suzan Trinh Almony, Broomfield, CO, for petitioners.

Cynthia H. Coffman, Attorney General, Glenn E. Roper, Deputy Solicitor General, Frederick R. Yarger, Solicitor General, Office of the Colorado Attorney General, Denver, CO, L. Andrew Cooper, Deputy Attorney General, Christine C. Brady, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Jillian J. Price, Brock J. Swanson, Assistant Attorneys General, Abbie Cziok, Attorney, Attorney General's Fellowship Program, for respondent.

Justice GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court.

When a criminal conviction is invalidated by a reviewing court and no retrial will occur, is the State obliged to refund fees, court costs, and restitution exacted from the defendant upon, and as a consequence of, the conviction? Our answer is yes. Absent conviction of a crime, one is presumed innocent. Under the Colorado law before us in these cases, however, the State retains conviction-related assessments unless and until the prevailing defendant institutes a discrete civil proceeding and proves her innocence by clear and convincing evidence. This scheme, we hold, offends the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due process.

I

A

Two cases are before us for review. Petitioner Shannon Nelson, in 2006, was convicted

137 S.Ct. 1253

by a Colorado jury of five counts—two felonies and three misdemeanors—arising from the alleged sexual and physical abuse of her four children. 362 P.3d 1070, 1071 (Colo.2015) ; App. 25–26. The trial court imposed a prison sentence of 20 years to life and ordered Nelson to pay court costs, fees, and restitution totaling $8,192.50. 362 P.3d, at 1071. On appeal, Nelson's conviction was reversed for trial error. Ibid. On retrial, a new jury acquitted Nelson of all charges. Ibid.

Petitioner Louis Alonzo Madden, in 2005, was convicted by a Colorado jury of attempting to patronize a prostituted child and attempted third-degree sexual assault by force. See 364 P.3d 866, 867 (Colo.2015). The trial court imposed an indeterminate prison sentence and ordered Madden to pay costs, fees, and restitution totaling $4,413.00. Ibid. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed one of Madden's convictions on direct review, and a postconviction court vacated the other. Ibid. The State elected not to appeal or retry the case. Ibid.

Between Nelson's conviction and acquittal, the Colorado Department of Corrections withheld $702.10 from her inmate account, $287.50 of which went to costs and fees¹ and $414.60 to restitution. See 362 P.3d, at 1071, and n. 1. Following Madden's conviction, Madden paid Colorado $1,977.75, $1,220 of which went to costs and fees² and $757.75 to restitution. See 364 P.3d, at 867. The sole legal basis for these assessments was the fact of Nelson's and Madden's convictions.³ Absent those convictions, Colorado would have no legal right to exact and retain petitioners' funds.

Their convictions invalidated, both petitioners moved for return of the amounts Colorado had taken from them. In Nelson's case, the trial court denied the motion outright. 362 P.3d, at 1071. In Madden's case, the postconviction court allowed the refund of costs and fees, but not restitution. 364 P.3d, at 867–868.

The same Colorado Court of Appeals panel heard both cases and concluded that Nelson and Madden were entitled to seek refunds of all they had paid, including amounts allocated to restitution. See People v. Nelson, 369 P.3d 625, 628–629 (2013) ; People v. Madden, ––– P.3d ––––, ––––, 2013 WL 1760869, *1 (Apr. 25, 2013). Costs, fees, and restitution, the court held, must be "tied to a valid conviction," 369 P.3d, at 627–628, absent which a court must "retur[n] the defendant to the status quo ante," – –– P.3d at ––––, 2013 WL 1760869, at *2.

137 S.Ct. 1254

The Colorado Supreme Court reversed in both cases. A court must have statutory authority to issue a refund, that court stated. 362 P.3d, at 1077, 364 P.3d, at 868. Colorado's Compensation for Certain Exonerated Persons statute (Exoneration Act or Act), Colo.Rev.Stat. §§ 13–65–101, 13–65–102, 13–65–103 (2016), passed in 2013, "provides the proper procedure for seeking a refund," the court ruled. 362 P.3d, at 1075, 1077. As no other statute addresses refunds, the court concluded that the Exoneration Act is the "exclusive process for exonerated defendants seeking a refund of costs, fees, and restitution." Id., at 1078.⁴ Because neither Nelson nor Madden had filed a claim under the Act, the court further determined, their trial courts lacked authority to order a refund. Id., at 1075, 1078 ; 364 P.3d, at 867.⁵ There was no due process problem, the court continued, because the Act "provides sufficient process for defendants to seek refunds of costs, fees, and restitution that they paid in connection with their conviction." 362 P.3d, at 1078.

Justice Hood dissented in both cases. Because neither petitioner has been validly convicted, he explained, each must be presumed innocent. Id., at 1079 (Nelson ); 364 P.3d, at 870 (adopting his reasoning from Nelson in Madden ). Due process therefore requires some mechanism "for the return of a defendant's money," Justice Hood maintained, 362 P.3d, at 1080 ; as the Exoneration Act required petitioners to prove their innocence, the Act, he concluded, did not supply the remedy due process demands, id., at 1081. We granted certiorari. 579 U.S. ––––, 137 S.Ct. 30, 195 L.Ed.2d 902 (2016).

B

The Exoneration Act provides a civil claim for relief "to compensate an innocent person who was wrongly convicted." 362 P.3d, at 1075. Recovery under the Act is available only to a defendant who has served all or part of a term of incarceration pursuant to a felony conviction, and whose conviction has been overturned for reasons other than insufficiency of evidence or legal error unrelated to actual innocence. See § 13–65–102. To succeed on an Exoneration Act claim, a petitioner must show, by clear and convincing evidence, her actual innocence of the offense of conviction. §§ 13–65–101(1), 13–65–102(1). A successful petitioner may recoup, in addition to compensation for time served,⁶ "any fine, penalty, court costs, or restitution ... paid ... as a result of his or her wrongful conviction." Id., at 1075 (quoting § 13–65–103(2)(e)(V) ).

137 S.Ct. 1255

Under Colorado's legislation, as just recounted, a defendant must prove her innocence by clear and convincing evidence to obtain the refund of costs, fees, and restitution paid pursuant to an invalid conviction. That scheme, we hold, does not comport with due process. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Supreme Court of Colorado.

II

The familiar procedural due process inspection instructed by Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), governs these cases. Colorado argues that we should instead apply the standard from Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 445, 112 S.Ct. 2572, 120 L.Ed.2d 353 (1992), and inquire whether Nelson and Madden were exposed to a procedure offensive to a fundamental principle of justice. Medina "provide[s] the appropriate framework for assessing the validity of state procedural rules" that "are part of the criminal process." Id., at 443, 112 S.Ct. 2572. Such rules concern, for example, the allocation of burdens of proof and the type of evidence qualifying as admissible.⁷ These cases, in contrast, concern the continuing deprivation of property after a conviction has been reversed or vacated, with no prospect of reprosecution. See Kaley v. United States, 571 U.S. ––––, ––––, n. 4, 134 S.Ct. 1090, 1110 n. 4, 188 L.Ed.2d 46 (2014) (ROBERTS, C.J., dissenting) (explaining the different offices of Mathews and Medina ). Because no further criminal process is implicated, Mathews "provides the relevant inquiry." 571 U.S., at –––– n. 4, 134 S.Ct., at 1110 n. 4.

III

Under the Mathews balancing test, a court evaluates (A) the private interest affected; (B) the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest through the procedures used; and (C) the governmental interest at stake. 424 U.S., at 335, 96 S.Ct. 893. All three considerations weigh decisively against Colorado's scheme.

A

Nelson and Madden have an obvious interest in regaining the money they paid to Colorado. Colorado urges, however, that the funds belong to the State because Nelson's and Madden's convictions were in place when the funds were taken. Tr. of Oral Arg. 29–31. But once those convictions were erased, the presumption of their innocence was restored. See, e.g., Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 585, 108 S.Ct. 1981, 100 L.Ed.2d 575 (1988) (After a "conviction has been reversed, unless and until [the defendant] should be retried, he must be presumed innocent of that charge.").⁸ "[A]xiomatic and elementary,"

137 S.Ct. 1256

the presumption of innocence "lies at the...