People v. Nelson

• Decision Date: 21 December 2015
• Docket Number: Supreme Court Case No. 13SC495
• Citation: 362 P.3d 1070
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner v. Shannon NELSON, Respondent
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

362 P.3d 1070

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner

v.Shannon NELSON, Respondent

Supreme Court Case No. 13SC495

Supreme Court of Colorado.

December 21, 2015

Rehearing Denied February 8, 2016

Attorneys for Petitioner: Cynthia H. Coffman, Attorney General, Christine Brady, Senior Assistant Attorney General, John J. Fuerst III, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado.

Attorneys for Respondent: Law Office of Suzan Trinh Almony, Suzan Trinh Almony, ADC Attorney, Broomfield, Colorado.

En Banc

CHIEF JUSTICE RICE delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 This case requires us to decide whether Respondent Shannon Nelson may receive a refund of costs, fees, and restitution that she paid following a conviction. Nelson's conviction was overturned and she was acquitted after a new trial. We hold that a trial court may not authorize a refund of costs, fees, or restitution following a criminal trial without statutory authority. Because none of the statutes governing the fines, fees, and restitution empowered the trial court to issue a refund, it could not do so. Exonerated defendants may seek a refund of costs, fees, and restitution, but only through a separate civil proceeding, which Nelson did not pursue.

I. Facts and Procedural History

¶ 2 In 2006, Nelson was convicted of five charges relating to sexual assaults allegedly committed against her children. The trial court sentenced Nelson to prison for twenty years to life, and ordered that she pay court costs, fees, and restitution. Specifically, the trial court ordered Nelson to pay the following costs and fees: (1) $125.00 to the victim compensation fund, (2) $162.50 to the victims and witnesses assistance and law enforcement fund (referred to as the "VAST fund" in the Register of Actions and this opinion), (3) $35.00 for court costs, and (4) a "time payment fee" of $25.00. She was also ordered to pay $7,845.00 in restitution, bringing the total owed to $8,192.50.

¶ 3 The court of appeals reversed the judgment against Nelson and remanded for a new trial based on the improper use of an unendorsed expert witness. People v. Shannon Kay Gonser, n/k/a Shannon Nelson, No. 06CA1023, 2009 WL 952492 (Colo.App. Apr. 9, 2009). In the second trial, a new jury acquitted Nelson of the five charges.

¶ 4 Between Nelson's initial conviction and subsequent acquittal, the Department of Corrections withheld $702.10 from her inmate account to pay the costs, fees, and restitution that she owed.¹ Eight months after her acquittal, Nelson filed a motion for a refund of the money she had paid toward the costs, fees, and restitution, arguing that a failure to refund the money would violate state and federal constitutional guarantees of due process. The trial court concluded that it did not have authority to order the Department of Corrections to return the funds. Nelson appealed.

¶ 5 The court of appeals reversed the trial court's decision. People v. Nelson, 2013 COA 58, ¶ 36, ––– P.3d ––––. It held that when a defendant's conviction is overturned on appeal and upon retrial she is acquitted, she is entitled to seek a refund of costs and fees, id. at ¶ 16, as well as a refund of restitution, id. at ¶ 21. The court of appeals concluded that an order for a defendant to pay costs, fees, and restitution must be tied to a valid conviction. Id. at ¶¶ 12–13. It then stated that Nelson's acquittal upon retrial rendered the prior conviction invalid. Id. at ¶¶ 14–16. The court of appeals reasoned that the parties should be "placed in status quo " and Nelson should receive a refund. Id. at ¶ 15 (quoting Toland v. Strohl, 147 Colo. 577, 364 P.2d 588, 593 (1961) ). Finally, the court of appeals determined that the State should issue the refund, because the State's action caused the "wrongful payment of restitution." Nelson, ¶ 29. The court of appeals acknowledged that "the [S]tate may be required to refund monies that it has already disbursed to third parties," id. at ¶ 28, but determined that, by disbursing the funds, the State "assumed the risk that the conviction could ultimately be overturned," id. at ¶ 30.

¶ 6 The People then petitioned this court for certiorari, asking whether the trial court may order a refund of restitution and, if so, which branch of the government should shoulder that burden. We granted certiorari to consider whether a trial court could issue refunds of not only restitution, but also costs and fees, and to determine which branch, if any, should pay the refunds.²

II. Standard of Review

¶ 7 Whether a trial court has authority to order a refund of costs, fees, and restitution presents a question of law, which we review de novo. See People v. Porter, 2015 CO 34, ¶ 8, 348 P.3d 922, 924. This case involves issues of statutory construction, which we also review de novo. Mishkin v. Young, 107 P.3d 393, 396 (Colo.2005).

III. Analysis

¶ 8 We begin with an overview of the statutes governing the costs, fees, and restitution ordered in this case, then proceed to a discussion of whether a trial court may authorize a refund. We hold that a trial court must have statutory authority to order a refund from public funds. A defendant may seek a refund of costs, fees, and restitution through the refund process created by sections 13–65–101 to –103, C.R.S. (2015) ("the Exoneration Act" or "the Act"). A trial court may not, however, order a refund of costs, fees, and restitution as part of a criminal proceeding without statutory authority to do so.

A. Legal Background

¶ 9 Nelson seeks reimbursement of restitution, costs, and fees that she paid after her initial conviction. This raises questions about the interplay between numerous statutes that govern the imposition, collection, management, and distribution of costs, fees, and restitution. See, e.g., §§ 13–32–105, 18–1.3–603, 24–4.2–104(1)(d), 24–4.1–119, C.R.S. (2015). A brief review of the relevant statutes is necessary to explain the relationship between them, and how they affect a court's ability to order a refund.

1. Costs, Fees, and Surcharges

¶ 10 When Nelson was convicted after the first trial, the court ordered her to pay several costs, fees, and surcharges, totaling $347.50. First, Nelson was ordered to pay $125.00 to the crime victim compensation fund. The court orders a defendant to pay this fine when a criminal action results in a conviction or deferred judgment. § 24–4.1–119. These fines go into the crime victim compensation fund housed in each judicial district. Id. ; § 24–4.1–117(1), C.R.S. (2015). Other than a small portion allocated to the fund's administrative costs, money in the fund is to be used "solely for the compensation of victims." § 24–4.1–117(5). Nelson paid this fee.

¶ 11 Next, the court imposed a separate charge for the VAST fund. § 24–4.2–104(1)(d). The court administrator in each judicial district is responsible for the VAST fund in that district. § 24–4.2–104(1)(a)(I). Fees supporting this fund are "levied on each criminal action resulting in a conviction or in a deferred judgment and sentence." §§ 24–4.1–119, 24–4.2–104. Nelson paid $162.50 to the VAST fund.

Nelson was also charged a docket fee of $35.00, which funds the judicial stabilization cash fund and the state commission on judicial performance cash fund. § 13–32–105. Nelson did not pay this docket fee.

¶ 13 Because Nelson was unable to pay the costs, fees, and restitution on the day that she was ordered to pay, she was charged a time payment fee of $25.00. § 16–11–101.6(1), C.R.S. (2015). This fee is charged each year that the amount owed is not fully paid. Id. Time payment fees fund the judicial collection enhancement fund, which is located in the state treasury. § 16–11–101.6(2). The General Assembly makes annual appropriations from the fund to cover "administrative and personnel costs incurred in collecting restitution, fines, costs, fees, and other monetary assessments." Id. Nelson did not pay the time payment fee.

¶ 14 Nelson began paying the fees according to a payment plan because she was not able to pay them when she was convicted. When a defendant pays according to a payment plan, the payments are credited in the following order: (1) crime victim compensation fund; (2) VAST fund; (3) restitution; (4) surcharges related to the address confidentiality program; (5) time payment fee; (6) late fees; and (7) any other fines, fees, or surcharges. § 16–18.5–110, C.R.S. (2015). However, the State pays the cost of criminal cases when a defendant is acquitted or when the court determines that the defendant is unable to pay. § 16–18–101(1), C.R.S. (2015). Because Nelson paid only a portion of what she was originally ordered to pay, the money was credited only to the victim compensation fund, the VAST fund, and toward restitution.

2. Restitution

¶ 15 In addition to these costs and fees, the court ordered Nelson to pay $7,845.00 in restitution to the victims. When a court orders a conviction, it must consider ordering restitution for any victims. § 18–1.3–603. An order of restitution is a "final civil judgment in favor of the state and any victim." § 18–1.3–603(4)(a). Moreover, "any such judgment shall remain in force until the restitution is paid in full." Id.

¶ 16 Restitution becomes "due and payable at the time that the order of conviction is entered." § 16–18.5–104(1), C.R.S. (2015). If no victim suffered pecuniary loss, then the court does not order restitution. § 18–1.3–603(1)(d). The amount of restitution may be increased if the court learns of additional victims or losses. § 18–1.3–603(3). It may also be decreased, either with the consent of the prosecuting attorney and the victims or if the defendant otherwise compensates the victims. Id.

¶ 17 The goal of ordering restitution is partly to rehabilitate defendants and deter criminal activity and partly to make victims whole. § 18–1.3–601(1)(c)–(e), C.R.S. (2015). The restitution program aims to fully compensate victims and to take the profit out of crime. § 18–1.3–601(1)(a)–(d) ; People v. Leonard, 167 P.3d 178, 181 ...